NIEUWE WEST-INDISCHE GIDS

VIJF-EN-VIJFTIGSTE JAARGANG

UITGAVE VAN DE

STICHTING NIEUWE WEST-INDISCHE GIDS
te Utrecht

1981

De uitgave van de 55ste jaargang van de NWIG – welke verschijnt met medewerking van de *Vakgroep Culturele Antropologie der Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht* – werd gesubsidieerd door de *Nederlandse Stichting voor Culturele Samenwerking*.

INHOUD VAN DE VIJF-EN-VIJFTIGSTE JAARGANG

Bilby, Kenneth M., *The Kromanti Dance of the Windward Maroons of Jamaica* (1 afb.) 52-101

Bovenkerk, Frank, *Why returnees generally do not turn out to be 'agents of change': the case of Suriname* 154-173

Parris, Scott V., *Alliance and competition: four case studies of Maroon-European relations* 174-224

Rivière, P.G., *A report on the Trio Indians of Surinam* 1- 38

Römer, R.A., *Labour unions and labour conflict in Curaçao* 138-153

Samson, J.A., *Citruscultuur in Suriname* (5 afb.) ... 109-137

VI

Visman, M.A., *Van slaaf tot plantagehouder. Een aspect van het 18e eeuws plantagewezen op Curaçao* 39- 51

Wagenaar Hummelinck, P., *Chris Engels (1907-1980)* (portret)..... 102-103

Afscheid van Dr. J.H. Westermann (1.VI.1907-10.VI.1981) (portret) 104-107

VIII

NIEUWE WEST-INDISCHE GIDS

onder redactie van

Prof. dr. H. Hoetink, Prof. dr. H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen, Dr. J.H. Westermann, Drs. L.J. Westermann-van der Steen en Dr. P. Wagenaar Hummelinck (eindredacteur).

No 1-2 AUGUSTUS 1981 (p. 1-108)
No 3-4 DECEMBER 1981 (p. 109-224)

B-C

No 1/2
55ste jaargang
augustus 1981

NIEUWE WEST-INDISCHE GIDS

UITGAVE VAN DE
STICHTING NIEUWE WEST-INDISCHE GIDS
te Utrecht
ISSN 0028-9930

NIEUWE WEST-INDISCHE GIDS

onder redactie van
Prof. dr. H. Hoetink, Prof. dr. H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen, Dr. J.H. Westermann, Drs. L.J. Westermann-van der Steen en Dr. P. Wagenaar Hummelinck (eindredacteur).

INHOUD

van het eerste en tweede nummer van de
vijf-en-vijftigste jaargang

P.G. RIVIÈRE
A report on the Trio Indians of Surinam
(6 foto's) 1

M.A. VISMAN
Van slaaf tot plantagehouder. Een aspect van het
18e eeuws plantagewezen op Curaçao 39

KENNETH M. BILBY
The Kromanti Dance of the Windward Maroons of
Jamaica (kaartje) 52

CHRIS ENGELS (1907-1980)
(portret) 102

DR. J.H. WESTERMANN (1.VI.1907-10.V.1981)
(portret) 104

OUDE JAARGANGEN zijn nog vanaf Jrg. 36 als volledige serie aan het redactieadres verkrijgbaar. Daarvoor verschenen jaargangen, alsmede de registers, zijn nog slechts in beperkte mate leverbaar.

Deze aflevering van de N.W.I.G. verschijnt met medewerking van de Vakgroep Culturele Antropologie der Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht.

P.G. RIVIÈRE

KONINKLIJK INSTITUUT
25-9-81
VOOR
TAAL-, LAND- EN VOLKENKUNDE

A REPORT ON THE TRIO INDIANS OF SURINAM

In memory of JAN VAN MAZIJK

This article is an abbreviated version of a report prepared for various departments of the Government of Surinam in February 1979. It is based on fieldwork carried out among the Trio Indians between January and June 1978.[1]

In October 1964 I submitted to the then Government of Surinam a report on the Trio Indians as I found them in 1963-64. This report was subsequently published in amended form in *Nieuwe West-Indische Gids* (Vol. *45*, 1966, pp. 95-120) under the title 'A policy for the Trio Indians'[2]. The present article updates the earlier report by taking account of both its contents and what has happened in the intervening fourteen years. In this way it is possible to assess the accuracy of the earlier predictions and the nature of additional intrusive factors. In particular, the new perspective afforded by time allows for a greater understanding of the internal dynamics of Trio society and culture and their reaction to external influences. While numerous changes have taken place, overall one is struck by how little many of the problems facing the Trio have changed. In many ways the situation closely parallels that of fourteen years ago. Some of the recommendations made in the earlier report have been put into effect (although it is not known whether this was a result of the earlier report), but in other cases nothing has been done and it has been found necessary to repeat the identical suggestions.

The earlier report was divided into two parts. In the first part a general description of the Trio Indians was provided. This included a section on the external influences at work on the Trio, and an examination of Trio society and some of its institutions. The second part contained the recommendations concerning the future treat-

ment of the Trio. A similar layout has been retained here, but the detailed recommendations sent to the Surinam Government in 1979 have been omitted for reasons of space, and only a summary of them is included.

I. External influences affecting the Trio

In 1978 the majority of the Surinam Trio were living in two large settlements; the village of Tepoe on the Upper Tapanahoni River, and that of Kwamalasamoetoe on the Sipaliwini River.

The village of Tepoe was the normal residence of approximately 350 Indians, mainly Trio but with a number of inmarried Waiyana and a group of Akuriyo. Although the Trio and the Akuriyo do not intermarry the latter are becoming increasingly Trio-ised. The village of Tepoe was formed in 1968 by the migration of the Indians who had previously lived at Paloemeu. The reason for this move, the possibility of which was mentioned in the earlier report, was to get away from tourists and workers at the airfield.


The village of Kwamalasamoetoe contains approximately 575 Indians, mainly Trio but also varying numbers of Waiwai, Katwena, Saloema, Tunayena, and others. These small groups are tending to adopt Trio ways, and the common language is Trio. The village of Kwamalasamoetoe was formed by the migration of the population from the old village of Alalaparoe in 1976-77. The reasons for this move are complex and difficult to untangle but there is no doubt that given the physical limitations of the Alalaparoe site the action was the right one. A few Indian families have remained at Alalaparoe. A handful of Trio are living at the Sipaliwini airstrip and there are some others married to Waiyana and living in Waiyana villages. The exact number of Trio and related Indians in Brazil at the moment is not known, but in 1970 the figure was 299.[3]

The demography and distribution of the Trio are discussed in greater detail in II.1.

The external influences at present operating among the Trio will be examined under six headings, although this is an expository device since in practice there is often overlap between the different groups. For the sake of continuity and for the purposes of compari-



1. Mechanisation has come to the Trio. An Indian cuts the the airstrip at Tepoe while two young girls hitch a ride.



2. One of the tasks now undertaken by Indians is the regular daily recording of meteorological information. The houses in the background belong to a mixed group of Katwena and Sikiiyana.

son the first five headings are the same as those used in the earlier report; this number has been increased by the inclusion of a group referred to as 'Employers'.

I.1. BUSH NEGROES

It had been noted earlier that intercourse between the Trio and Bush Negroes was decreasing. It has continued to do so, and at present is at a very low level. For the moment trade with the Bush Negroes is of little importance to the Trio who can obtain manufactured goods by other means. From the Bush Negro point of view the Trio's increasing numeracy and monetary sophistication make the Indians less attractive (i.e., easily defrauded) trading partners. The Trio retain their ambivalent attitude toward the Bush Negro, although they seem less fearful of them and more willing to stand up to them than in the past.

Despite this a surprising number of Trio still claim to have a Bush Negro trading partner. In most cases this partnership is currently dormant, but given the right conditions, such as the disappearance of other sources of money it is quite possible that these partnerships will be reactivated. Dogs, of which the Trio at the moment have a very large number, are still seen as valuable trading items, and the traditional purchasers of them were Bush Negroes.

For the moment Bush Negro influence on the Trio is negligible but this does not rule out the possibility that with changed circumstances it will not regain some of its traditional importance.

I.2. COASTAL PEOPLE OF SURINAM

There is now more contact between the main population of Surinam and the Trio than there was in the past. Much of this increase results from Trio visiting the coast, although there have also been changes in the situation in the interior.

As has been noted the Trio at Paloemeu moved up river in order to get away from non-Indians. In their present village they are almost completely isolated from the contacts they disliked most.

However, many of the younger men are not happy with this isolation, welcome contacts with people from the coast because of the economic advantages entailed, and given the right circumstances would not be unwilling to return to Paloemeu. On the other hand the older men at Tepoe, those who led the move from Paloemeu, claim that they would shift to an even more remote location if unwanted strangers took up permanent residence in or near Tepoe.

Until the Indians from Alalaparoe moved to Kwamalasamoetoe they had virtually no contact, at least in the interior, with people from the coast. This situation changed following the move to Kwamalasamoetoe where men from the coast are employed on the construction and maintenance of the airstrip. Developments there almost exactly parallel those at Paloemeu in the past, with a number of incidents resulting from workers taking Indian women. Such occurrences are rare but they give rise to more problems than in the past since Trio men with their greatly increased self-assurance are now willing to stand up to the outsiders.

There are two further aspects to this situation that deserve mention. The trouble thas has occurred has not been helped by the intransigent position adopted by the LVD administration who insisted that a worker return to Kwamalasamoetoe after the Indians had forced him to leave. An action of this sort shows a quite unnecessary disregard for the Indians' sensibilities, and indicates an unfortunate attitude towards the Indians.

On the other hand those from the coast resident in the interior are not entirely to blame for their affairs with Indian women. Trio woman are well aware of the economic advantages of such liaisons and are not above instigating them.

As agents of change coastal people in the interior are relatively insignificant; their most important role is of demonstrating to the Trio the existence of another culture radically different from that revealed by the missionaries. Some of the younger Indians find this alternative attractive and go out of their way to develop a relationship with people from the coast. The numbers involved are too small to have any effects other than minor ones and some short-term advantages of an economic nature. More significant is the contact gained when Indians visit the coast, almost exclusively Pa-

ramaribo. For one reason or another a large number of Trio have now been down to the coast. They tend to be ambivalent about it. They are curious and they very much want the material things that urban culture has to offer. On the other hand stories abound of cases in which Indians have been swindled out of all their money or had other unpleasant experiences. The majority soon wish to return to their village. A few have gained a superficial sophistication about town life but for most the experience is too meaningless to have any deep influence.

Finally one might note that the attitude of the coastal people towards the Trio tends to be one of benevolent paternalism. The Indian is regarded as a poor, underprivileged, and backward child, who should be an object of charity on condition he behaves himself. The Indians are not totally unaware of this and are capable of playing on it in order to obtain advantages and privileges not readily available to other Surinamese.

I.3. OFFICIAL BODIES

Contact between the Trio and representatives of different Government departments and other official bodies has increased greatly in the last 14 years. The Trio now meet from time to time a wide range of such people including the President, the Prime Minister, Members of Parliament, District Commissioners, civil servants of various ranks, and policemen. The Trio have not yet learnt to distinguish between the respective authority and importance of these people and they tend to attribute similar power to all Government representatives, including the workers on the airstrip.

It is difficult to define precisely the Trio notion of the Government and it is doubtful whether they have any clear conception of it. It is recognised as an agency that has a vital role to play in the Trio's welfare. The Government is the source of much wealth; not only are the Indian officials paid by it but sizeable *ex gratia* handouts in cash and kind flow from it. The Trio attitude to these gifts is that they are owed them by the Government which is in a sort of tribute-paying position. At the same time the Government is seen as unreliable and inconsistent. The Trio complain continually and

on every possible occasion about the failure of the Government to fulfil its promises. Nor do the Trio understand why people from the Government who seem so friendly when visiting a Trio village are not interested in them when they visit Paramaribo, and may not even have time to see them.

It is true that the Government's treatment of the Trio is inconsistent and sporadic, and characterised by an ill-advised paternalism. While in some cases this is the result of opportunism since there is always political capital to be made out of doing something for the Indians, it mainly springs from a wish to do well by the Indians, but not knowing how to set about it and lacking a policy by which to be guided.

I.4. CASUAL VISITORS AND TOURISTS

Relatively few tourists visit Trio villages, but there has been a marked change over the years in the Trio's attitude towards them. Particularly at Tepoe and to a lesser extent at Kwamalasamoetoe, the Trio express a dislike, often bordering on hostility, of tourists. Indeed some Indians would prefer no-one to visit them who was not engaged in some way in benefitting the Trio.

Many Trio now object to being photographed, or will demand money in return for posing. They also take what advantage they can of the tourists by selling them Indian artefacts at very high prices.

It is unlikely that in the foreseeable future tourists will present any serious problem. Their numbers are too few, and given the cost of reaching the Trio villages it is improbable that this number will grow. At the moment most casual visitors are those who accompany a Government official who has business with the Trio. The influence of casual visitors and tourists can be ignored in considering the future of the Trio.

I.5. THE MISSIONS

There are now two missionary organizations working among the Trio. The American West Indies Mission which is mainly concerned with evangelising the Trio has been operating since 1961. In the earlier report attention was drawn to the strong influence that the missionaries had had and were having on the Trio. It was also pointed out that, regardless of one's views about the far-reaching cultural changes brought about by evangelisation, the Trio had benefitted in many ways from the mission's presence.

During the last 14 years the influence among the Trio of the West Indies Mission has undoubtedly waned. There is no single reason for this but among a variety of causes may be listed: changes in mission personnel; the loss by the mission of their medical and educational functions; the loss by the mission of their monopoly on the Trio; a decline in the intensity of religious fervour among the Trio; and increasing familiarity with the outside world on the part of the Trio. However this does not mean that Christian beliefs and practices have weakened, and today they are to be found embedded in all facets of the Indians' everyday life.

The translation into Trio of the New Testament and selected parts of the Old Testament is now complete. The present policy of the West Indies Mission is to build up a self-supporting native church so that the missionaries can be withdrawn, at least to the coast. This aim is to be achieved by concentrating the Bible teaching on suitable Indians, the Church Elders, who will then minister to the rest of the population.

The second missionary organization is the Medische Zending voor Suriname which although church associated and funded is not concerned with evangelising, but as its name indicates with medical work. The mission was begun in 1966 and trained nurses took up residence in the Trio villages. From small beginnings this organization has come to administer most of the medical work in the interior. The programme was initially funded by charities but the whole cost has now been taken over by the Surinam Government. It might be noted that the medical treatment available to the Trio is almost certainly as good if not better than that for any other Indian

group in South America, and certainly better than that obtainable by a very large proportion of the subcontinent's total population, urban and rural.

While the primary aim of the Medische Zending voor Suriname has been to provide health care for the Indians both by keeping trained personnel in the villages and by supplying hospital facilities as necessary, there has also been a policy of training Indians to take over their own medical work (a move strongly recommended in the earlier report). Thus one of the duties of the resident nurses has been and is to train a few Indians as clinic helpers. In order to help with this the mission branched out into education, and appoints school teachers to both villages. Primary education is in the Trio language, and arithmetic and Dutch are also taught. The teacher's task is also to train Indians to take over the teaching duties.

As with the West Indies Mission, the policy of the Medische Zending voor Suriname is toward Trio self-sufficiency. The difficulties faced by the latter organization in achieving this are greater than those faced by the West Indies Mission. All religious affairs are conducted in the native language while it is essential for a competent clinic helper to speak Dutch.

These two missions, because of their permanent and relatively long contact with the Trio and because of the very nature of their aims and activities, have been and are the most influential agents of change. In Part II some of these changes will be described. Whether one approves or disapproves of missionary work, one would have to be either unrealistic or a romantic not to admit that the Trio have benefitted in many ways from the presence of the missions.

The Trio themselves recognise the advantages which they derive from the missions, and distinguish clearly between those resulting from evangelisation, education, and medication. Their attitude to the missionary personnel is favourable although, like anyone else, they prefer some to others. Nurses, because of the nature of their duties combined with Trio ideas about the causation of sickness and death, are most frequently sanctioned in Trio gossip. However it should be noted that is is always the practitioner who is criticised, and not the practice.

I.6. EMPLOYERS

This group overlaps extensively with others since Government de partments, people from the coast, and missionaries all employ Tri labour. In recent years commercial companies have also provide employment. The possibilities for earning money have increase enormously in the last 14 years although in this period the Tri have experienced considerable fluctuation in the availability o work.

The impact on the Trio produced by wage-labour has been great but, as will be seen in Part II, it has not yet resulted in any radical and irreversible changes. The main reason for this is that the demands of the employers have not yet interfered with traditional Trio practices. This appears to be the result of luck rather than good management for most employers are not interested in the Trio except as wage-labourers, and while on the whole they treat them with the best intentions, they have only a shadowy idea of the Indians' own needs.

II. TRIO SOCIETY AND CULTURE

II.1. DEMOGRAPHY AND DISTRIBUTION

An outline description of the location and size of the modern Trio villages was given at the beginning of Part I. Here these topics will be examined in greater detail.

In April 1964 there were approximately 220 Trio Indians at Paloemeu, and 160 at Alalaparoe: a total in Surinam of 380. If one includes the various minority groups living at Kwamalasamoetoe that total today is near the 900 mark. This dramatic increase can be accounted for in two ways. First there has been further migration of Indians from the Brazilian side of the frontier, and second there has been an enormous natural increase in the population. Directly as a result of medical care life expectancy has increased greatly, and a side effect of this is that the death rate has been artificially low during the last decade. There has also been a dramatic drop in the infant mortality rate from somewhere near 60% 14 years ago to

around 10% today — the death of a baby is now an unusual event compared with the past. At the same time it is probable that the birthrate has increased, but the absence of reliable figures for premissionary years makes this only guesswork. Assuming the birthrate has increased it is not possible to know whether this results from an increase in natural fertility, possibly as a result of improved health, or from the decrease in such practices as abortion and infanticide, both of which undoubtedly occurred although with what frequency it is impossible to estimate.[4]

For social purposes it is not all that important whether the higher birthrate and survival rate result from improved health, from a reduction in cases of abortion and infanticide, or from increased fertility, and it is most likely to result from a combination of these factors. What does have social and economic implications is that approximately 50% of the population is under 15 years old, or below reproduction age. While this is a significant indicator of the part played by natural increase in the growth of the Surinam Trio population, it also contains the warning of a potential population explosion when this under-15 age cohort starts reproducing. The medical personnel are already alert to this situation, and are making certain contraceptive devices available to Trio women. This policy has proved successful, and unlike the reluctance of populations in many parts of the world to accept contraception, the Trio have welcomed it. One reason for this is almost certainly their own tradition of family planning and their practice of limiting the number of children.

The increase in life expectancy is also having certain social consequences, especially for the structure of the family. The facts will be noted here, and their implications are discussed in II.4. In the past two-generation families were usual, three-generation rare, and four-generation non-existent. Today the three-generation family is common, there are several cases of four-generation families, and the existence of the occasional five-generation family can be predicted.

As well as the gains in the Surinam population resulting from immigration there have also been some losses through emigration, almost entirely from village of Tepoe. About fifty Trio from there have moved back to Brazil in the last decade. Some of these have

gone to the main area of Trio settlement near the Roman Catholic mission on the Paroe savanna, and the rest have formed a relatively isolated village further to the east.

Alongside these fairly permanent changes in residence there are continual temporary movements with smaller or larger groups travelling between the Surinam villages and backwards and forwards to Brazil. These journeys are undertaken to see relatives, to trade, to look for work, for the fun of travelling, or evade problems at home. These population movements are traditional and to be expected. It is safe to assume that they will continue for as long as the Trio maintain their social organization since such journeys have an important function to play in it.

A less traditional reason, that of wage-labour, accounted for the absence of men from the villages, in particular Tepoe, during the period of research. In all cases these absences were regarded as temporary even where whole families had moved to Paramaribo. These families were seen in Paramaribo and outside. In every case the Indians referred to their ties with the interior and voiced the expectation that they would make regular return trips.

In the earlier report considerable space was given to discussing the viability of the large settlements. This examination was conducted in terms of centrifugal and centripetal forces, i.e., those pressures acting to make the Trio disperse, and those working to maintain the large settlements. The future of Trio society was seen to depend on which of these two forces proved stronger. The present existence of two settlements, even larger than they were 14 years ago, proves that the centripetal force has so far proved stronger. However this is not necessarily a permanent condition since the struggle between the opposing tendencies continues, and there is evidence to suggest that the centrifugal forces are becoming stronger. The nature of the various factors involved will emerge in the following sections. All that need be noted here is that even if the centrifugal forces gain the upper hand only a limited dispersal is likely to occur. The great majority of Indians will not want to lose touch with the existing settlements which will continue to act as medical, educational, commercial, and religious centres. This development has already taken place in Brazil where it appears to work perfectly satisfactorily.

II.2. ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

The basic Trio subsistence economy has remained unchanged. The fundamental reliance on slash-and-burn agriculture, hunting, fishing, and gathering remains, and the diet continues to depend on the exploitation of a very wide range of resources. Some additional crops have been successfully introduced but these are of a supplementary nature, like fruit, rather than staples. The Trio like rice but the chances of getting them to grow it for themselves are slim. Given the extra time and effort required and other disadvantages that rice has, especially when compared with cassava, the Trio are probably right to be hesitant about it. Experiments with domestic animals have been made but have proved a failure (as was anticipated in the earlier report).

The only imported food present in the diet in any quantity, and then still in minute amounts, is rice. There are certain other imported foods on which the Trio are keen, such as tinned fish and tea, and others, such as tinned meat, which they tend to dislike (as might be expected there is great personal variation in likes and dislikes). However foods of this sort are rarely available and play no significant part in the diet.

The Trio have adopted a large range of manufactured goods. In many cases these have replaced traditional items without bringing about any radical changes in practices and techniques. Thus the shotgun has largely replaced the bow and arrow for hunting, although the latter is still an important aid for fishing. A brief review of the more common imported items will be made, and where appropriate their more profound side effects commented upon.

Trio pottery has been totally superseded by manufactured metal pots of all shapes and sizes. Some types of basketwork have suffered the same fate, although those items concerned with the processing of cassava, for which there are no manufactured substitutes, are still made and used. Many men and women still know how to make baskets and pots.

Western clothing has partly replaced traditional dress. In the case of women there has been a complete switch. The traditional, small cloth apron is never worn except by one or two of the very old



3. Outboard motors have brought many changes to the Trio way of life. Here a dugout canoe, much larger than the traditional size, sets out on a journey up the Sipaliwini River.

women, and bead aprons are now curiosity. The very least worn by a woman today is a pair of underpants and a length of cloth wrapped round as a skirt, often supported by elastic. Western style dresses are worn by many. The men still wear the traditional loin clothes; some men rarely wear anything else, while others only wear western clothes. Some Indians have learnt to look after their clothes well and always look clean and neat; in other cases the clothes are unwashed and tatty. Men's clothes are mainly bought readymade, but the women usually make their own from rolls of cloth. There are a number of sewing machines in both villages, and these are used by both men and women. Most Indians wear thong sandals, and some have canvas or leather shoes. Gumboots are also popular.

The use of body paint, especially the oil-based red paint, has declined, and this is clearly a response to the adoption of western dress. Other ornaments and decorations are less used than previously, but large quantities of beads are still often worn. The Trio have become far less conservative in their choice of colours, and they will now include yellow, green and other colours in their beadwork which they would not do formerly. Red has also ceased to be the dominating colour for clothing, and although men's loin clothes are still invariably red, many colours and patterns are found on other clothing.

At the moment one of the most expensive but most sought after objects is an outboard motor. During the first half of 1978 there were 16 of these at Kwamalasamoetoe and 10 at Tepoe, and the number was growing steadily. The outboard motor is used to extend and to make easier traditional activities. For example, the distance from a village that one can travel in a day in order to hunt using an outboard motor far exceeds that which it is possible to cover on foot or in a canoe with paddles. The area over which natural resources can be exploited is greatly increased by the outboard motor. Thus it might appear to be a centripetal force, but in fact it is a neutral element since Indians can just as easily disperse and use the motor in order to exploit the various facilities of the main villages.

There is also a great range of other consumer goods that the Trio now have: transistor radios, tape-recorders, some cameras, soap, toothbrushes, toothpaste, towels, lamps, hair lotions, lipstick, etc.,

etc. It is difficult to see that these things have brought any profound social or economic repercussions. However, there is one item which no Indian owned 14 years ago but is universally possessed today; that is the hammock cover. In passing it might be noted that the Trio still make their own hammocks, although they may use machine-made imported thread rather than their own cotton. The existence of hammock covers has had several interesting side effects. First they provide relative privacy; something very difficult to come by in an Indian village. Second the traditional positioning of the husband's hammock immediately above that of his wife is not feasible with a cover. Thus one of the symbols of marriage has fallen into disuse.

Third, and perhaps most interesting, the hammock cover has brought about a change in the pattern of daily, or at least nightly, life. The marked drop in temperature at night used to mean that few Indians slept undisturbed; there was constant movement as people stoked up their fires, and in the coldest hours before dawn many abandoned their hammocks to sit round the fire. Much of the basketwork was done at this time which was said to be ideal since the material is damp from the night dew and thus more pliable. The view was also expressed that a 'good' Trio would be up early doing such jobs. This pattern of behaviour has now changed completely. People, warm in their hammock covers, are more prone to sleep through the night, and if they wake early are more likely to stay in bed listening to their transistor radios than to get up and make baskets. As mentioned above certain basket objects are essential for the processing of cassava, but the basketwork is now done during the day with the material dampened with water in order to obtain the required pliancy. The notion of the 'good' Trio as an early riser has also waned.

Although individually manufactured objects may not have produced any radical alterations in Trio society and economy, their presence does raise certain questions. In total these goods and external contacts have produced many superficial changes. The Trio look very different today from what they did 14 years ago, and most people will decry the decline of traditional crafts. But the major problem for the Trio is that their new possessions cannot be provi-

sioned from the environment. Outboard motors need petrol: shotguns need cartridges; and transistor radios, tape-recorders, and torches need battries. The Trio are becoming decreasingly self-sufficient and increasingly tied to an external cash economy.

The vital question is how far has their reliance on manufactured goods gone? The answer is not too far for them to be able to resurrect their traditional techniques. The knowledge of old skills is still there even if it is not often put into practice. The Trio see themselves more dependent on manufactured goods than they actually are. The Trio would claim vehemently that metal pots, shotguns and other manufactured objects are now necessities, and this would not be surprising since no one likes to be deprived of things to which they have become accustomed and have to revert to former ways. In fact, at the moment, with their subsistence economy intact, it would still be possible for the Trio to re-adopt their material and technical culture of 14 years ago.

The possession of manufactured goods depends on the Trio having a supply of money. The cash economy of the Trio, perhaps better described as the means by which they obtain money, can be examined separately from the traditional economy. This is because, while objects purchased with cash have been incorporated into the traditional economy, money *per se* has not been. The two economic spheres are to a large extent still autonomous.

Fourteen years ago, money if not unkown to the Trio was little understood by them, and the opportunities for obtaining it very limited. At Alalaparoe casual work for the missionary and the sale of artefacts were the only possibilities. At Paloemeu, as well as these means, there were also a few jobs available working on the airstrip or for the Mines Department. At that time there were also two salaried Government appointed officials.

Today the situation is rather different, and the number and kinds of sources of money have increased greatly. The most general source is employment in various roles by official, semi-official, and private organizations. The availability of work varies, and the Trio have in the past, and will almost certainly in the future, experienced alternating periods of affluence and deprivation. The case of Tepoe illustrates this. In the late 1960s there was a period in which many Indians were able to find employment. This was followed by

some years when there was little work available. Recently this trend has been reversed and there has once again been plenty of work available. No such opportunities for earning money presented themselves at Alalaparoe, but on moving to Kwamalasamoetoe many Indians found work constructing the airstrip there. This provided 15 months employment but on completion of the airstrip the workforce was reduced to an handful of maintenance men.

During periods of work the Indians enjoy considerable affluence. They are paid relatively well (Sf 6-8 a day, compared with Sf 1 a day 14 years ago), and they do not have to spend any of it on subsistence. Accordingly they are much better off than many better paid workers on the coast who are faced with the cost of food and housing. Given these facts it is not difficult to understand how some Trio have saved enough money to buy outboard motors which cost approximately Sf 1,500 delivered at Kwamalasamoetoe.

Other, more casual labour, such as building houses for mission personnel, still occurs. Indians also undertake such minor but routine tasks as recording meteorological data, cutting grass on the airstrip at Tepoe, and minding the electricity generator. For these jobs they receive a small but regular income.

The largest, steady supply of money into the villages comes from the salaries paid by the Government to the Indian officials. The number of posts and the size of the salaries have both increased greatly in the last 14 years. Whereas in 1964 there were just one captain and one lieutenant (both at Paloemeu), today there are 2 Granman, 3 captains, and 18 lieutenants including 4 women. In the past the captain received Sf 360 a year and the lieutenant Sf 100. Today a Granman gets Sf 3,000 a year, a captain Sf 1,800, a male lieutenant Sf 1,200, and a female lieutenant Sf 960. These officials are very well paid for what they do, for with the exception of the women whose job it is to clean the village, their duties are ill-defined to the point of being non-existent. However the salaries do provide a reliable income of around Sf 32,000 a year for the Trio, and many more Indians than just the recipients benefit from the money.

The Government-appointed officials are not the only Trio to receive salaries. The eight Trio clinic helpers, four in each village, get

just over Sf 100 a month each. However, unlike the officials, the clinic helpers earn their money doing a responsible job. The Trio school masters also receive a monthly but much lower salary.

There is still money to be made by the manufacture of traditional artifacts for sale. Enthusiasm for this varies since the Trio have worked out that in terms of time and effort this business gives a very poor return when compared with the rewards obtainable from wage-labour. The sale of articles provides an income for those unable to work, and acts as a stand-by when other sources of cash dry-up.

What influence has the presence of wage labour and the Trio's genuine desire to obtain money had on traditional life? The most obvious concern is how far the Indians' engagement in a cash economy has prevented them from participating in his own subsistence economy. There are a number of points to be made on this subject.

First, many of the objects bought with the cash earned save the Indian time. Manufactured items substitute for traditional articles on which an Indian would have to spend time making. An object such as an outboard motor eases traditional tasks as well as permitting their more rapid completion. Second, within his traditional life a Trio did not spend more than 20 hours a week on average directly engaged in obtaining food. At some times of the year, for example during the cutting and planting of fields, the figure would be higher than that but in other seasons it would be much lower.

In other words the hours engaged in wage labour are not all used at the expense of the time that would normally be devoted to subsistence activities. It is possible for the Trio to practise both economies simultaneously without his subsistence base suffering any serious decline. This does not mean that there is no cause for worry since some additional factors have to be taken into account. The first of these is the location of the work, and the second is the proportion of men involved in it. The contrast between the situation at Kwamalasamoetoe and that at Tepoe in 1978 provides a useful illustration of this point.

At Kwamalasamoetoe the work, the construction of the airstrip

and the building of the schoolteacher's house, was local. Although nearly half the adult men were engaged in these occupations, even during the busy planting season the traditional economy was clearly not under any strain. However, an important additional factor here was that rarely were the Indians working on the airstrip expected to do a full day's work and they were left ample time in which to tackle traditional tasks.

At Tepoe all available work took men away from the village, in some cases for two to three months at a time. At the time of the research approximately half the able-bodied men were away from the village and their absence had placed a burden on the remainder, mainly the young and the old. The village was visited during a not very busy time of year (April-June) and the strains observed tended to be more social than economic. The situation would have been more serious in seasons of intense economic activity.

Most of the other occupations mentioned above can be readily integrated with traditional economic activities. However the potential difficulties attached to involvement with wage labour cannot be ignored. The fulltime employment of a large proportion of the population holds inherent dangers for the traditional subsistence economy. At the moment it is intact, and while it is the Trio will have no trouble in surviving years of economic regression. At present there is no sign that the traditional economy is threatened. One good piece of evidence for this is that money is still one remove from causing any radical changes in social, economic and political relationships. No Trio has yet started paying another Trio to do things for him, and in particular food is not regarded as something for which one gives money to another Trio.

The fact that money is not used internally in Trio society does not mean that it is not employed elsewhere. Most transactions with non-Indians involve cash, and with non-Indians even food is exchanged for money or goods. The Trio are becoming increasingly knowledgeable about money and its worth. Those who live on the coast or visit it often are beginning to understand the nature of an economic system in which everything, even food and shelter, has to be paid for. However, for the majority of Trio an economy involving a complex division of labour in which objects

and services are all tied in a cash nexus is incomprehensible.

There are some exceptions to the claim that the Trio do not use money among themselves. Two cases that were recorded are on a small scale. One concerns the man who has been working on the Paloemeu airstrip for more than 15 years, and he resides there. The Indians who moved there temporarily in order to work obtained on occasions cassava from this man who charged them for it. The other case involves one of the few Trio who has moved more-or-less permanently to the coast. This man took his family with the exception of a teen-age daughter whom he has left with another family, and he pays them to look after her. The family in question has visited North America, and its head is the Trio who best understands the ways of western culture.

A third case is an altogether different matter. In the earlier report it was suggested that some provision be made in the interior for the Trio to spend his money without their having to go to town. This requirement was met by the missionaries who set up and operated stores in both Trio villages. Indian assistants were employed in the running of these stores, but the present policy is to hand them over completely to an Indian storekeeper. This has now happened and in both villages the stores are owned by Indians who, still with some supervision from the mission personnel, run the whole business themselves, including ordering goods from Paramaribo, arranging their transport, fixing prices, and doing the bookkeeping. It is too early to say whether these Indian storekeepers will be successful, and they face many difficulties such as fully appreciating the notion of profit and loss, and being able to withstand the demands from kin for special consideration — a common reason for the failure of such stores in many developing countries. However, if properly managed the potential rewards are very high although these will naturally fluctuate with the general affluence of the Trio. Some idea of this can be given by figures from Kwamalasamoetoe where in a period of affluence the store took Sf 72,000 in 18 months. (During the same 18 months the total cash income of the village was in excess of Sf 100,000.)

The important point to be made here is that the Trio now have among their own number Indians with whom they engage in regu-



4. Both Trio village contain stores which are now managed and run by Indians with some supervision. Not everyone who turns up is there to buy since much of the interest is in seeing what other people buy.

lar cash dealings and who will have to work within the commercial constraints of profit and loss if they are going to succeed. However the impact of this will be diminished since the storekeepers are only acting as brokers for externally derived goods and currency. There is no reason to expect them to extend their newly learnt commercial notions into the sphere of the traditional economy, no more than that they can allow traditional economic ideas and practices to invade the commercial sphere. The two economies, subsistence and cash, are still separate entities, although interconnected by simple links. Accordingly no radical change will take place until the cash economy intrudes into traditional economic relationships[5].

One further, economic-related, change that has taken place in the last 14 years is that the notion of work *per se* has arisen. A word for it (*orokome*) has been adapted from Sranan. This concept is not just applied to the new economic activities (although almost certainly responsible for its occurrence) but is equally used to describe traditional practices which would not have been so distinguished in the past. The idea of work has also been accompanied by that of leisure although this is less well developed and more infrequently referred to. Work is seen as a good thing in its own right and not simply for the rewards it brings. However, one must be hesitant about explaining this as the Puritan work ethic implanted by Gospel teaching. A not dissimilar idea distinguishing energetic from lazy people existed in traditional Trio thought.

II.3. AUTHORITY

No discernible development of any traditional system of maintaining order or settling disputes has occurred. The authority structure of the Trio, as far as it exists, is illsuited for developments that can cope with the present situation. In the earlier report it had been forecast that a new authority structured would emerge round the groups of Church Elders. This has not happened and it now seems unlikely that it will, since the opportunity has passed. As far as it has been possible to reconstruct what happened it seems that a few years ago the Church Elders had managed to gather considerable authority into their hands (with the tacit and not-so-

tacit support of the missionaries). However, recently this power seems to have diminished again. Several reasons for this can be posited. These include changes in mission personnel, greater familiarity with Christianity and experience of other Christians on the part of the Trio, and the fact that the generation now coming to adulthood have lived all their lifes under the missionary regime, do not have the innate understanding of their old beliefs, and thus are less dependent upon and less enthusiastic about Christian beliefs than were and are the original converts. The behaviour of many Church Elders or their close kin has not always been above suspicion, and a number of them, especially at Tepoe, have resigned because of this, or have used it as an excuse to rid themselves of a burden with which they had become disenchanted.

Another factor in all this is the creation of a group of Village Leaders who are meant to have responsibility for secular affairs, leaving spiritual matters to the Church Elders. While a good idea in theory, in practice this separation of secular and spiritual authority has not been successful for a number of reasons. First, in many cases it is difficult to decide what is a secular rather than a spiritual matter. A state of affairs only to be expected in such societies as the Trio where institutions tend to be embedded in one another. Second, this situation is compounded by the fact that there is a high degree of overlap between the Church Elders and the Village Leaders; this is particularly so at Kwamalasamoetoe but less so at Tepoe. This means that a Village Leader will use the opportunities presented to him in church as an Elder to speak on matters that would appear to be purely secular. Nor does it stop a Village Leader who is not a Church Elder from using the same arena to give sermons on what are more clearly spiritual affairs. The church provides a captive audience for both.

Both Village Leaders and Church Elders are chosen by the Indians themselves with the main say going to the existing members of the group and guiding pressure being exerted by non-Indians. The Village Leaders have to have their position confirmed by the Government which then pays them a monthly salary. The details of this have already been given in II.2. In the earlier report it was recommended that the whole system of Government-appointed Officials be discontinued. In fact the opposite has happened and

whereas 14 years ago there were two such officials costing Sf 460 a year, there are now 23 costing over Sf 32,000 a year. The system is working better today because some individuals for whom the other Trio hold respect have been appointed, unlike the original two officials who still hold office and are still regarded as a joke by the other Indians. This is still true of many of the present officials who are not simply unlikely ever to do anything for their money but are in no position to do so since they lack any authority. If the practice of appointing officials in the present numbers is to be defended it can only be on the grounds that it is a covert way of providing the Trio with a steady cash income.

It should also be pointed out that even those officials whose advice and opinions are respected and acted upon are mainly not competent to act as intermediaries between the Trio and outsiders because they do not speak Dutch or Surinamese. There are a number of young Trio men who can speak some Dutch, and it is more than possible that, as has happened elsewhere in the world, their linguistic ability will allow them to gather power which traditionally they would not have had because of their lack of knowledge about Indians ways. This sort of thing is already beginning to happen, and a particularly interesting example arose as a result of the Kwamalasamoetoe Granman's manipulations to have his Dutch-speaking but very young brother's son made a Village Leader.

While such developments as these may bring changes in the future, at present whether an individual be a Church Elder, a Village Leader, both, or neither the respect in which he is held and the authority he has do not derive from the office he holds. The traditional competences for a Trio leader were to be able to lead and to persuade. For the first he had to be able to do things at least as well if not better than anyone else; for the second he had to have 'strong' talk. These are still recognised by the Trio as the important characteristics of a leader, and it is very much on them that the leaders rely today for maintaining orders and settling disputes. However the present size of the settlements greatly weakens the influence of these informal means, and no new methods of mediation or coercion, perhaps backed by sanctions, have appeared. Rather unsuccessful attempts at applying sanctions have been made. These have included the whipping of Indians as punishment for misde-

meanours. (It is not at all certain where the notion of corporal punishment arose since it is not a traditional Trio practice. A possible explanation is that it is an overzealous application of certain Biblical admonitions). Other sanctions have been discussed and tried but no satisfactory ideas have been forthcoming. One reason for this is that the traditional Trio response to conflict or coercion is migration. This is still the normal reaction to such situations even if it is only threatened rather than put into practice. This problem was highlighted at Kwamalasamoetoe as a result of a severe dispute between the two senior Village Leaders, who happen also to be the two senior Church Elders. Without mediation on the part of non-Indians it seems fairly certain that one or other of the two men would have left the village for a longer or shorter time, perhaps with a sizeable group of followers.

In the absence of any new forms of dispute settlement and the presence of the traditional reaction to conflict, the unity of the large settlements remains at risk. This problem will worsen with the withdrawal of mission personnel and the lack of any competent outsider to arbitrate in disputes.

II.4. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Although not all the data collected on this topic have been analysed as yet it is clear that Trio social organization has not undergone any important changes. In fact it has remained remarkably intact while adjusting itself to new conditions that have arisen. Some examples of this can be given.

The large settlements are not simply disorganised agglomerations of houses, but are divided into groups separated by well defined physical and social boundaries. The composition of these groups is almost identical with that which existed in traditional villages. The Trio continue to follow their traditional marriage rules, and the pattern of exchanges of objects and services between different categories of kin and affines remains as it was 14 years ago.

Some further comment on this last aspect is required since some Trio claim that the relationship between affines is changing. It is

said that the conventional avoidance behaviour is no longer observed and that in-laws now talk to one another.[6] Avoidance, it was explained, was part of their bad old way of life. However, observation failed to detect any obvious diminution in the practice, and Trio of all ages, allowing for normal individual variation, still behave in the traditional manner. On the other hand, the Trio consider that the conventional obligations and duties owed between affines should continue. Some people complain that various services are not being fulfilled because the individual owing them was too occupied with wage labour. It is not known whether the present incidence of failing to fulfil obligations is any higher now than in the past when it resulted from other causes, including residence in different villages, but for the moment it is not resulting in any serious unrest except in the odd individual case. Although a number of Indians had received sums of money from affines, usually in order to acquire some specific item, money is not recognised as a substitute for traditional affinal prestations.

In II.1. mention was made of the increasing number of three-, and even four-generation families whose existence results in the main from an increase in life expectancy. One of the side effects of this is that a man's obligations to his parents-in-law last much longer than in the past. Formerly a man who had a mature son-in-law would not normally have a surviving father-in-law, and he would gradually have been able to retire from the more energetic activities, leaving these to his son-in-law. This situation is not so common today, and a man with a mature son-in-law often finds himself with a father-in-law to whom he still owes prestations. Behaviours and expectations have not yet adjusted themselves to this new situation, and it is not possible to predict how they will. However, the new vertically increased extended family would seem to present a good institution through which to accommodate to the demands made on its members' time and energy by both the subsistence economy and wage labour.[7]

Finally, on this topic, it should be stressed that it is the combination of an intact social organization and a fully functioning subsistence economy which has allowed Trio society to maintain its fundamental integrity.

II.5. HEALTH

It would be superfluous to make any detailed observations on the state of Trio health since this has been carefully monitored for over a decade and detailed information on it is available.[8] It will suffice to say that the general level of Trio health is good, that they receive excellent medical attention, and that all those concerned in bringing this state of affairs about deserve congratulations for what they have achieved.

However, some comments on Trio ideas relating to the causation of sickness and death need to be made in order to warn of certain problems that may arise in the future. This is a complex subject and since it can only be dealt with briefly here some oversimplification is necessary.


Traditionally the Trio did not just become sick or die. Sickness and death were the result of the maleficent activities of some agent, either human or spiritual, or both acting in coordination. For example, accidental death resulting from a tree falling on someone required for a proper explanation a further agency than the falling tree. The Trio perfectly well understand that if a tree falls on someone it is likely to kill him, but there are further questions: why did the tree fall, just then and on that particular person? The answer was to be found in some malevolent agent, human or spiritual.

The same sort of explanation was given in cases of sickness. Sickness was not simply a matter of the body as a physical entity, but a phenomenon that was equally symptomatic of social problems. In other words, for the Trio the individual's being consisted of a network of social relationships, and sickness indicated the malfunctioning of these just as much as of the body. Diagnosis and cure concerned both the physical and social aspects of the individual, and the traditional medical practitioner, the shaman, was involved in restoring both physical wellbeing and social harmony; health depended on both. A vital component in the causation of sickness and death was cursing, the idiom in which disrupted social relationships were expressed.

These notions have not undergone any fundamental changes although they have adapted themselves to the new teaching about the



5. Under missionary guidance, the Trio church has become nearly self-sufficient with services being conducted by Church Elders.



6. A large proportion of the Trio can now read and write in their own language and are becoming familiar with arithmetic. Elementary teaching is carried out by Indian teachers.

spirit world and to western medical practices. The vital influence on the individual's health of the state of his relationships with others is still of paramount importance. The idiom in which this is now commonly expressed is that of people's spiritual integrity, their relationship with God. The sinfulness of others, as much as one's own, can bring about sickness and death. The efficacy of medical treatment is incorporated in this set of ideas, for it is claimed that God withholds the power of medicine if its giver is not a 'proper' Christian. The Trio definition of a Christian is strict, but the assessment of an individual can be made *post facto*, depending on the outcome of a particular event.

This is of some importance to the future of medical work among the Trio. Most of the Medische Zending voor Suriname nurses have been the focus of accusations by Indians. The Trio blame the nurses for the deaths of certain individuals, saying that the medicine had failed to work properly. While unpleasant and disturbing for the nurses such accusations have no further implications because they are directed against outsiders who have a different value system. However, this will not be the case when the medical care is left in the hands of the Trio clinic helpers. These Indians will face grave difficulties when the medicine which they have dispensed has failed to cure. The problem is serious enough to undermine the future possibility of a self-sufficient Trio medical programme. This situation is not helped by the fact that seven out of the eight Trio clinic helpers now being trained are women. Given the nature of Trio society and the position of women in it, this is a mistake. The female clinic helpers, even more than the man, will be the object of great social and psychological pressures.

There is one further problem in the creation of a self-sufficient group of clinic helpers, and this is a linguistic one. The aim is that while the clinic helper will operate within her own society she will be using western medicine and be backed by medical resources from outside. It is difficult to see how, within the foreseeable future, any of the clinic helpers are going to achieve adequate fluency in Dutch to allow them to communicate with non-Indian speakers from the coast.

II.6. EDUCATION

A very large proportion of the Trio are now literate in their own language, being able both to read and write it. A few are able to speak and write a little Dutch and/or Surinamese. A growing number of Trio is also numerate to the extent of being able to do basic arithmetical exercises. Counting, which in the absence of numerals did not exist formerly, is now a natural part of everyday life for many Indians. Given the Trio's increasing and inevitable involvement with money this has proved a particularly useful additional skill.


Another aspect of numeracy has been an increasing understanding of western notions of time. Many Indians have watches and know how to read the time; they have started to adopt a western calendar, and there are signs of an adoption of a chronological framework by which past events can be dated.

The Trio schoolmasters who are being trained are competent to teach reading and writing in their own language, and also elementary artithmetic. However, once again there is the problem about how the Indian teachers are to gain sufficient fluency in Dutch in the near future so as to be able to teach it.

At the moment no adult education is given, but schooling is provided for boys and girls up to approximately 18 years old. School hours are arranged so that they do not interfere with the Indians' normal daily and weekly routine. Holidays are arranged to fit with the interests of all parties. The value of schooling is recognised by many of the Trio, and in particular they appreciate the advantages that are to be derived from knowing arithmetic and being able to speak Dutch and/or Surinamese.

II.7. RELIGION

Almost all the Surinam Trio are nominal Christians although the enthusiasm of the years following conversion has waned and a rather more balanced approach to religious practices is now taken. Less time is spent in church, and many Indians no longer find it necessa-





7-8. The policy of training Indian medical assistants is paying off, and there are now a number of Indians capable of treating with Western medicine a wide range of complaints.

ry to go more than once a week. There has been a decline in praying before embarking on almost any activity, and when prayers are said their duration is much briefer.

All this is particularly true of the younger generation which has grown up in a nominally Christian society. Young people are generally more casual towards Christian beliefs, and fail to appreciate the part Christianity played for their elders vis-à-vis traditional beliefs. For example, aware of but insensible to the central importance of tobacco in communication with the spirit world, many young Trio can see nothing wrong with smoking and do so. A further contributing factor is the Trio's widening knowledge of the outside world where are to be found good and trustworthy people who do not adhere to the strict Christian tenets taught by the missionaries.

Even if there has been some falling away from strict Christian ideals, this does not mean that the Trio are going to or are in a position to revert to their traditional beliefs. To a surprising degree the form and content of the traditional religion has been forgotten (even by the older people) or become blurred through the incorporation of Christian themes. The present religion is an amalgam of old and new ideas which has its own internal dynamic, and the withdrawal of direct missionary contact with the Trio will not halt or reverse this process.

In the spheres of social and economic organization the missionaries have had little influence, and only a temporary one in the political arena. However, Bible teaching has had a profound affect on many facets of Trio life, although it is not always easy to distinguish the changes brought about by the missionaries from those resulting from secular contacts. For example, during the last 14 years, the Trio have become much more selfassured, especially in their dealings with outsiders. Of course this could be explained as the natural adjustment to the vastly increased experience of outsiders which they have had. However, there are too many examples from elsewhere that indicate that it is not a necessary natural response to wider contact. Nor does it explain in the case of the Trio why they are no longer so frightened of the Bush Negroes, people with whom they have interacted for over one hundred years, and more in the past than the present. At least in part, the source of

this new-found self-confidence is attributable to Christian teaching, and to the simple but explicit faith that God will answer the Trio's prayers and protect them.

One final point here, and this is a conservative rather than an innovative aspect, is that all Christian teaching has been done in the Trio's own language. While this approach speeds up the rate of evangelisation, at the same time it leads to a greater distortion of the original message. In the case of the Trio it is also an important contributory factor to the more-or-less total monolingualism that continues to characterise the Trio.[9]

II.8. CONCLUSIONS

Trio society and culture have changed in the last 14 years, but not all that much and in certain crucial ways not at all. There has been a gradual and on the whole successful adaptation to their changed and changing circumstances. The socio-economic structure has remained intact; their health is much improved and demographically they are in a strong position; and the various agencies involved with them are making strenuous attempts to prepare the Indians to understand and be able to partake in the wider Surinam society. There has been a loss of traditional knowledge and practices but not to the point where it represents a threat to the society's autonomy. Given changed conditions techniques and skills not at present practised would be revived. At present and as far as things have gone the Trio case can be regarded as a success story, especially when compared with what has happened in similar situations elsewhere. That this is so is almost entirely due to the efforts of a few dedicated individuals who have spent many years working on their behalf.

However this does not mean that there are not difficulties ahead. There are tensions in Trio society which can best be summarized in terms of the centripetal and centrifugal forces operating there.

At the moment the main elements of the centripetal force, that acting to maintain the large settlements, are the various services available in them; medical, commercial, educational, and spiritual. The potentially strongest centrifugal force, that acting to disperse the large settlements, is the Trio desire for money. If work is avail-

able in or near the villages this force is neutralised, but there is no guarantee that employment will be so located. The strength of this force nearly became evident in 1978 when it looked as though Paloemeu would continue as the main centre of work for the people at Tepoe. If this had happened there is every indication that a proportion of the Tepoe inhabitants would have moved their residence back to Paloemeu.

There are other centrifugal forces at work. In particular can be mentioned the lack of any sound means to regulate disputes and the traditional tendency to move in the face of tension and conflict. There is also a greater awareness on the part of many Trio of the disadvantages of living in large settlements. They complain of the lack of peace and quiet in the large villages, and realise that there tends to be a local scarcity of many essential items from agricultural land to game, and from firewood to house thatch.

It is difficult to predict what the future developments will be but on existing evidence the following forecast seems safe. Both Tepoe and Kwamalasamoetoe are sited on rivers which provide good means of communication, and this asset has been made even more useful by the ownership of outboard motors. This means that the Indians, while maintaining a house in the main village, can more readily have a secondary settlement some distance away. To some extent this has already happened at Tepoe where Indians have houses and have cut fields away from the main village. Observation from the air suggested that something similar had happened at Alalaparoe, it has happened on a larger scale among the Brazilian Trio,[10] and it would be surprising if it did not occur in due course at Kwamalasamoetoe. This pattern of dispersal round a focal village which is a service centre is almost certainly the best way in which the Trio can merge new ways with traditional practices.

Summary of recommendations

— That the status of the Trio Indians as citizens of Surinam, with all the rights and privileges that entails, be confirmed, but that due and appropriate allowance be made for their unique social and cultural tradition together with the right to develop in their own way.

— That the Trio be granted inalienable land rights to an appropriate area of the interior of Surinam.
— That the Medische Zending voor Suriname and the West Indies Mission be encouraged to continue their operations among the Trio. If this is not possible, that a well qualified advisor/coordinator of Indian affairs be appointed whose task it will be to mediate between the Trio and the non-Indian world.
— That no work, development or other schemes be introduced without careful consideration of their aim and likely outcome.
— That the current practice of making gratuitous gifts and excessive promises to the Trio be replaced by more reliable and realistic forms of subsidised assistance.
— That the Government be prepared to introduce legislation to prevent the exploitation of the Trio by wage labour and to ensure the maintenance of their traditional subsistence economy.
— That some provision be made for giving a few Trio a technical training.
— That, beyond these recommendations, as little disruption as possible be allowed to the present path of Trio development.

NOTES

1 The authorities responsible for giving me permission to carry out research among the Trio stipulated that I should report to them on the state and condition of these Indians. The report was in fulfilment of that requirement. Because a number of other official and unofficial bodies and concerned individuals expressed interest in the results of my investigations, and because no terms of confidentiality were imposed on me, the report was circulated fairly widely. At the moment of revising the report for publication (January 1980) I have received no reaction or comeback to it.

I am extremely grateful to the Surinam authorities for giving me permission to do my research, and to the many people, above all personnel of MEDISCHE ZENDING VOOR SURINAME, the MISSIONARY AVIATION FELLOWSHIP, and the WEST INDIES MISSION, for all the help, kindness and hospitality they offered.

The research was funded by the SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL of GREAT BRITAIN under Grant No. HR5344/2.

2 Other recent reports on the Surinam Trio include BOS (1967) and BRANDS *et al.* (1969), and for the Brazilian Trio there is FRIKEL (1971). Accounts of change in other Cariban societies of the Guyanas can be found in ADAMS (1972, 1979), KLOOS (1971), SCHWERIN (1966), and THOMAS (1973).

3 FRIKEL & CORTEZ (1972). This figure was composed of 222 Trio, 64 Kaxuyana, and 13 Ewarhoyana.

4 THOMAS (1973: 74) has concluded that it is the improved infant survival rate rather than changes in female fertility which accounts for the recent rapid growth of the Pemon population.

5 A not dissimilar state-of-affairs is reported from the Karinya (SCHWERIN, 1966: 85-6, & 174).

6 A similar change among the Brazilian Trio is noted by FRIKEL (1971: 83).

7 For changes in the pattern of cooperation within the Barama River Carib family as a result of the introduction of wage-labour see ADAMS (1972: 104-5; & 1979).

8 From 1965 onwards first the Surinam Interior Fellowship and then the Medische Zending voor Suriname issued twice yearly statistics on health and health care among the Trio and Wajana.

9 For accounts of missionary activity and its effects among the Trio in Brazil see CORTEZ (1977) an REWES (1977).

10 For the situation in 1970 see FRIKEL (1971: 43-5). Since then the process of 'decentralisation' has continued (personal communication from FRANCISCO CERQUEIRA currently carrying out fieldwork among the Trio in Brazil).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ADAMS, KATHLEEN J, 1972. *The Barama River Caribs of Guyana restudied: forty years of cultural adaptation and population change.* Unpub. Ph.D. dissertation: Case Western Reserve University.

ADAMS, KATHLEEN J., 1979. Work opportunity and household composition among the Barama River Caribs of Guyana. *Anthrops 74* : 219 - 222.

BOS, G, 1976. *Sociologische notities over de Trio-Indianen*. Mariënburg, Suriname.

BRANDS, A., *et al.*, 1969. *Notities betreffende de sociologie en de landbouw der Bovenlandse Indianen in Suriname*. Algemeen Diakonaal Bureau van de Gereformeerde Kerken: Leusden.

CORTEZ, ROBERTO, 1977. *O 'Diaconato' indígena: articulação étnica no recôncavo do Tumucumaque Brasileiro.* Dissertação de Mestrado: Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro.

FRIKEL, PROTÁSIO, 1971. *Dez anos de aculturação Tiriyó: 1960-70.* Museu Paraense Emílio Goeldi, Publicações avulsas 16: Belém-Pará.

FRIKEL, PROTÁSIO & CORTEZ, ROBERTO, 1972. *Elementos demográficos do Alto Paru de Oeste, Tumucumaque Brasileiro.* Museu Paraense Emílio Goeldi, Publicações avulsas 19: Belém-Pará.

KLOOS, PETER, 1971. *The Maroni River Caribs of Surinam.* Van Gorcum & Co.: Assen.

REWES, RALPH. 1977. Los Indios Tiriyos con la ayuda de antropólogos se integran a la vida moderna. *Geomundo 1*: 738-751.

SCHWERIN, KARL H., 1966. *Oil and steel: process of Karinya culture change in response to industrial development*. Latin American Studies 4. Latin American Center: University of California, Los Angeles.

THOMAS, DAVID JOHN, 1973. *Pemon demography, kinship, and trade.* University Microfilms: Ann Arbor.

P.G. RIVIÈRE
Institute of Social Anthropology
University of Oxford,
51 Banbury Road, *Oxford.*

VAN SLAAF TOT PLANTAGEHOUDER

EEN ASPECT VAN HET 18e EEUWS PLANTAGEWEZEN OP CURAÇAO

DE WEGEN NAAR DE VRIJHEID

Toen, na de proclamatie van 30 september van het jaar daarvoor, op 1 juli 1863 aan de slavernij op de Antillen (en Suriname) eindelijk een eind was gekomen, werden op die dag 6750 mensen feestelijk in vrijheid gesteld, waaronder 67 die aan het Gouvernement behoorden.

Al sinds 1817 had de op Curaçao werkende pater J. Stöppel er bij koning Willem 1 en zijn regering op aangedrongen de slaven een meer menswaardig bestaan te geven, onder meer door hen met hun levenspartner te laten huwen, onderwijs te laten genieten en gezinsscheidingen bij wisseling van eigenaar van b.v. plantages ongedaan te maken. Allemaal zaken waarvoor ook diverse commissies aan het werk zijn geweest, vóór en na de emancipatie. Meer dan het aantal in vrijheid gestelde Curaçaose ingezetenen van Afrikaanse herkomst was echter reeds vrij, al was dit een vrijdom met beperkingen.

Afgaande op schattingen ons, onder anderen, door Dr.C.Ch. Goslinga verschaft in zijn werk 'Emancipatie en emancipator' van 1956, mogen we gevoeglijk aannemen dat bij de algehele emancipatie van 1863 het aantal *z.g. vrije Negers* dat van de *onvrijen* verre overschreed. Bij die vrije Negers waren er een aantal die al generaties lang in het burgerleven een plaats hadden gevonden, want al in de Taxatielijst van 1702 (1) komen 'vrij Negers' voor die in zoverre in goede doen zijn dat zij aangeslagen werden voor het betalen van belasting. Ook in het *z.g. Hoofdgeld* als eigenaren van slaven.

Maar het grootste aantal slaven dat de vrijheid weet te verkrijgen vinden we in en na de tweede helft van de 18e eeuw. Er bestonden verschillende, vaak willekeurige, redenen om uit slaafse dienst ont-

slagen te worden. De minst humane was wel die, als door ziekte of onbekwaamheid hij of zij overbodig werd en met zijn *z.g. vrijbrief* in feite een hoogst onzekere toekomst tegemoet ging in de stad, levend van genadebrood. Of als door het verlopen van een plantage of zijn maatschappelijke status, de eigenaar van de zorgen over zijn afhankelijken verlost wilde worden. In dit geval hadden de nieuwe vrijen een betere kans van slagen dan de eersten. Veel gevallen van in-vrijheidstelling kwamen ook voort uit genegenheid voor een trouwe dienaar of dienares, een vlijtig arbeider die zijn aspiraties niet onder stoelen of banken stak, en — niet in het minst — bij gevallen van een intieme relatie waaruit de nakomelingen een onmiskenbare familieband gingen betekenen, zoals wij ook verder in dit artikel zullen tegenkomen. In de 18e eeuw, toen allengs duidelijk werd dat slavernij een onhoudbaar kwaad was, werden buitenechtlijke nazaten zowel gekend als erkend.

In een groot aantal testamenten dat onder ogen kwam, meest nog van stadsbewoners, troffen we bij de begunstigden in de verdeling van zowel roerend als onroerend goed, ook de namen aan van slaven. Zij verkregen testamentair tevens hun vrijheid in die gevallen, erfden vaak huis en haard, of grond. Zo schenkt Frans Grootestam, zoon van de gelijknamige Frans 'de oude', en evenals deze bekend planter in zijn tijd, aan zijn buitenechtelijke dochter Marietje, die hij verwekt had met de Negerin Hortensia, in 1782 de plantage *Zorgvliet* of *Corporaals Tuyn*, tegenover *Daniel*, en naast *Jan Kock* gelegen. De 'vrij Mulattin' Marietje komt later voor onder zowel de achternamen Grootestam als Niemand. Zij huwt Johan Andreas Schaup wiens knoek gelegen is binnen de plantage *St. Nicolaas*. Frans Grootestam had geen kinderen bij zijn wettige vrouw, en bij zijn dood erven zowel zijn vrouw en zuster als Marietje.

Planters hadden ook intieme verhoudingen met de autochtone bevolkingsgroep, n.l. de Indianen. In 1752 (2) laat een zekere Andries Boothman *'alles na aan de Indianin genaamt Maria de Roga, door de wandeling genoemt Maria Damoe.'* De laatste naam komt nog voor op Curaçao. Welke knoek zij bezat is niet bekend. Wel weten we van andere Indianen die plantages bezaten, zoals Jeronimo, eigenaar van de grond die hij in 1709 verkocht, en die nog zijn, thans 'geheiligde' naam draagt: *St. Hyronimo*, of Leentje Bastiaanse die in 1737 de grond verkocht die later de plantage *Patrick* werd.

Er bestonden, zoals wij zagen, vele *motieven* om uit slaafse dienst te geraken, doch er bestonden slechts twee methoden waarop, met consent van de eigenaar, door middel van z.g. vrijbrief *Manumissie* werd verkregen.

De eerste methode, n.l. het vrijkopen door middel van extra arbeid, was de oudste en tot aan 1863 toegepast. Gebleken is dat al vóór 1700 slaven zich door het leveren van 300 schepels maïs vrij konden kopen. Een schepel bestond uit een (meest houten) schop met opstaande rand waarmee de voorraden in de magazijnen werden gemeten. Een schepel maïs stond heel lang in waarde gelijk aan 1 Peso, en voor drie honderd ervan verdiende een slaaf -na overleg met zijn meester- de vrijheid. Op de meeste plantages hadden de arbeiders kleine eigen grondjes waarop zij bijvoeding kweekten als boontjes, wat groenten en vruchten, om aan het eenzijdig door het hoofdhuis verstrekte *funchi*-rantsoen wat variatie te geven.

Door extra maïs aan te kweken en de grond zorgvuldig te cultiveren, (en vermoedelijk ging het opbrengen daarvan in coöperatie met bevriende lotgenoten) oogst men op die manier een overschot dat als betaling werd afgedragen aan de heer en meester. Vrijkopen verliep vaak in termijnen; men bracht niet gauw 300 schepels in één seizoen op van een stukje grond, zeker niet als een deel ervan in droge jaren voor eigen gebruik beschikbaar moest blijven.

De andere methode werd vaak toegepast op de slaven die voor hun meester een bepaald beroep uitoefenden in de stad als: schoenlapper, schrijnwerker of pondjesbaas, die een vastgesteld bedrag per week moesten opbrengen. Door opvoering van dit bedrag werd een aflossing overeengekomen die moest leiden tot de vrijdom van betrokkene. Weglopen, alhoewel zeer veel voorkomend, had geen enkele zin; op papier bleef de ongelukkige een slaaf. De vluchteling leed dan het leven van een paria, leed honger en angst want hij bleef een vervolgde tot hij weer gevat werd. Zelfs een vlucht naar de kusten van Venezuela bracht niet altijd bescherming: ook hier kon hij in slaafse dienst gesteld worden, of worden uitgewisseld. Velen van de weglopers werden verraden en gevat, of kwamen om.

De meeste *vrijbrieven* werden afgegeven onder het bewind van gouverneur Isaac Faesch (1740 tot zijn dood op 13 Oct. 1758) en zijn opvolger Jean I.C. Rodier, die waarnemend was van 1758 tot

1761 en eind 1762 tot 1764, en vast aangesteld van 1764 tot 1781.

In het tussenliggende jaar, 1761-1762 heeft Curaçao een uiterst lastig en tactloos bewindsman gehad aan Jacob van Bosvelt, die kans zag in de kortst mogelijke tijd na zijn aankomst en installatie met iedereen overhoop te liggen. Hij had niets dan afbrekende kritiek op al datgene dat door zijn voorgangers was volbracht, en ook het grote aantal vrije Negers was hem een doorn in het oog.(3) Maar nog voordat hij in deze situatie kon ingrijpen stierf Bosvelt, en nam Rodier zijn functie weer over.

Rodier, een oud-zakenman en reeds vele jaren woonachtig op het eiland wist de situatie beter te beoordelen dan de nieuwbakken Bosvelt. Over het toenemend aantal vrije Negers verdedigde hij zich in een brief aan de Heren Bewindhebbers door op te merken dat ze *'niet meer last veroorzaken dan andere luiden en getrouw hun dienst vervullen in het Vrij-Negerkorps als ze daartoe geroepen worden'*.

VROUWELIJKE PLANTERS

In de geschiedenis van het plantagewezen is het opmerkelijk te zien hoeveel weduwen of anderszins alleenstaande *vrouwen* knoek- of plantage eigenaars zijn. Het merendeel is geboren en getogen op een plantage en heeft zodoende de agrarische kennis, die onontbeerlijk is voor het welslagen van een opzet als die de Curaçaose planter voor ogen heeft, door ervaring opgedaan.

Ook onder vrijgelaten slaven komen we ze in groten getale tegen, vrouwen die voor korte of langere duur een plantage bezitten en besturen. Zo bezit reeds in het jaar 1715 de Vrij Negerin Magaya een perceel grond in het Ruyter Quartier. In in 1743 is het de eveneens Vrij Negerin Maay die een kleine plantage bezit, annex de grotere plantages *Zeelandia* en *Grootdavelaar*. De grond van de eerstgenoemde wordt in 1793 *Macay* genoemd bij een overdracht van een belendende plantage, en bij examinatie ervan noemt de factoor Jan Evertsz het *'een blood stukje grond'* (OAC 1095, fol 71). Samen met het belendende *Vriendenwijk* vormt het later het zo bekende mooie plekje *Mahaai*, dat na 1940 als woongebied door

particulieren werd 'ontdekt', zoals J. van Soest terecht opmerkt in zijn 'Olie als Water' (1977).

De Vrij Negerin Anna Maria, in de wandeling Anika genoemd koopt in 1814 de plantage *Watervliet*, nabij *Scherpenheuvel*. Maar ondanks de bekende waterrijkheid hiervan kan ze het werk kennelijk niet aan en verkoopt het een jaar later.

In 1785 vinden we de Vrij Mulattin, ook Anna Maria genaamd, die als weduwe van de blanke planter Pieter Stuyling haar kleine plantage verkoopt *'nabij Groot. St. Joris en Scherpenheuvel gelegen'*. Mogelijk wordt hier *Klein Tuintje* bedoeld, nu nog als zodanig bekend. Dan is er in 1796 Anna Matthew, Vrij Mulattin, die de Plantage *Chobolobo* bezit. Zij is tevens de naamgeefster aan deze zoutplantage, die vanaf haar bezitsperiode in de overdrachtdocumenten als *Sebollobo* genoemd wordt (OAC 1098 fol. 202-3) alvorens haar huidige naam te krijgen. Voordien ging het onroerend goed van hand tot hand onder namen *Uytzicht*, *Zoutpan* en *Grote Zoutpan*. Op het levensverhaal van de ex-slavin Maria Magdalena, komen we later in dit artikel nog terug.

De weg naar Hato

Gouvernementsslaven hadden de beste kansen om vrij te komen; de WIC stond welwillender dan b.v. plantage-eigenaren tegenover het verlenen van de Vrijbrief. Vooral de gouvernementsplantage HATO spande de kroon. Deze waterrijke plantage, tevens ontspanningsoord voor hoge militairen of ambtenaren, was vele jaren de retraite bij uitstek voor vele gouverneurs. De plantage leverde zowel geregeld maïsoogsten als fruit. Het aantal slaven bedroeg gemiddeld tegen de honderd, waaronder een aantal die elders gewerkt hadden en nu van een rustiger oude dag konden genieten. In 1773 was het merendeel zelfs boven de 50, waaronder een zekere Maria die 100 jaar oud was. (4)

Het waren dan ook de gouverneurs die slaven van Hato, wegens bijzondere diensten, of getoonde ijver, in vrijheid stelden, met een flinke knoek als toegift. Deze gronden vindt met nu nog links en rechts van de weg naar Hato, gerekend vanaf de rotonde bij *Torenkwest*. De meeste van deze oude plantagegronden die toen aan de

Vrij Negers werden gegeven zijn thans verkaveld in woonwijken, doch oude namen als *Luis Paula, Calabare, Juan Hato, Baas Gracie, Guanapa, Nanie, Gora, Jenefoe, Kanga, Guanota* enz. spreken duidelijke taal!

Twee grotere plantages in deze omgeving, die op dezelfde manier zijn ontstaan zijn: *Juan Domingo* (ongeveer 75 ha, gelegen tussen *Julianadorp* aan de weg naar West Punt), en *Ceru Fortuna* ongeveer 150 ha, en oostelijk van *Hato* gelegen). Beide voormalige plantages zijn inmiddels aanmerkelijk verkaveld ten gunste van woningbouw. Mr. Jan Noach Du Fay is de oorspronkelijke stichter van deze plantages. Hij kwam in 1721 op Curaçao aan, als opvolger van de (waarnemend) gouverneur Juan Pedro van Collen, en bleef voor de volle tien jaar, tot 1731. Omstreeks 1729 kocht Du Fay voor eigen rekening de twee bovengenoemde percelen grond die braak lagen, met het doel er plantages van te maken. Misschien had hij toekomstdromen als planter, na zijn functie neergelegd te hebben, maar de werkelijkheid zou anders blijken te zijn.

Du Fay stelde op beide nieuwe plantages een *factoor* aan om toezicht te houden op de werkzaamheden, waartoe hij twee, z.i. geschikte, krachten uitkoos onder de slaven van *Hato* en hen in vrijheid stelde. De eerste heette Juan Domingo, die de leiding kreeg over de plantage, die sindsdien zijn naam draagt. De andere factoor was de Vrij Neger Francisco Bertran (ook wel Beltrano geschreven), die *Ceru Fortuna* ging cultiveren. Vermoedelijk werden zij geholpen door slaven van *Hato* die Du Fay aan deze plantage onttrok. In januari 1731, toen de werkzaamheden, waaronder het bouwen van een woonhuis, voldoende waren gevorderd, schreef Du Fay eigenhandig het document uit dat hem het privilege gaf tot het vormen van een koekoraal (5). Hij ging met al deze zaken behoorlijk buiten zijn boekje, en werd dan ook in hetzelfde jaar (1731), toen hij opgevolgd was door Juan Pedro van Collen, door de Heren Bewindhebbers in Nederland gevoelig op de vingers getikt. Het was ten ene male verboden voor overheidsdienaren plantages te bezitten, al werd dit verbod door velen ontdoken. (Gouverneurs kochten soms plantages op naam van derden om geen last te krijgen.) Doch met het aanleggen van liefst twee nieuwe plantages ging Du Fay over de schreef! Mogelijk zal de door hem zelf bedongen grondprijs destijds ook een rol hebben gespeeld, alhoewel wij die niet hebben kunnen achterhalen.

Du Fay zag zich genoodzaakt zijn nieuwe plantages van de hand te doen, en hij deed dit op een humane manier: hij gaf de één cadeau en vroeg voor de andere een lage prijs. De acte met betrekking tot de overdracht van *Ceru Fortuna* luidde als volgt:(6)

3 juli 1731

'Juan Pedro van Collen - gouverneur - verklaart dat in eigen persoon is verschenen de Heer Mr. Jan Noach du Fay -scheepen der stad Amsterdam en oud gouverneur van Curaçao, welke verklaart verkocht te hebben en over te dragen aan de vry Neger Francisco Beltran een stuk grond genaamt Shera Fortuna, gelegen op de grote berg omtrent de Plantage Hato, verdeelt in zes(!) perceelen land, met opstal van huis, en privilege van coralen.'

De prijs bedroeg Peso 800. Niet is bekend of Beltran dit bedrag later wist op te brengen. Hij verkocht zijn bezit al in 1735 aan Jaques Veeris. Spoedig daarna ging het landgoed van hand tot hand en werd voor een deel verkaveld. Als plantage heeft het nimmer iets betekend.

De ex-slaaf Juan Domingo verging het beter. Hij kreeg in 1731 van Du Fay het enorme perceel grond waarop hij werkte, met behuizing enz. gratis. Afgaande op het feit dat de grond, na 2½ eeuw nog steeds zijn naam draagt, mogen we aannemen dat Juan Domingo en zijn nakomelingen lang op dit bezit hebben gewoond. In ons archief zijn we echter zijn naam kwijtgeraakt. Zoals ook die van Piet (zonder meer!), ex-slaaf van David Senior, die in 1751 van Gouverneur Faesch een deel van de voormalige plantage *Suffisant* kreeg. Of van Ceintje, wiens naam voortleeft in de knoek *Vader Ceintje*, gelegen ten Westen van *Jongbloed*. Zij, en velen die naamloos blijven in de plantagegeschiedenis, verpersoonlijken de levensgeschiedenis van hen die eens *niets* bezaten, ook het hoogste goed de *vrijheid* niet, maar die op een gouden dag hun lot verbeterd zagen en verder leefden als bezitter van grond, en huis en haard.

Toch moeten we hierbij niet vergeten dat het plattelandsleven zoals dat zich op de Antillen afspeelde allerminst rooskleurig was. Om aan de droge grond en het hete klimaat vruchtdragende gewassen te ontlokken was constante arbeid en idem irrigatie vereist, en het bleef steeds een wonder als het weer lukte!

Toen Curaçao, ook voor de andere eilanden van de toenmalige

kolonie, voldoende andere werkgelegenheid bood, zoals na 1915 (Shell, handel en nijverheid, of de Overheid), werden allengs de tuintjes en plantages verwaarloosd en bleven alleen de huizen over met een karige begroeïng op de velden en weinig of geen vee in de koralen. Aan een agrarisch tijdperk was definitief een eind gekomen — en werd nadien bij velen vermoedelijk het begrip geboren dat plantagebezit een zaak was geweest welke *hende di coló* niet aanging?

MARIA MAGDALENA

Vervolgens willen wij de lezers de opmerkelijke geschiedenis van Maria Magdalena Martha niet onthouden. Ook háár naam is tot in lengte van dagen verbonden aan de, zij het thans sterk ingekrompen, grond die zij en haar man Francisco in cultuur hebben gebracht. Deze oude plantage was ook, evenals de hierboven eerder besproken percelen, gelegen langs de oude weg naar *Hato*, Oostelijk van wat nu de Franklin D. Rooseveltweg heet. Heden ten dage ingeklemd tussen *Klein Marchena, Gora, Jenefru* en *Selinda*, besloeg *Maria Magdalena* oorspronkelijk — samen met *Rosendaal*, dat in 1735 werd gekocht — een oppervlakte van ca 150 ha. Het was gelegen tussen de plantages *Bleinheim* in het zuiden en vermoedelijk *Salsbach* in het noorden; in het oosten begrensd door *Buena Vista*. Maria Magdalena moet een doortastende vrouw zijn geweest; alle officiële documenten staan op haar naam. Zij en haar man waren als huisslaaf in dienst bij de moeder van Juan Pedro van Collen, genaamd Leonora Goedvriend. Vermoedelijk was het in 1731, toen Van Collen opnieuw gouverneur werd, dat zij door diens bemiddeling voldoende vrijheid van handelen kregen om een eigen bestaan op te bouwen. Ze kregen hun vrijheid echter niet zonder er iets tegenover te zetten zoals we straks zullen zien.

Maria Magdalena en haar man boerden kennelijk goed; enkele jaren na het aanleggen van de oorspronkelijke plantage kochten ze de grond in het zuiden gelegen erbij, die later (1747) de naam *Rosendaal* zou krijgen, als volgt: (7)

Aº 1735

De Gebroeders Pieter Claasz en Andries Christiaansz verkopen aan Maria Magdalena Martha, vrij Negerin, een stuk grond bij de Plantage genaamt Bleynheim, off en aan het Joodse Kerkhoff.

Maar vermoedelijk was de opgave te zwaar. Een uitgebreider terrein moest bewerkt worden en er zijn aanwijzingen dat de krachten van haar man Francisco afnamen. Wat de redenen geweest zijn kunnen we alleen gissen, maar op 2 Mei 1740 verkoopt Maria Magdalena Martha de *'canoek genaamt St. Magdalena aan Juan de Palma'* (8) en vermoedelijk doet zij even later haar nieuw verworven plantage *(Rosendaal)* over aan (haar dochter?) Juana Maria Baptista. Deze op haar beurt verkoopt echter al in 1747.

St. Magdalena heeft inmiddels een huis, en de inventaris vermeldt: 2 Negerslaven, 100 schapen, wat hoenders en 2 rijpaarden. Maria Magdalena koopt een huis 'aan de overzijde van de haven', hetgeen wil zeggen dat ze zich op Otrabanda vestigde. Inmiddels is aan de aflossing voor de verkregen vrijheid een eind gekomen getuige de volgende acte:(9)

16 October 1741:

'De Neger Francisco betaalde aan Leonora, Weduwe' Goedvriend voor zijn vrijdom en dito vrouw en kinderen P 1140.- in 12 afbetalingen, waaronder levering van 100 schepels maïs. Geregistreert onder mijne Minuten onder No-86.
Get.: Leonora Goedvrient
en Jan van Schagen-fiscaal

Maar twee rampen zouden spoedig de vreugde bederven. Een jaar nadat hij als vrij man in het leven stond, stierf Francisco, en bleef Maria Magdalena achter met haar kinderen waarvan we met zekerheid weten dat er twee volwassen zonen bij waren, die zeevarend waren. En juist daar sloeg het noodlot opnieuw toe!

Spaanse, Franse en Engelse kaperschepen hebben de wateren rond onze eilanden lang onveilig gemaakt. Ondanks de op Curaçao uitgeruste schepen, die bekostigd met gelden uit de z.g. *kaperkas* de zee schoon probeerden te houden, vielen vele Nederlandse barken en andere schepen in handen van zeerovers. Deze leefden van de buit, en de opbrengst van de vaak geconfisqueerde vaartuigen. Soms lukte het de Nederlanders een zeeroverschip op te brengen, of de kapers tot betere gedachten te brengen, zoals in de beginjaren

van 1700 toen de Nederlandse kaper Rijnier Tongerloo, na het onze schepen erg moeilijk gemaakt te hebben en vele naar Jamaica opgebracht te hebben, uiteindelijk zijn houding verbeterde en, liggend in St. Michielsbaai, een 'generaal pardon' kreeg van het Curaçao gouvernement. Andere naties waren onverbiddelijk in hun vernietigende jacht en veroorzaakten op de eilanden grote verwarring als er keer op keer vaartuigen, ontdaan van hun lading, en na betaling van een hoge losprijs, na lange afwezigheid terugkwamen.

Zo gebeurde het met het schip waarop de twee zoons van Maria Magdalena voeren; deze kwamen echter niet terug en waren door een Engelse kaper naar de Engelse kolonie in Amerika opgebracht, om als slaaf verkocht te worden! Maria Magdalena zat niet bij de pakken neer. Ze beschikte kennelijk over zowel overredingskracht als een invloedrijke positie in de Curaçaose gemeenschpap, getuige de volgende stap die genomen werd:

Isaac Faesch, sinds twee jaar de nieuwe gouverneur schreef op 7 juni 1742 eigenhandig een brief (10):

Aan de Heer Coll. Thomas, Gouverneur over Rhoode Eyland-enz... Alszoo de vrij Negerinnin Maria Magdalena, weduwe van de vrij Neger Francisco, wonende alhier, heeft het ongeluk dat enkele van haar zeevarende zoons door een Engelse kaper genomen en naar Rhoode Eyland (zijn) opgebracht.

Faesch zond in zijn brief de bewijzen van vrijdom en vroeg dringend de mannen weer op vrije voeten te stellen. Bewijzen van een happy ending zijn ons helaas niet onder ogen gekomen in deze zaak, doch aangezien er een ere-code bestond met betrekking tot dit soort gevallen, nemen we aan dat de zoons vroeg of laat Curaçao weer hebben teruggezien.

Hoe ging het verder met Maria Magdalena? Zij koopt en verkoopt geregeld huizen op Otro Banda, voert zelfs een 'cachet' of wel een zegelring waarmee ze de transacties bij de notaris bekrachtigt. Deze ring droeg een beeltenis van een boom, met daarnaast een vrouw met een hondje dat tegen haar opspringt. Van boven voorzien van de woorden HOU en TROUW. Iets dergelijks had ook de Vrij Negerin Martha van Bambergen, die in dezelfde jaren zegelt met een beeltenis van een boom, waarnaast een man met laarzen en een brandende flambouw in de hand. Ook hier een hond-

je dat tegen hem opspringt. Zij echter voerde in bovenrand de woorden: TROU EN GEHEYM. Wélk geheim vragen we ons af...(11)

Nog enkele malen komen we de naam van Maria Magdalena (Martha) tegen maar dan betreft het waarschijnlijk een dochter of kleindochter, gezien de datum: 1828. In dat jaar testeert Maria Magdalena's naamgenote, als voorbeeld van de 'geest des tijds' als volgt:(12)

De Vrij Negerin Maria Magdalena enz..., laat haar 2 Negros slaven na overlijden vrij, zo zij zich weten te gedragen naar de letter der geldende wetten.'

Zij tekent, net als haar naamgenote vóór haar, met een kruisje.

Vrij Negers sloegen ook soms de handen ineen bij de koop of verkoop van onroerend goed, zoals in het volgende geval van drie — niet met name genoemde — Vrij Negerinnen die omstreeks 1795 een stuk grond bezaten aan de 'Overzijde van de haven', genaamd *Maguaje*, met een weg naar het binnenwater, of *Kreek*, zoals het toen heette. Op hun grond hadden ze 'een huis, combuys en twee afdakken'. Omstreeks 1800 verkopen de drie vrouwen het gezamenlijk aan Andries A. Scharbaay, en tekenen met een kruisje. (13)

In dezelfde stadswijk krijgen enkele jaren later een aantal vrijgemaakte slaven van wijlen dominee Rasveld en zijn eveneens overleden weduwe een stuk grond ten geschenke, als volgt: (14)

(Testament opgemaakt 31 juli 1809, geopend 1812)

'*Mej. Sybrecht van Uytrecht in leven weduwe van de Wel. Eerw. Heer Wigboldus Rasvelt, in leven predikant alhier, enz... laat na aan al haar vrijgegeven slaven en slavinnen, een stuk grond genaamd de Loos, met daarop afdakken enz., gelegen aan de Overzijde van deze haven, aan de Noordzijde van de Breedstraat, be-Westen het huis van G.M. Ellis.*

Onbekend is gebleven het aantal mensen dat in dit geval de vrijheid kreeg, maar vermoedelijk betrof het hier haar huispersoneel. De weduwe Rasveld liet na haar overlijden de plantages *Ascencion*, *de Kloof* en *Soemboe* na, doch die gingen - en zeer waarschijnlijk inclusief de aldaar werkende slaven - over in handen van haar neef C.L. van Uytrecht. Haar humaniteit kende dus grenzen. Het perceel grond 'de Loos' is inmiddels opgeslokt in de enorme stads-

ontwikkeling die sindsdien op Otrabanda heeft plaatsgevonden, en komt niet in de stratengids voor van Willemstad.

Op eenzelfde manier vermaakt onder meer de Weduwe van Abraham Nolet in 1747 '*al haar grond, geld en goederen aan haar tevens vrijgemaakte slaven*'

Er hebben op Curaçao in het verleden verschillende plantages bestaan die de naam *Eenzaamheid* droegen. Het toeval wil dat twee ervan in handen kwamen van ex-slaven. Het eerste perceel van die naam maakte deel uit van de gronden die nu onder plantage *Raphael* vallen, het andere is thans een deel van *Karpata* en *Heintje Kool.* De Vrij Negers kwamen als volgt aan hun bezit:
29-4-1794 Plantage de Eensaamheyd, gelegen in het Joden Quartier, met opstal van huysinge en magazijn, verkocht door Jurriaan Crisson, oud-Capt. van de Burgerij, oud Raad, enz. aan de Vrij Neger Juan Bentura. De plantage ligt in gemeen tranqueer met de plantage Nooytgedacht (alias Heintje Kool). (15)

De andere transactie betreft weer een schenking blijkens het op 27 januari van 1824 geopende testament: (16)
Plantage de Eensaamheyd, met vervallen woonhuis, gelegen in de midden divisie, 1e district en in eigen tranqueer liggend, (enz) nagelaten door F. Borel Rijke, en gelegateerd aan de Vrij Negerin Marie Consecion, gelegen tussen de plantages van Alb. Bergh en Andries de Lannoy.

Men zou, al lezende, de nieuwe knoek-eigenaren veel voorspoed en geluk willen wensen, doch de geschiedenis gunt ons dat genoegen niet. Juan Bentura n.l., die in 1794 in het bezit kwam van eerstgenoemde plantage, stierf in 1803, waarna de Weesmeesters zijn nagelaten bezit aan Rudolf Raven verkochten, en zo de eventuele erven genoegdoening schonken.

En Maria Consecion voelde kennelijk niets voor het plantersleven want zij verkocht haar nieuw verworven bezit onmiddellijk aan haar buurman Barend Bergh voor 2050 Peso, waardoor de Savaan en Maria's kortstondige bezit aan één familie ging behoren. De naam Concession komt heden ten dage nog voor op Curaçao, zij het niet als plantage-eigenaren. Hetzelfde kunnen we zeggen van de naam Bentura, met uitzondering van een flinke tuin in de buurt van Santa Rosa die deze naam draagt.

Het is ondoenlijk om alle Vrij Negers op te noemen die in de z.g. slaventijd al beschikten over eigen kostgrondjes, grotere knoeken of zelfs plantages van enige belang. We hebben met een aantal voorbeelden aangetoond dat een lang vergeten groep kleine boeren in het verleden heeft bijgedragen aan het wel en wee van de Curaçaose agrarische sector.

Ter afsluiting van dit artikel moge er op worden gewezen, dat sommige Vrij Negers al rond het jaar 1750 gebruik maakten van testamenten. Zij hadden lakzegels met initialen, doch tekenden de overdrachtsdocumenten meestal met een kruisje. Er waren toen ook al Vrij Negers, en 'moulatten', die volgens de officiële huwelijksafkondigingen huwden, net als de blanken (17).

NOTEN

(De afkortingen OAC en WIC staan voor respectievelijk *Oud Archief Curaçao* en *West Indische Compagnie* met daarachter de nummering zoals in het Haags Algemeen Rijks Archief is geïndexeerd.)

1. WIC 567, fol. 356-372
2. OAC 820
3. WIC 1163 getuigt van zijn zwartgallige visie in dit opzicht, in zijn brieven aan de Heren Bewindhebbers in Patria.
4. WIC 1165, fol. 33
5. OAC 800
6. ibid
7. OAC 804
8. OAC 1550
9. OAC 847
10. OAC 848, fol. 165
11. OAC 1555, testament, geopend 1756
12. OAC 1082, fol. 52
13. OAC 1102, fol. 111
14. OAC 1114, fol. 106-7. Onder een 'Afdak' werd verstaan een vertrek met een half pannendak dat tegen de muur van een groot gebouw, of woonhuis werd gebouwd. Men ziet ze nog wel op Scharloo en Otrabanda.
15. OAC 1094, fol. 46
16. OAC 1127, fol. 59. A. Bergh was eigenaar van de Savaan nabij het huidige Julianadorp.
17. Voorbeelden o.a. in OAC 829 uit 1753.

THE KROMANTI DANCE OF THE WINDWARD MAROONS OF JAMAICA

Introduction 52

Religion in Moore Town 53

The spirit world 55

Ceremonial organization 57
The Fete-Man — The Pakit — Spirit possession — Divination — Herbal medicine — Animal sacrifice — Ritual objects — Ritual motions — Music and Dance

Outsiders in Kromanti dance 76

Outside influences in Kromanti dance 80

Relationship of Kromanti dance to Afro-Jamaican cults 81

Kromanti dance and Maroon identity 86

Notes and Map 91

References 99

INTRODUCTION[1]

In the mountainous interior of Jamaica live several groups of people known as Maroons. They are the descendants of African and Creole slaves who escaped from bondage during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and fled to the mountain forests, where they were able to from their own societies.[2] Despite repeated efforts, the British colonists were unable to destroy these rebel communities. The Maroons successfully adapted to their new environment, and developed a formidable military organization based on an innovative style of guerilla warfare. The British found it ne-

cessary to sue for peace, and in 1739 concluded treaties with the Maroons, granting them legal freedom, parcels of land, and a sort of vague, incomplete political autonomy.[3]

Today there are four major Maroon communities in Jamaica: Accompong, in the western part of the island; Scott's Hall and Charles Town, in the east-central part; and Moore Town, the largest community, in the eastern Blue Mountains. These communities today are politically and economically more or less integrated within the larger Jamaican society, but their inhabitants retain a distinct ethnic identity. While present day Maroons for the most part share the culture of other rural Jamaicans, they maintain a definite cultural distinctiveness within a few limited spheres. One such domain, and the central topic of this paper, is the system of beliefs and practices relating to the supernatural.

The information presented below, unless otherwise indicated, refers specifically to Moore Town. Although much of it would apply accurately to the other Maroon communities as well, each community displays significant variations of its own.[4]

Religion in Moore Town

There is little in the historical literature from which we can draw a picture of the traditional religion of the early Maroons.[5] The most we can assume is that some sort of religious syncretism began to occur at an early stage as Maroons from a great many different African cultures first came into contact. Drawing from several West African (and possibly Central African) models, the result must have been unmistakeably 'African' in a broad sense — although there is some possibility also of early Christian influence through slaves who joined the Maroon communities after several years spent on the plantations.[6]

Christian missionary activity first reached Moore Town in the 1820's. Within a few decades an Anglican church had been built in the center of the village and virtually the whole community converted. Throughout the century the Anglican church remained the sole mission in Moore Town and dominated the religious life of the community.[7] In spite of the thoroughgoing conversion of Maroons

to Christianity on the surface, it appears that the traditional religion continued to be practiced as a separate system. The process which SPICER (1954: 665-670) called 'compartmentalization' seems to have operated in Moore Town in the religious sphere. Christianity and the traditional religion coexisted as separate systems, each with its own concerns. While Christianity provided the setting for worship and preparation for the afterlife, the more immediate problems of everyday life, as well as the major crises, were handled in the context of the traditional ceremony known as *Kromanti dance* (also called *Kromanti Play*). The two systems existed simultaneously, apparently without conflict.

This situation continued into the twentieth century. However, by the 1940's, the influence of several other Christian sects had reached Moore Town. Within a short time the Anglican hegemony had been replaced by a more complex picture, as new churches sprang up within the village and claimed their own converts. In recent times a large number of foreign-based fundamentalist sects such as the Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the Church of God have gained dramatically in popularity. Unlike the Anglican church of Moore Town, some of these churches violently and actively oppose the traditional Maroon religious practices in general, and the *Kromanti dance* in particular. For this reason, and a variety of others, the tradtional religious system of the Moore Town Maroons has declined to the point that very few younger Maroons participate in it or have any real understanding of it.

The majority of the people in Moore Town today belong to one or another of the several Christian churches in the village. Many of these churches forbid participation in traditional Maroon rituals. Thus it should be borne in mind that a large segment of the community no longer participates in the ceremony of *Kromanti dance*, on the infrequent occasions it is held. Nevertheless, many elements of the traditional belief system continue to be shared by all segments of the community, and during times of crisis even the strictest Christians may deign to seek aid from one of the few remaining ritual specialists.

Although the *Kromanti dance* complex is waning in importance for the majority, it continues to occupy a primary place in the lives of a few individuals. The main body of this paper is devoted to an

examination of this complex as it exists today. As in the past, the *Kromanti dance* and the belief system associated with it remain 'compartmentalized', and there is little evidence of Christian syncretism, even though some of its primary practitioners are also practicing Christians.

Once again, in reading what follows, it should be kept in mind that the *Kromanti dance* is no longer a community-wide event; nor is it held on a regular basis. But it continues to have importance for a large number of Maroons, although fluctuating participation makes even an approximate estimate of this number impossible.

The Spirit World

In traditional Maroon belief, there is one supreme deity, the omnipotent creator, known as *Yankipong* or *Tata Nyame*, who inhabits the sky.[8] *Yankipong* is generally seen as being remote from the living and unconcerned with everyday human affairs. Nonetheless, in times of extreme crisis it is felt that his aid may be sought through prayer. But direct communication with *Yankipong* is not possible.

Below *Yankipong* are the spirits of the ancestors. There is no pantheon of intermediate deities such as one finds in many African and Afro-American religions.[9] The spirits of the dead, called *duppies, jumbies,* or *bigi-man*, are closely linked with the living and have a great deal of influence in daily human affairs. They possess the power to bring about either good or evil.

Close contact is maintained between living Maroons and the ancestral spirits. *Duppies* may be manipulated by the living for their own purposes. In most respects they resemble living persons very closely. Like the living, they have desires and needs, emotions and personalities; like human beings, they can be angered or appeased, threatened or cajoled. They do possess, however, super-human powers, and if given the proper attention and favors, will sometimes put these powers at the disposal of living individuals. Power over spirits is sometimes referred to as *obeah*, as in the rest of Jamaica, although this term has been supplanted by the more modern term, *science*. Nowadays in Moore Town 'obeah' carries negative impli-

cations, for it has come to mean the use of power by outsiders for evil ends.

The ancestral spirits are arranged in a sort of vague, informal hierarchy. At the apex are the spirits of the earliest Maroons, who lived centuries ago. Few of these are remembered by name, although the great heroes, such as Kojo and Nanny, have not been forgotten.[10] Also near the top of the hierarchy are four early Maroon warriors (sometimes referred to as 'generals'):

1. Swiformento[11] 2. Okonoko 3. Puss 4. Welcome[12]

These ancient spirits are more distant from the living than the spirits of those who have died in more recent times. As a result of their great age they have acquired tremendous power, but in turn they have become farther removed from human affairs. In fact, they have become more or less inaccessible to the living. These four topmost 'generals' are said to correspond to four 'tribes' or 'nations' (both of the foregoing terms are Maroon usages):

1. Dokose 2. Ibo 3. Mongola 4. Prapa[13]

There is a certain amount of confusion as to which individual corresponds to which tribe, but these are the four most commonly mentioned tribes from which the present day Maroons are said to have sprung. Each of the four 'generals' is vaguely conceptualized as the apical ancestor of all Maroons descended from the tribe to which he corresponds.

The concept of 'tribes' among the present-day Maroons is rather nebulous. Most traditionally-oriented Maroons assert that one or another African tribe is dominant in their family history, although they will add that there has been so much intermarriage between tribes in the past that it is sometimes very difficult to single out the one particular tribe which outweighs all others in importance. The only social context in which this notion of tribes comes into play is the traditional ceremony of *Kromanti dance*, in which certain songs are said to relate to specific tribes, and to invoke the spirits of past Maroons descended predominantly from one or another of these tribes. Aside from the four tribes listed above, which are con-

sidered the principal tribes in the Maroon ancestry, several others are cited by present-day Maroons as having contributed to early Maroon society. Among these are: Mandinga, Nago, Wesuman, Mabiwi, Mabere, Timbambu, Oyesu, Okrio, Okriba, Chankofi.[14] All of these individual tribes are subsumed under the one most powerful tribe, the Kromanti tribe, which has become almost synonymous with the name 'Maroon', and the primacy of which is taken for granted.

Under the four 'generals' is another group of four ancient warriors whose spirits also possess great power:

1. Wendandu Kofi
2. Jinsandi Kofi
3. Kromanti Kofi
4. One-yeye Kofi

None of these early Maroon spirits play much of a part in the ceremony of *Kromanti dance*. Although spirit possession is an important feature of the ceremony, usually only the younger, less powerful spirits take possession of living individuals; it is said that possession by one of the truly ancient spirits is extremely violent and may lead to the death of the person possessed.[15]

Under the upper echelon of ancient spirits lies a large body of ancestral spirits whose powers decrease in proportion to their closeness to the living. A very large number of such spirits are remembered by name, and it is this group which is in constant interaction with the world of the living. Every Maroon no longer alive, within the past few generations — so long as he or she is still remembered by the living — belongs to this group.

Ceremonial Organization

There is no special cult organization connected with *Kromanti dance*. Participation is open to all adult Maroons; non-Maroons are excluded, except under certain special circumstances. Ceremonies used to be held regularly, several times a week, in a structure known as the *asafo house*, located near the center of the village.[16] Several years ago the *asafo house* fell into disuse, and today public ceremonies are usually held at a nearby spot known as Bump

Grave. Aside from these infrequent public ceremonies, private ceremonies are sometimes held at individuals' homes. Although in principle any adult Maroon may participate in these, in practice they are usually attended only by a select few who are invited.

There are two types of *Kromanti dance*: *Business dances* and *Pleasure dances*. The latter are dances which have no purpose other than entertainment, and in which spirits are not purposefully invoked (although spontaneous possession will sometimes occur in this context). *Business dances*, on the other hand, are taken very seriously, and are only held in order to achieve some clear purpose through the invocation of ancestral spirits. Most often *Business dances* are held for the purpose of healing spirit-caused illnesses, although nearly any problem can be dealt with in this context. In times of crisis a *Business* rather than *Pleasure dance* will be held, and the aid of ancestral spirits will be sought. *Business dances* are more frequently held than *Pleasure dances*.[17]

The Fete-Man

The ritual specialist, and the central personage in *Kromanti dance* is known as the *fete-man*. There are a number of alternative names for him: *dancer-man*; *work-man*; *Business-man*; *titai-man; kumfu-man*.[18] But the most common form is *fete-man*.

At any given *Business dance* there is usually one key *fete-man* who is chosen in advance to work for the person seeking aid. Although several *fete-men* may be present at the dance, it is this particular chosen individual who is responsible for effecting the cure, or the resolution of the problem if it is something other than an illness.

Kromanti dance usually begins shortly after nightfall and continues until daybreak; when very serious problems are involved, the dance will sometimes continue for several days and nights. During the initial stages of the dance, anyone present is permitted to participate in the dancing, which is sometimes done in ring formation. However, after several hours the dance loses its recreational character, and the central *fete-man* becomes possessed by an ancestral spirit. At this point, the proceedings become very grave and

formal, as the possessed *fete-man* takes complete control of the ceremony. During the remainder of the ceremony, except for short periods when he is absent from the danceground, the *fete-man* is the center of attention. He gives commands which must be followed, and he alone dances, unless he invites others to join him. He also decides which songs are to be sung.

Although this central position is most commonly occupied by males, there are also a lesser number of respected *fete-women* who achieve an equal degree of power and whose services are equally valued.[19]

The Pakit

The primary source of a *fete-man*'s power is his *pakit*.[20] A *pakit* is an ancestral Maroon spirit which has devoted itself to a particular *fete-man*, and has become his own personal possession. A *fete-man*'s *pakit* is seen as the key to his success, and is at the very root of his power. If a man's *pakit* is weak, then he will not excel as a *fete-man*; if a man's *pakit* is strong, then he will most certainly achieve great things in the realm of the supernatural. *Pakits* are owned only by *fete-men* and are not well understood by the general population. In almost every case, a man's *pakit* is the spirit of a Maroon who, during his own lifetime, was a practicing *fete-man* with a *pakit* of his own. It is said that whenever a living *fete-man* dies and enters the spirit world, his spirit will eventually find another living *fete-man* to which to devote itself.

Any Maroon may strive to become a *fete-man*, but it is felt that certain individuals are born with a special gift, and only such persons can achieve true greatness in this field. These individuals often begin to exhibit their gifts at an early age: they are able to see or sense the presence of *duppies* around them while still children, and their unusual behavior is interpreted to mean that they possess a sort of innate affinity with the spirit world. Sometimes these gifted persons enter into an informal apprenticeship with an older *fete-man*, who teaches them the secrets needed to manipulate the spirit powers. But apprenticeship is by no means a necessary stage in the process of becoming a *fete-man*. In fact, any adult Maroon who is

able to attain a *pakit*, by whatever means, is capable of becoming a *fete-man*.

There are several possible ways of obtaining a *pakit*. For a few especially fortunate persons the process is a quite simple and passive one: the spirit of a former *fete-man* takes a strong liking to them, and offers itself to them as a *pakit*. This occurs most often in a dream, in which the spirit approaches the sleeping person and communicates its desire to give itself to him. In such cases there is no choice, as refusal of the offer would anger the spirit and result in dangerous repercussions. Once this relationship between living person and spirit is established, the former is well on the way to becoming a *fete-man*. The spirit, which is now his own personal *pakit*, will visit his dreams often and begin to teach him the knowledge — much of it secret — necessary to a *fete-man*.

In some cases, the process of acquiring a *pakit* is more violent. The spirit which decides to become a person's *pakit* may simply take possession of that person while he is in a waking state. When this occurs, the possessed person loses control of his behavior and is unconscious of his surroundings. Sometimes his behavior will become violent and unpredictable, and it will appear that he is going mad. Little by little, however, it will be understood what is happening: a spirit has chosen to be this person's *pakit* and, being too impatient to teach him gradually, has possessed him prematurely.

The majority of persons who wish to become *fete-men* do not receive a *pakit* in this way, but rather, must go and actively seek the help of a *fete-man* It is possible to buy a *pakit* from an experienced *fete-man* (although this is considered unethical); if things are done properly the *fete-man* should be willing to perform this service free of charge, out of friendship for the receiver, and in recognition of his natural rapport with the spirit world.

A *fete-man* will never give away his own *pakit*, of course. He will instead give another spirit with which he has become acquainted in his work, and over which he has achieved a certain amount of power. The private ceremony in which a *pakit* is given to a person is known as *wash-head*, for it involves the bathing of the recipient's head with a special herbal mixture.[21] Contained within this mixture must be a special 'weed' which corresponds to the recipient's tribe;

it is said that for every tribe represented among the Maroon there is a matching 'weed' — for example, Ibo weed, Dokose weed, Nago weed, Mandinga weed, Chankofi weed. Although in reality 'tribal' divisions among the Maroons have long since faded into the past, a prospective *fete-man* should have some idea of which tribe is dominant in his ancestral background, so that the proper 'weeds' can be used in washing his head.

In many cases, the person whose head is being washed must also be taken to the grave of the person whose spirit is to become his *pakit*. At the graveside, the *fete-man* introduces the spirit to its future owner, and goes through a series of motions intended to cement the new relationship. If things go as planned, the person for whom the ceremony is being held is now a *pakit-man*, a *fete-man* who is equipped to dance *Kromanti*. However, *pakits* given in this way are not as powerful as those which offer themselves to individuals of their own will, for the *fete-man* who gives a *pakit* retains the power also to take it away.

Pakits sometimes visit the world of the living in the form of an animal.[22] Each *pakit* has its own special animal form which it adopts whenever it chooses to manifest itself physically. The most common form taken by *pakits* is that of *ananka*, the snake, but there is a wide variety of other possible forms, such as *opete*, the johncrow (vulture); *okrema*, the chickenhawk; or *sumans*, the crayfish.[23] *Pakits* are said to visit *Kromanti dance* in these animal forms on occasion; they are said to resemble natural animals, except that they emit a whitish glow from within — they shine in the dark. Several informants who had snake *pakits* claimed that these would sometimes appear while they were dancing *Kromanti*, and would coil around their bodies as they danced.

One of the most important functions of a *pakit* is that of protection. *Kromanti dance* is viewed by Maroons as a sort of metaphorical warfare, on a spiritual rather than physical plane. The work of the *fete-man* is conceived of as a fight — a battle between the spirits controlled by the *fete-man* and those afflicting the person seeking his help. (The term 'fete-man' is derived from the verb 'fete', from a deep layer of Maroon creole, meaning 'to fight', as well as 'to dance for sickness'.)[24] For this reason every *fete-man* risks incurring a 'blow' — a spirit-caused injury — anytime he dances *Kro-*

manti. Even during the course of his normal daily life the *fete-man* must be prepared against attack from the vengeful spirits he has previously opposed in *Kromanti dances*. His *pakit* offers full-time protection against such assaults, and if his *pakit* is extremely strong, then he is virtually invulnerable to spirit-harm of any kind. But most *pakits* do not function perfectly all of the time, and thus must be given special attention before any crisis situation is to be approached. Using special 'weeds' and other secret paraphanelia, the *fete-man* must *trim* (also sometimes pronounced 'prim') himself — ritually prepare himself and his *pakit* in a private ceremony — before facing any dangerous tasks involving the spirit world. Interestingly enough, in Maroon oral tradition the word 'trim' is also used to refer to the ritual preparation of the ancient Maroon warriors before going into battle.

Spirit Possession

No *Kromanti dance* can achieve its purpose without one or more of the participants becoming possessed by the spirit of an ancestor.[25] It is common, especially early in the ceremony, for a number of persons to experience possession by 'stray' or 'wandering' spirits that happen to be passing by the danceground and are attracted to the scene by the music. Such spirits usually visit *Kromanti dance* merely to 'pleasurize' themselves, and their possession will normally last for a relatively short time, since they have no special duty to perform at the *Play*, but have only come to dance and enjoy themselves.[26] In contrast, the *fete-man* will at some point — if things proceed properly — be possessed by his *pakit*, and will then take full control of the ceremony and begin to perform the rituals necessary to bring about the resolution of the problem at hand. During the greater part of the rest of the ceremony the *fete-man* will remain in a state of possession, although there are likely to be intermittent periods in which the spirit disengages from him, followed eventually by periods of repossession. At times the *fete-man* will remain in an uninterrupted state of possession for several hours. In between periods of possession by his *pakit* the *fete-man* may also be possessed by other spirits with which he has become

familiar, who come to the *Play* to satisfy their curiosity or to offer additional help. But the *fete-man*'s *pakit* is the primary spirit in the ceremony, and will manifest itself through possession more frequently than these other spirits. As previously mentioned, it is said that the *pakit* will also sometimes visit *Kromanti dance* in the shape of an animal.

The term for spirit possession in general among the Maroons is *myal*.[27] Although the random possession experienced by casual participants is somewhat milder than the calculated possession of the *fete-man* by his *pakit*, both types are called *myal*. In ordinary speech a person who becomes possessed is said to 'get in myal', 'take myal', or 'catch myal'. When he goes in *myal* fully, it is said that his 'head turns'. The special terminology of spirit possession, as in many New World black religions — for instance, Haitian *Vodun* — is based upon an equestrian metaphor. The spirit refers to the person whose body it is possessing as its *horse*, and the act of possession itself is known as *riding*. (The possessing spirit will also sometimes refer to its *horse* as its 'boy', and will say that it is 'walking on' its 'boy'.) Anytime a *fete-man* is dancing for a *Business Play*, he will tie his head with a specially prepared kerchief known as a *saddle*, which has been treated beforehand with special 'weeds'. The *saddle* is a precious possession, for it must be worn by the *fete-man* in order for his *pakit* to *mount* him properly.

The condition of *myal*, especially the *myal* of the *fete-man*, is extremely serious and must be treated with great caution, for it is potentially very violent. Bystanding participants who are not possessed (persons not in possession are said to be *live-head* or *clean-yeye*)[28] must stay clear of the possessed *fete-man*, and should not approach his vicinity unless called forward by him. Possessed *Kromanti* dancers have inhumanly quick and unpredictable tempers, and the slightest incident may suddenly arouse their anger. Maroon spirits are pugnacious by nature, and the older the spirit — and thus, the higher its position in the hierarchy of the spirit world — the more excitable it will be. A favorite object of Maroon spirits is the *afana*, or machete, and should a possessing spirit be given the slightest cause for anger it will instantly get ahold of this weapon and launch into a series of threatening gestures.[29]

Possession is usually brought on by music and dancing, although some *fete-men* also commonly experience spontaneous possession in the absence of external stimuli. In the latter case, the *fete-man* may be sitting calmly at one moment, and in the next instant he bolts forth from his chair with great force and goes into a sort of loping, spinning motion. When this happens, the possessed individual must be attended to immediately by a helper who will tie his head with his *saddle* and answer his commands. In the context of *Kromanti Play* there are several explicit signs which warn onlookers of the onset of possession. The person going into *myal* begins to execute a very distinctive dance motion, a sort of jerky, spinning movement in which one leg is crossed over the other in a rapid backward kick. His legs begin to quiver rhythmically, and as he bounds back and forth in this circular motion, his eyes are directed upward in a blank stare. This continues for some time, and as the state of possession stabilizes, the individual, still in motion, expels a succession of piercing screams. In a matter of time, the spirit will 'cool down', but before this occurs it is dangerous to approach the person in possession.

The intrinsic fierceness of Maroon spirits is one of the most remarkable things about them. Although they share human emotions and desires, these are exaggerated and distorted to such an extent that when they possess human beings they behave completely irrationally and unpredictably. Spirits appear to operate according to an inscrutable logic of their own. *Clean-yeye* persons in the presence of a possessed individual must obey certain basic rules, so as not to inflame the spirit. They must never smoke while a person is in *myal*. They must remove all shiny objects from their bodies, such as watches or jewelry, for these are repugnant to the spirit. Above all, they must never address the spirit by its *horse*'s name, or even mention the *horse*'s name to another person while the spirit is in possession; to do this could cause serious injury, or possibly death, to the *horse*.

As the possessing spirit begins to cool down, it becomes somewhat more tractable and willing to communicate with the living human beings around it. The possessed individual is addressed by the living as *granfa* or *old man* if the possessing spirit is a male ancestor, and as *grandy*, if a female. The *granfa* or *grandy* in turn ad-

dresses living Maroons as *pikin*, or *nyuman*.[30] The linguistic situation at *Kromanti dance* is quite complex; several different language forms are employed within the dance context at different times. The normal dialect of the Maroons — which is essentially the same English-based creole spoken throughout Jamaica — is appropriate for communications between living persons. On the other hand, the 'spirit language' used in conversations between spirits themselves, or spirits and living persons, appears to consist of a deep layer of Maroon creole which has been maintained only in the context of *Kromanti Play*. Although English-based, and sharing many lexical and grammatical features with the 'standard' Jamaican creole, it is partially unintelligible to non-Maroons, as well as Maroons who have no experience of *Kromanti Play*. Finally, there is the language form known as *Kromanti*, or simply as *Language*, or *Country*. DALBY (1971: 38) was correct in conjecturing that this *Kromanti* 'language' is in fact not a fully functional language, but rather, 'an esoteric repository of isolated words and set phrases'. Although a few phrases of *Kromanti* are used in a code-like way for communication, the majority of words and phrases are used for other purposes, and the meanings of some of them have been lost. The main function of *Kromanti* words seems to be the invocation of spirits; the words in and of themselves have magical power. There is virtually no English content to *Kromanti* (it appears to be derived largely from Akan, with a smattering of other influences), and being the language of the 'first-time' Maroons, it provides a connection through which the almost unlimited power of these earliest ancestors can be tapped — *if* the user has accurate knowledge of it.[31] In the times of greatest crisis, the *fete-man* feels he can rely on the inherent power of deep *Kromanti* — its power to mobilize the ancient, most powerful Maroons in his behalf. Even the remotest ancestors will respond to the deep *Kromanti* and offer their aid, if the language is properly understood and applied.

While the younger Maroon spirits which routinely possess the living normally use the deep-level creole in their communications, they also sprinkle their speech with bits of *Kromanti* 'language', so as to draw on the power of their predecessors. Uttering fragmentary bits of *Kromanti* 'language' in this way — in an exclamatory tone, without any specific communication intended — is known as

'cutting Country', and is a distinctive pattern of Maroon behavior shared by the living and the spirits of the dead alike.[32]

After the spirit possessing an individual calms down, it becomes more malleable and willing to listen to the desires and needs of the living persons surrounding it, so long as its commands are obeyed. Normally, at any *Kromanti dance* there is a person who accepts the role of *kwatamassa* (quartermaster), a sort of special assistant who remains unpossessed and follows the orders of the *granfa* or *grandy*, fetching for him whatever ritual objects or other items he may request. The *kwatamassa* sometimes also acts as an intermediary between the *granfa* and living individuals, some of whom may not understand the spirit language very well.

Many of the spirits who possess persons in *Kromanti dance* are recognized by participants as someone they had once known as a living person. Some spirits will directly identify themselves by name, while others will only give behavioral clues as to their identity. Most spirits can be recognized by certain idiosyncracies, such as a limp, or a twitch, or some special facial expression for which they were known while alive. Once the possessing spirit has calmed down somewhat, and is recognized by some of the participants, the atmosphere becomes a bit more relaxed, and there may even be some joking or bantering between the *granfa* and participants. But people must always remain somewhat cautious in the presence of a *granfa*, even when a certain warmth of feeling is apparent, for Maroon spirits are never as rational or predictable as human beings, and are subject to sudden changes of temper.

A major part of *Kromanti Play* revolves around the performance of physical feats by persons in possession. There are many reports of possessed *fete-men* climbing trees backwards or upside down, flying though zinc roofs without causing damage, or devouring whole glasses or bottles. One of the most impressive feats, said to be performed only rarely today, involves the use of a machete. The *fete-man*, in possession, cuts or stabs himself severely — sometimes, it is said, he actually disembowels himself — and then disappears into the woods. When he returns in a short while the wound is completely healed, with little or no scar tissue to show where it originally was. There exist today Maroon oral traditions relating how the ancient warriors were once trained in this art of magical healing be-

fore being allowed to join in battle against the English.

When the spirit cools down, and after a good deal of begging on the part of the individual seeking his help, the *granfa* will eventually agree to take the case, and will start to perform a series of rituals lasting through the night, some of which will be briefly described at a later point. After the *granfa* has finally completed the work for which he has been called, he will be ready to return to the spirit world. The spirit may be able to 'pull' itself off its *horse*, but, more often, will request the assistance of the *kwatamassa*, with a command such as 'kre me haas'! ('clear my horse'). In order to 'clear' the possessed individual, a particular object chosen by the spirit must be held by the *kwatamassa* or someone else — the object can be anything from a wooden stick or glass bottle to a piece of chalk — and passed over and around the individual in a series of motions, while he reclines on his hands and feet. The last motion consists of a circular movement directly over the head, and as soon as it is completed the person who has been in possession jerks back into the arms of the *kwatamassa* and lets out a gasp. Once the spirit has been 'pulled' in this manner the person who was possessed stumbles about in a dazed and confused condition for several minutes. When he becomes lucid he claims that he remembers nothing that took place during the period of his possession.

Divination

Every *fete-man* possesses a special object known as a *jege*, which is given to him by his *pakit* soon after their relationship is first established.[33] The *pakit* usually appears in a dream and tells the *fete-man* that he should look in a particular secret place where an important object has been hidden. The *pakit* guides him to this spot, where his *jege* is waiting, and begins to explain its uses to him. Almost always the *jege* resembles a marble between a half-inch and two inches in diameter; it is usually a light shade of amber in color, and is transluscent, with a dull, slightly pocked surface.

The *jege* is one of the most important tools of the *fete-man*, for it is crucial to the practice of divination. Without his *jege* a *fete-man* is nearly powerless, because he is unable to determine the ultimate

source of the problem he is supposed to be treating. Although there are variations of method between individual *fete-men*, the most common procedure for using the *jege* is outlined below.

When a prospective client first consults a *fete-man* for help, there is a period of private discussion during which the *fete-man* attempts to 'read' the person — to tell the person what exactly his problem consists of, and what sort of help he desires, before the latter has had a chance to clarify it to the *fete-man*. This is really a formality meant to convince the prospective client of the *fete-man*'s mystical prowess. The *fete-man*'s success in this endeavor is assured by the power of his *jege*, which rests in his pants pocket at the time, along with certain powerful 'weeds' he has prepared with rum beforehand. If the reading is a success and the *fete-man* decides to accept the case, a date is set for a *Kromanti dance*. In the meantime the *fete-man* 'trims' himself and his *pakit* for the dance, by observing certain private rituals.

After the dance begins the *fete-man*, while still *clean-yeye*, eventually commences the process of divination. He brings out his *abaso*, a white enamelled metal bowl (formerly made of wood), and sets it on the ground in the dancing area. In the bowl is a mixture of crushed 'weeds' and rum. The *fete-man* takes his *jege* from his pocket (sometimes a *fete-man* will receive more than one *jege* from his *pakit*, and will use all of them together), and places it in the bowl; then he picks up the bowl, and begins to roll the *jege* around in it. One *fete-man* described the process this way:

> Sometimes you must get a plate and put the marbles in it, and then throw some rum in the plate. When you throw the rum in, the marbles are going to dance in the plate, they're going to spin around. It's the jeges, the marbles in the plate, that you have to use to read the sign now. The marbles are going to show you definitely what happened to the man. Some of the marbles show you how long a man has been sick. You have marbles with marks on them, anywhere from one to a hundred marks. When the marbles are spinning in the plate, anywhere you see them rest and stop on a number, you can say whether it has been four days, or five days, or two days that the man has been sick.[34]

The jege shows what is the underlying, spirit-related cause of the problem at hand. When the *pakit* later possesses the *fete-man*, the *granfa* will then act in accord with this knowledge to bring about a solution or a cure. At times the *clean-yeye* divination proves to be incomplete or otherwise insufficient, and the *granfa* must use the

jege himself to get to the root of the problem.

The oracular power of the *jege* may be brought to bear on a wide variety of problems, and is by no means limited in application to the context of *Kromanti Play*. *Fete-men* often use their *jeges* for personal purposes, such as reading the future so that they may be warned in advance of approaching dangers. *Jeges* are also important in the process of 'capturing' and confining malicious spirits, for they evince the crucial signs which indicate whether or not an unseen spirit has been subdued.

In recent times some *fete-men* have begun to supplement their *jeges* with the use of a crystal ball obtained in one of the larger towns.

Herbal Medicine

The Maroons are famous throughout the island for their outstanding knowledge of the wild plants which abound in the forests surrounding them. A great number of these are said to possess medicinal properties of which only the Maroons are aware; in fact, many Maroons will say that there is no plant on the face of the earth which does not have a use.[35] In the context of *Kromanti Play*, the medicinal properties of wild plants (usually called 'weeds') are seen as secondary to their spiritual powers. How these powers are understood varies from one individual to the next. Some informants stated that every plant has a spirit of its own, while others asserted that the power of a plant derives from its association with a particular ancestral Maroon spirit. In any case, the power of plants can be great, and is often employed in ritual contexts.

Outsiders stand in awe of the Maroons' legendary grasp of supernatural plant lore. Several non-Maroon informants living in outside locations told the author of incidents in which they had seen Maroons use 'weeds' to 'cramp' an individual. Typically, such stories would relate how a Maroon in an argument with a non-Maroon would pull some 'weeds' from his pocket and, while 'cutting Country', would spray a mouthful of rum on them. Within a matter of seconds the Maroon's antagonist would be paralyzed on the ground, suffering convulsions. Several *fete-men* in Moore Town

corroborated these accounts, and claimed that the use of 'weeds' for cramping persons in this way, whether in defense or offense, was common.

Fete-men must become expert herbalists; if their *pakit* is good, it will teach them a great deal about the uses of different herbs. So essential are 'weeds' in the manipulation of spirit powers that Maroons often use the phrase, 'rubbing trash' ('trash' meaning 'weeds'), as a synonym for 'working science' — that is, manipulating spirits.

During the course of a *Kromanti dance* there is usually a point at which the possessed *fete-man* runs off into the woods to pick the herbs which are required for the completion of the ceremony. The *fete-man* will sometimes be gone from the danceground for an hour or more. During this time he finds the combination of 'weeds' to be used in the cure. Since the spirit is riding him, he is able to locate the plants, some of which are rare, in pitch darkness, without the help of a torch or any other source of light.

When he returns with the special herbs, they are crushed and blended with rum (and sometimes animal blood) in a bowl. This mixture is used to 'bath' the person for whom the dance is being held: it is applied to his skin in a vigorous rubbing motion by the *fete-man* and the *kwatamassa*. This occurs near the end of the ceremony, usually shortly before daylight. The mixture should remain on the skin for several days, and the person being treated may use only white rum, and no water, to bathe himself during this period. Sometimes the patient is also told to drink an herbal potion which has been previously prepared by the *fete-man*.

'Weeds' are also important in the manufacturing of a 'guard'. A guard is a protective power which is fastened to a human being and works to fend off potential spirit harm. Every *fete-man* must have one, to work in conjunction with his *pakit*; many non-specialists also possess guards which they have purchased from a *fete-man* in a private ceremony. The guard is usually administered in the form of an herbal potion, although sometimes it is also applied externally to the skin. Once given, it will last indefinitely, but must be kept absolutely secret, or else it will 'spoil', and lose its protective efficacy. Some informants say that a good *fete-man* can sense when a person has a guard, for he will be able to perceive a slight glow emanating

from the person's body, but unless told the details of how it was administered, he will have no power over the guard.[36]

Animal Sacrifice

Most *Kromanti dance* ceremonies require the sacrifice of an animal to the *fete-man*'s *pakit*, in return for the work which the *pakit* has agreed to carry out. The sacrifice is performed by the *fete-man*, either while *clean-yeye* or in a state of possession. The animal's blood is an important ingredient in the herbal mixture which will be used in the ceremony.

The animal chosen for sacrifice is most often an *okoko*, or fowl, preferably a white one; if the case is an easy one a pigeon may be used instead, or if it is particularly difficult, an *oprako*, or hog, may be employed.[37] Unlike certain Afro-Jamaican cult groups in other parts of the island, the Maroons never use goats for sacrifice. The goat is strictly taboo for this purpose, and although many Maroons nowadays will eat goat meat with no compunction, it is said that in older days Maroons would carefully avoid it.

The sacrifice is performed by cutting off the head with a machete, or cutting the throat, if a hog is being sacrificed. The blood is caught in a white bowl, and is used for making certain ritual marks on the patient, either before or after the 'weeds' are added to it. The meat is later cooked and served to participants, but a portion of it is prepared separately for the spirit, without salt, since salt repels spirits.

Ritual Objects

Each *fete-man* possesses certain ritual objects which he keeps inside his house until the time of the ceremony. Aside from his *jege* and his *saddle*, he may keep a pair of *Kromanti* drums at his yard. These drums are sacred, and must be given special care, for they provide the music for *Kromanti dance*. Another object which may be used in a ceremony is the *junga*, the traditional Maroon spear, made of a carefully sharpened metal blade attached to a long

wooden haft. Although used primarily for hunting wild hog in the surrounding hills, the *junga* is an object of pride and a symbol of Maroon identity, and may also be used in *Kromanti* rituals. Most *fete-men* like to keep a *junga* in their yard, whether or not they are hunters.

Many *fete-men* possess a special switch made from the branch of a tree which is sometimes used in *Kromanti Play* as a whip. On certain occasions it may be necessary to flog a person who is being afflicted by a *duppy*, either to scare the *duppy* away from him, or to exact atonement from him, if he has done something wrong which has caused the *duppy* to injure him of its own accord.

If a *fete-man* is especially lucky he may gain possession of a *thunder-ball*, a small stone-like object with a round or oval shape and a smooth surface. *Thunder-balls* are usually found in the ground, a few inches below the surface. It is believed that they fall from the sky, and that they are special gifts from *Yankipong*. A person who stumbles upon a *thunder-ball* is entitled to several years of good luck. *Thunder-balls* are greatly desired by *fete-men* in particular, for once acquired they will act as a general enhancer of power.[38]

Fire, or *timbambu*, is an important element in *Kromanti dance*. Maroon spirits are attracted by fire, and often a *granfa* will call for *timbambu-sticks* — pieces of partially — burned wood with red-hot embers at one end — to be used in a spectacular dance which sends showers of sparks about the danceground. *Timbambu-sticks* may be used also to test the bravery of bystanding participants, or in certain ritual operations.

Almost any object may obtain ritual significance in the context of *Kromanti Play*, for the *granfa* may decide to choose whatever object he pleases to perform certain operations — often for reasons that only he comprehends. But certain objects and materials are used more commonly than others, such as bottles, machetes, sheets, sticks, eggs, rice, thread, pieces of chalk, rocks, mirrors. The *granfa* may call for any of these during the *Play*, and in most cases only he understands the significance of the objects and knows what to do with them at that moment.

Ritual Motions

Kromanti Play always involves certain very distinctive ritual motions. One of these, called 'spinning', consists of a sort of twirling movement which requires two persons: one of them takes the other's hand, and holding it above the other's head, guides him through a full turn, and then back again. After this, the person who initiated the spin gently pushes the other person down into a squatting position and steps over him, whereupon the other person, still squatting, turns around to face him again, and the motion is repeated. These motions are a typical part of possession behavior, although they are sometimes also performed by *clean-yeye* persons. They are repeated very often in the context of *Kromanti Play*. When a *granfa* spins a living person, it is said he is 'cutting off destruction' — that is, he is clearing away any evil influences which may be lurking nearby.[39] Spinning is thus a sort of gesture of goodwill, in which the *granfa* transfers a small part of his power to other persons participating in the ceremony.

Another very important set of motions is known as *busubrandi* (sometimes called *faiakre*). The *fete-man*, either while possessed or *clean-yeye*, puts the patient in standing position and begins to pass one of his ritual objects around the two of them in a very distinctive manner: first he passes it around his own body, between and around each leg, around the torso, then under each arm and around over the opposite shoulder, and finally over his head. When this is done he performs the same sequence of movements on the patient. Then he takes each of the patient's feet and traces the form of a cross on each sole; he follows this by similarly 'marking' the palm of each hand, the nape of the neck, and the forehead. Sometimes animal blood is used in making these marks on the patient. The process of *busubrandi*, like spinning, imparts a measure of the performer's power to the person undergoing it. But beyond this, it enlists the aid of other spirits over which the performer has control, and draws them to the living person, so that the latter may benefit from their benevolent power.[40]

The pouring of libations is also common at *Kromanti Play* as is the practice of 'blowing' rum. In the latter, a mouthful of white rum is sprayed, in a fine mist, in the direction of a particular person

or object. Once again, this action can be used to draw the power of spirits to oneself or others. It is also used by the *kwatamassa* during the early stages of possession to help pacify the inflamed *granfa*.

The metaphor of 'tying' is often used by *fete-men* in discussing their methods of operation. A *fete-man* may 'tie' himself before going to a *Kromanti Play* at which he is just a casual participant, so as to prevent his *pakit* or other spirits from possessing him. Or he may try to 'tie' a rival *fete-man* who is using spirits to work against him. When he catches a malevolent spirit and traps it in a glass bottle, he says that he has 'tied' the spirit. The usage of the word 'tie' thus corresponds to the idea of subduing or controlling a spirit. The metaphor is undoubtedly drawn from the practice of capturing a spirit by tying it with a specially prepared string or piece of cloth. A good *fete-man* knows how to 'mek knot' in such a way as to trap a spirit indefinitely.[41]

Aside from the above-mentioned ritual motions, each *fete-man* learns from his *pakit* a large set of idiosyncratic ritual operations used for a number of different purposes. Therefore, at each *Kromanti Play* there occurs a large amount of ritualistic behavior which is not socially patterned, and the meaning of which remains a mystery to all, except the *fete-man*, or the spirit possessing him. Each *fete-man* keeps to himself his own personal store of knowledge which is not meant for others; every *fete-man* must have his own secrets.

Music and Dance

Music and dance are integral parts of *Kromanti Play*, without which the ceremony cannot be held. The musical ensemble usually consists of a pair of drums, each of which is called *printing*; a machete used as a percussion instrument, called 'iron', or *adawo*; and sometimes a hollow piece of bamboo beaten with two sticks, called *kwat*. The *Kromanti* drummer, known as the *okrema* or *printing-man*, is secondary in importance only to the *fete-man*.[42] He must be highly skilled on his instrument, and must be familiar with a diverse repertoire of drumming styles. When the *fete-man* becomes

possessed and 'throws' his songs, the *okrema* must know exactly which drum style goes with each song. If he plays poorly or makes mistakes the *granfa* will become agitated and refuse to work. Normally, two drummers are needed at *Kromanti dance*, one to play the supporting drum, called the 'rolling drum', and the other to play the lead drum, called the 'cutting drum'.[43]

There are several different types of *Kromanti* songs, some of which are associated with specific styles of drumming. The lighter, less serious songs are known as *Jawbone*, and although they may invoke spirits at times, they are used mainly for entertainment and recreational dancing. The words of these songs are usually in English or creole. A large number of other songs are grouped according to the 'tribe' with which they are associated. Among these are *Ibo*, *Prapa*, *Mongola*, *Dokose*, *Mandinga*. These songs are more powerful than *Jawbone* songs, and are used to invoke Maroon spirits belonging to the same tribes. They contain fewer English words than *Jawbone*. Another lighter group of songs is called *John Thomas* (closely related to yet two other styles known as *SaLeone* and *Tambu*). These songs may also be used to invoke spirits, although their power is limited.

The most powerful group of songs is known as *Country*. Maroon *Country* songs have a unique quality unlike any heard in other parts of Jamaica. They are accompanied by an explosive drumming style which approaches free rhythm — that is, the drumming is in speech mode and lacks a consistent underlying pulse — and they are chanted in a rather slow, dirge-like manner. Few of the *Country* songs have any English words; they consist, rather, of *Kromanti* words. These songs are usually saved for the peak of a crisis, for they call forth the greatest powers available to living Maroons. Such is their power that they usually will cause possession to occur within a matter of seconds. *Country* songs are very sacred and should never be sung without a purpose, for they attract large numbers of *duppies* very rapidly, and these spirits will be seriously angered if they have been summoned capriciously.

Each of the musical styles mentioned above has a corresponding dance style. While casual participants are welcome to dance for enjoyment during the early hours of *Kromanti Play*, and are familiar with the lighter styles, the later hours are usually reserved for the

fete-man, who is supposed to have mastered a varied and complex set of dance movements to match each of the different drumming styles.

Although spontaneous possession may occur without music on occasions, at most times music is required to bring about the controlled possession of a person by a particular spirit. Individual spirits have their own favorite songs, and these may be used at a *Kromanti dance* specifically to invoke them. Each *fete-man* also has a personal *pakit* song which he may use to invoke his *pakit* when he wishes to be possessed.

Outsiders in Kromanti Dance

Among the Maroons, a strong ethic of secrecy pervades all matters pertaining to traditional ritual. Although *fete-men* will share a certain amount of their specialized knowledge among themselves, even then they are reluctant to dispense with too much. There is a strong feeling that every individual must covet and protect a certain core of secret knowledge for himself. While he may exchange a good deal of information — perhaps even the greater part of what he knows — with other Maroons, he must always keep one last 'key' to himself, as a sort of last resort which can be seized upon in a dire emergency. One *fete-man* put it this way:

> Every nation is supposed to have a secret. Most have a secret. My secret I can't let out. Some people would like to get the details of everything, but no one can get all the details, because a part of the key is there. That key is a very amazing key. That is *my* key. It keeps everything steady.[44]

This 'key' must be kept absolutely secret and must be shared with no one, for once another person is given access to it he acquires the same measure of power, and should he decide to turn against the person who let out his secret, the latter would no longer have an ultimate defense.

On a more general level, secrecy about traditional Maroon beliefs and practices is a dominant theme running through Maroon culture.[45] Even the most general, widely-known areas of ritual knowledge must be kept within the in-group, and protected from the cu-

riosity of visiting outsiders. Non-Maroons are not permitted to learn of these things. There are supernatural sanctions against the giving out of Maroon knowledge to outsiders, and thus Maroons have developed patterned ways of 'dodging' the queries of meddlesome outsiders. (The Maroons have a special word, *jijifo*, meaning 'to dodge' – that is, to evade or mislead, by means of trickery or subterfuge, persons with whom one is at odds; the concept is somewhat similar in meaning to that of 'to fool someone'.)[46] There are several strategies regularly employed to protect secret Maroon knowledge from those who should not have access to it.[47] This broad rule of secrecy is tacitly understood by all of those who attend *Kromanti Play*, and is reflected in a few maxims which one hears repeated frequently in ritual contexts:

1. 'Yeye see, mouth shut.'
2. 'He that keepeth his mouth, keepeth his life.'

Those who violate this rule and talk too freely to outsiders are likely to incur the wrath of the ancestors, and may suffer some spirit-caused misfortune, such as an illness.[48]

Membership in the Maroon community is conceived of in terms of a vague ideology of blood relationship. Any person born of two Maroon parents is a full, or 'true-born', Maroon. Outsiders, meaning persons with no Maroon blood, are referred to by the general *Kromanti* term, *obroni*.[49] In common speech, black persons who are not Maroons are referred to by the term *niega*, which may or may not have derogatory connotations, depending on the speaker and the context.[50] Traditional Maroons will never refer to themselves or other Maroons as *niegas*, but will insist that, as Maroons, they belong to a different 'nation' from *niegas*. Many Maroons harbor feelings of superiority over *niega* people, although in day to day contacts they will show few signs of aloofness or hostility toward the latter. In many cases, Maroons develop close friendships with *niegas* from neighboring districts, and intermarriage between the two groups is common. (The child of a Maroon and a *niega* is called a *white-a-miggle*, and is considered half-Maroon.)[51] In fact, in most contexts little or no distinction is made between Maroons and *niegas*. There is constant interaction between

Maroons and outsiders, both within Moore Town and in surrounding areas, and more often than not such relations are amicable.

Nevertheless, in *Kromanti Play* the distinction between Maroons and *niegas* — and, for that matter, all other outsiders — is of paramount importance. It was previously mentioned that outsiders are strictly excluded from *Kromanti Play*, except in certain cases.[52] In actuality, these exceptional cases are fairly common. People from outside districts, well aware of the Maroons' reputation for supernatural cunning, often visit Moore Town seeking help of one sort or another, sometimes traveling many miles. Once they have been directed to a *fete-man*, he may offer to help them by means of *salo* — that is *clean yeye* spirit work, in which no possession occurs. On the other hand, the case may be too serious for relying on *salo*, and may require the higher power which can only be achieved in the context of *Kromanti dance*. If this is the case, the outsider is warned of the danger of *Kromanti dance*, and if he gives the impression that he is sufficiently brave, a dance will be planned for him. Traditionally, if dancing for another Maroon, a *fete-man* should not charge a set fee for his services, but should ask for '*yeye-sight*', meaning a token contribution the amount of which is decided by the patient. However, when dancing for outsiders, most *fete-men* will charge set amounts, ranging anywhere from twenty to more than one hundred dollars.

When an *obroni* attends a *Kromanti Play* he must be handled with extreme caution, for nothing will so enrage a possessing Maroon spirit as the presence of an outsider.[53] This point cannot be exaggerated. Upon sensing the presence of an *obroni*, whether a *niega* or any other outsider, the *granfa* will invariably become violently inflamed, and the life of the outsider will be in peril. There is a fairly consistent pattern of behavior occurring in such situations, as described below.

When the time comes to hold the *Kromanti dance,* the *obroni* is sequestered in a hut or house a short distance from the dance-ground. The dance begins and eventually, as the music gets hotter, the *fete-man* becomes possessed by his *pakit*. Almost immediately the possessed *fete-man* (now called *granfa*) becomes agitated and begins to sniff at his own armpits — a gesture which is recognized by the other Maroons present to signify that he 'smells' a 'different

blood' in the vicinity. The *granfa* instantly calls for an *afana* (machete) and starts to rant and rave about the *obroni* in his midst. When he gets hold of his weapon he may charge the house where the *obroni* is located and begin to violently chop at the walls, as he shrieks out obscenities directed at the *obroni* and the living Maroons at the ceremony who are responsible for his presence. Meanwhile, the *kwatamassa* and other Maroons present beg the *granfa* not to hurt the *obroni*, who has only come for help and intends no harm.

Eventually the *granfa* will cool down somewhat and it is then deemed the proper time to bring the *obroni* out. The *obroni* is instructed to stand directly behind the *kwatamassa* and hold his hands from behind. Thus linked together, the two of them make their way out to the danceground. As soon as the *granfa* sees them he instantly becomes incensed once again and charges at them. The *kwatamassa* must stay in front of the *obroni* at all times and act as his protector. So long as he stays between the *granfa* and the *obroni*, the latter will be safe, for as a rule a *granfa* will never shed the blood of another Maroon. The *granfa* lunges at them from all sides, attempting to find a way around the *kwatamassa*, all the while shouting and slashing the air with his machete. When he begins to show signs of cooling down again, it is time for the *obroni* to face him on his own. The *obroni* is placed standing up with his back against a bamboo pole or the wall of a house; before leaving him, the *kwatamassa* warns him not to move or show any signs of fear. He is told that if he runs he may be injured.

Once again the *granfa* charges at the *obroni* and begins to hack with great force at the surface over his head. As he chops from all sides, splinters of wood or bamboo fly about. He may put the point of the machete at the *obroni*'s chest or throat and begin to apply pressure. When he is satisfied with the *obroni*'s courage, he will at last step forward and shake his hand, indicating his acceptance. But before the *granfa* can begin to work for him, the *obroni* must be sworn to an oath of secrecy. This oath is administered by the *granfa*. He takes his machete and places the blade in the *obroni*'s mouth, sharp side in. While uttering an incantation, he pours a mixture, called *asikere* (sugar and water), over the upper edge of the machete and down the patient's throat. Sometimes the *obroni* will

also be instructed to repeat certain words after the *granfa*, and to take the machete and thrust it into the ground three times. When this is done the *obroni* is fully sworn, and is warned that should he tell anyone about what he sees during the ceremony, he will suffer disastrous consequences.[45]

Once an *obroni* has been sworn by a *granfa*, the spirit that was riding the *fete-man* at the time knows him and will recognize him during future possessions. However, if a different spirit rides the *fete-man*, the swearing process will have to be repeated in its entirety, since the spirit has not yet been introduced to the *obroni*. After the *obroni* has been given the oath by the spirit that will be helping him that night, the business at hand may proceed. Depending on the nature of his case, the *obroni* will be put through a series of ritual operations, some of which were described in an earlier section of this paper. In many cases the cure will require more than one dance, and the *obroni* will have to return at a later date for further treatment.

Outside influences in Kromanti Dance

As mentioned before, *Kromanti dance* has been subject to a process of compartmentalization, and there is little evidence of syncretism with features from Christianity or other religious systems from outside. However, there has been a slight influence from the traditions of magic practiced in urban areas. The word 'science', used in reference to magical or spiritual practices, is itself derived from urban traditions. But the Maroons have adopted the term for their own purposes, and use it to refer to traditional Maroon practices. Nowadays, Maroons state that they work *science*, while outsiders work *obeah*. The major distinction between these two forms lies in the materials used: Maroon *science* relies on the natural power of 'weeds', either to heal or injure, whereas the *obeah* practiced by *niegas* depends on magical oils, powders, candles, and other manufactured paraphanelia, and is seen as usually being evil in intent. Many of the materials used in *obeah* are imported from esoteric companies in the United States which specialize in good luck charms and other 'novelties'. Books and manuals of 'Black Magic'

are also used by outside practitioners of *obeah*. These books, most of which are published in the United States, have been outlawed in Jamaica, but are highly desired by *obeah-men*.

While a few Maroon *fete-men* have begun to use urban methods and materials in the context of *Kromanti Play*, and particularly in working *salo*, the traditionalists, who make up a majority, refuse to incorporate these non-Maroon elements in their work. They disparage those who use books, and oils and powders, asserting that this only serves to dilute the natural power inherent in Maroon 'weeds'. Some *fete-men* state that the oils and powders used in *obeah* actually repel Maroon spirits; manufactured oils and perfumes and natural herbs, they insist, simply do not mix, so it is better to rely on one or the other than to try and combine the two. Nonetheless, a number of less traditional *fete-men* feel that there is no incompatibility between traditional and imported materials, and regularly make use of manufactured items such as books, crystal balls, oils, incense, candles, rings, and other charms, alongside their *jeges*, *saddles*, and Maroon 'trash' (herbs).[55]

Relationship of Kromanti Dance to Afro-Jamaican Cults

Donald Hogg, in an interesting paper (1960), has speculated on the possible origins of two Afro-Jamaican religious cults, *Kumina* and *Convince*, in the traditional religious practices of the Windward Maroons. These two cults, concentrated in the eastern parishes of Jamaica, are practiced in areas adjoining the Maroon districts, and display a more African character than the Afro-Christian cults found throughout Jamaica, such as *Pocomania* (*Pukkumina*) or *Zion Revival*. Hogg suggests that these cults, particularly *Convince*, may have developed among the Maroons, or at least have had a historical connection with the spread of individual Maroons to surrounding areas after the general emancipation of slaves in 1838. The hypothesis is an intriguing one, but the data collected on the *Kromanti dance* tradition would seem to lend it only partial credence. Relying on the sparse data available on Maroon religion at the time, Hogg (1960 : 16) correctly notes that

> ...the little information available on Maroon religion indicates that it is similar in many respects to Convince. For example, both involve animal sacrifices, possession by ghosts, religious dancing, ritualized aggression, the use of ghosts for Obeah, and copious consumption of rum during ceremonies. The members of both cults have strong propensities for climbing trees when possessed and are reputed to accomplish the same kinds of miraculous feats.

Everything in this statement would hold equally true for the *Kumina* cults, which are found in an area which roughly coincides with that in which *Convince* occurs. There are several other parallels between the *Kromanti* tradition and both *Kumina* and *Convince* which HOGG does not mention. For instance, in both *Kromanti Play* and *Kumina*, spirit possession is termed *myal*; *Convince* workers, on the other hand, more often use the expression 'tek body' to mean possession. *Convince* members tie their heads with a kerchief known, as in *Kromanti dance*, as a *saddle* (although it is tied in a very different manner), while *Kumina* people generally do not tie their heads at all while in possession. Both *Kumina* and *Convince* devotees, like Maroons, make use of an equestrian metaphor in speaking of possession. In all three traditions, possessed persons adopt a different mode of speech from the living, and in *Kumina*, participants refer to the most powerful and deepest level of language as *Country*, as do the Maroons.[56]

In spite of all the above, members of all three traditions are quick to point out the differences between them, and these would seem, from a broader perspective, to outweigh the similarities. Both the *Kumina* people and the Maroons think of themselves, in a somewhat ill-defined way, as 'nations', and representatives of both traditions, while recognizing that they share a related African ancestry, vehemently reject the idea that the two groups share the same cultural and historical heritage. *Kumina* members refer to themselves as 'Africans', members of the 'bongo nation', and view the Maroons as a 'different nation' closely related to them, but with a separate cultural tradition. Conversely, Maroons refer to *Kumina* people as the 'bongo race', and think of them as a separate 'nation' with a different tradition. Maroons and *Kumina* people are said by members of both groups to represent 'two sides' of a larger, broader African tradition which also encompasses other Jamaicans of African descent.

This contention of separate identity and origin would seem to be

borne out by the available facts. There is a good deal of objective evidence indicating that the *Kromanti* and *Kumina* traditions stem from two separate cultural-historical streams which have been in contact over a long period, and thus have borrowed back and forth from each other. Even today, Maroons commonly visit and participate in *Kumina* ceremonies in St. Thomas parish, where they are treated with special respect. Although much of what the Maroon visitor witnesses at the *Kumina* ceremony will be familiar to him in essence, much of it, unless he has been trained in the *Kumina* tradition, will also appear strange. By the same token, on the less common occasions that a *Kumina* person is allowed to visit a *Kromanti dance* in the Moore Town area, there is much that he will readily grasp, but the larger part of what happens will not be understandable to him. The primary reason for this is that the ceremonies of *Kumina* and *Kromanti*, while sharing many general elements and possessing broad structural similarities, are based on different behavioral patterns and distinct visual and aural cues, many of which are related to spirit possession. When a Maroon is possessed by a Maroon spirit, a *Kumina* person will not understand his actions or his language, and the same is true conversely.

In particular, the linguistic evidence strongly supports the theory of a separate origin for *Kumina* and the Maroon *Kromanti* tradition. Informants very quickly point out that 'African' *Country* (that spoken by *Kumina* people) and Maroon *Country* are very different, and are not mutually intelligible. In fact, it seems fairly clear at this point that the *Country* spoken by the *Kumina* people is basically of Kikongo (Central Africa) origin, while the *Country* of the Maroons shows a strong Akan influence.[57] The *Kromanti* 'language' of the Maroons and the *Country* of the *Kumina* people (which they sometimes refer to as 'Kongo language') are totally distinct. In addition to this there are several significant details in which the Maroon and *Kumina* traditions differ. For instance, the *Kumina* tradition lacks an equivalent concept to the *pakit*, which is so important in Maroon tradition; nor does it include a specific instrument of divination such as the *jege*. *Kumina* ceremonies often include the sacrifice of a goat, which is strictly taboo in the *Kromanti* setting, and hogs are never used unless Maroons are present. Although Maroons and *Kumina* people share a large

number of songs, these are sung in different ways, and all belong to the lighter categories of songs. The deeper *Country* songs of the two groups are in different languages, and are backed by completely different drumming styles. The drums themselves and methods of playing differ markedly; those of the *Kumina* people are short, with a broad head, and are turned on their sides and mounted while played, while those of the Maroons are long and slender and played in an upright position, held between the legs.

Furthermore, there is a marked contrast in the overall tenor of *Kumina* versus *Kromanti* ceremonies. The factor of secrecy is nowhere near as important in *Kumina* as in *Kromanti Play*. *Kumina* ceremonies are open to anyone who wishes to attend, although an admission fee is sometimes charged. *Kromanti Play*, on the other hand, is restricted solely to Maroons, a rule which is strictly observed, except in certain special circumstances, as previously noted. *Kumina* ceremonies include no tradition of giving oath, such as is found whenever an outsider attends a *Kromanti Business dance*. Moreover, there is no comparison between the institutionalized belligerence of the possessed *Kromanti* dancer, usually bordering on frenzy, and the sporadic aggression sometimes displayed by *Kumina* devotees when possessed. The difference is not merely one of degree, but also of quality: Maroon spirits are bellicose *by nature*, whereas the 'bongo spirits' which possess *Kumina* people vary widely in temperament, and some have very mild dispositions. Even those 'bongo spirits' which tend to behave violently never display the sustained ferocity which is the norm for Maroons in a state of possession.[58]

But all of the above evidence is merely circumstantial. The strongest case for an independent origin of *Kumina* is to be found in MONICA SCHULER's recent historical work (1980) on the post-Emancipation immigration of Africans to Jamaica in the nineteenth century. Shortly after Emancipation in 1838 the large landowners and planters began to experience a serious shortage of labor as the newly freed former slaves rapidly abandoned the plantations to start their own settlements in the hills. To ameliorate this situation the planters developed a scheme for the 'voluntary' immigration of free wage laborers from Asia and Africa. A major part of this plan revolved around the importation of laborers drawn from

the population of 'recaptives': that is, Africans from various parts of the continent who had been captured as slaves, and subsequently intercepted by British patrols (sent out to suppress the slave trade) before the slavers on which they were stowed reached their destinations. Most of these 'recaptives' (also known as 'Liberated Africans') eventually ended up in Sierra Leone, where a colony had been established for the 'repatriation' of Liberated Africans. The Jamaican government (as well as several other West Indian governments) arranged for the recruitment of large numbers of these Liberated Africans. Between 1841 and 1867 more than eight thousand such Liberated Africans, representing many different tribal or ethnic groups, entered Jamaica as wage laborers (SCHULER 1980: 112-113). Most of these persons were transported from Sierra Leone or St. Helena, but a smaller number were brought directly from the ships on which the British had intercepted them. Although many of these people considered themselves temporary immigrants, few were given the opportunity to return to Africa, and their descendants remain in Jamaica today.

Many of the Liberated Africans brought to Jamaica were resettled on plantations in St. Thomas, the parish in which *Kumina* is today strongest. At this point it may be said that the evidence points overwhelmingly to a relatively recent origin for *Kumina*; all things considered, it appears that the religion and ceremonial dance which is today known as *Kumina* was introduced to Jamaica by Liberated Africans between 1840 and 1870. It is quite possible that the religious system introduced by the newly-arrived Liberated Africans syncretized with elements from Afro-Jamaican cults already present in the island, but in any case the *Kumina* tradition of today still clearly bears the cultural stamp of recent arrival. The presence, for instance, of a large number of specific and relatively 'pure' Central African cultural and linguistic retentions in *Kumina* strongly supports the theory of recent origin. (It comes as no surprise that the majority of the immigrant ships arriving in St. Thomas parish during the nineteenth century came not from Sierra Leone, but from St. Helena, where the Liberated African population was almost exclusively of Central African origin.) It is important to note as well that the contemporary oral traditions of more prominent *Kumina* cultists strongly support the theory that

Kumina originated among the Liberated Africans in Jamaica (SCHULER 1980: 65-96). Some of MONICA SCHULER's *Kumina* informants in St. Thomas claimed to be but a few generations removed from a specific Central African ancestor (Ibid: 70-80), as did several of this author's *Kumina* informants. All of the above would seem to lend credence to the oft repeated assertions of both Maroons and *Kumina* people that *Kromanti dance* and *Kumina* represent the traditions of two different 'nations'.[59]

The *Convince* cult is particularly interesting, and deserves to be treated separately. While bearing some similarity to *Kromanti* tradition, the *Convince* cult, in the author's view, appears to be the result of a syncretization of elements from the tradition to which *Kumina* belongs with other elements stemming from the early attempts at Christian missionization in Jamaica, going back to the nineteenth century. Some *Convince* informants used the title '61 Revival' interchangeably with the name 'Convince', apparently making reference to the sudden upsurge of Christian enthusiasm known as the Great Revival which swept Jamaica during the 1860's. *Convince* men, like the *Kumina* people, claim to belong to the 'bongo nation', and in fact assert that they are of the same 'nation' as the *Kumina* people, but use different spirits and methods of working. At the same time most of them recognize that the Maroons belong to a different 'nation' altogether, and employ different methods of spirit-work, as well as different language, songs, and dance movements. *Convince* men, when possessed, behave and speak in a manner totally uncharacteristic of Maroon *granfa*s. Although they may become violent at times, they lack the intensity and the unremittent truculence of possessed Maroon *fete-men*. And unlike Maroon *granfa*s, they are not inflamed by the presence of persons with 'different blood'. *Convince* ceremonies, like *Kumina*, are open to all 'well-wishers' who choose to attend.

Possessed *Convince* workers speak the Jamaican creole with a very peculiar accent, different from speech modes in both *Kumina* and *Kromanti*, although they spice their conversations with a fair number of words from the 'African Country' of the *Kumina* people, and a lesser number of words from Maroon *Kromanti* as well. In addition to this, they have a small vocabularly of words which are used only by *Convince* spirits. The songs used to invoke

spirits consist either of reworked Christian hymns, newly composed songs with an unconventional Christian emphasis, or folk songs of a recreational nature, some of which are also sung by *Kumina* groups. *Convince* men in general do not know any of the higher Maroon songs, nor do they understand more than a slight bit of Maroon *Country*.

Interestingly enough, there are a few Maroons from the Moore Town area who have adopted *Convince* work in favor of their own *Kromanti* tradition, and present day *Convince* men state that it was not uncommon in the past for Maroons from Moore Town, Charles Town, and Scott's Hall — as well as persons of partial Maroon descent from neighboring districts — to take up the *Convince* tradition. One of the author's informants was a Maroon who formerly danced *Kromanti*, but decided to put that tradition aside and take up *Convince* work while he was living in the parish of St. Thomas. He was fully conscious of the differences between the two traditions, and felt that *Convince* was not his own 'real' tradition, but preferred it over *Kromanti Play* because he found it was less of a strain on his body. Another informant, a 'bongo man' from St. Thomas, was trained in *Convince* by a Maroon from Moore Town who had lived in St. Thomas for several years and adopted *Convince*. This man recounted how his 'boss' used to become possessed by both Maroon and 'bongo' spirits, and described how the spirits from the two different 'nations' would act differently. (This man was able to imitate fairly accurately the distinctive speech patterns of a Maroon *granfa*). He stated that when his 'boss' was possessed by 'bongo' spirits, the spirits would sometimes comment that their *horse* was a Maroon, and belonged to a 'different nation' from them.

Most *fete-men* in the Moore Town area today have encountered *Convince* during visits to outside villages, and some have joined as casual participants in *Convince* ceremonies. All of these individuals feel that *Convince* is properly the tradition of a different 'nation', although they are aware that a small number of Maroons take part in *Convince* ceremonies.

All of the above leads to the conclusion that the *Convince* cult developed apart from the *Kromanti* tradition, in outside locations, among persons who were familiar with *Kumina* and considered

themselves members of the same 'bongo nation', but who had adopted and reinterpreted certain superficial Christian elements to fit their own religious system. It is quite likely that Maroons, as they migrated away from their settlements, participated in and influenced this development also. This sort of interaction between Maroons and outsiders, in outside ritual contexts, still occurs to some extent today.[60] It is reasonable to assume, however, that such contacts, whether in the past or present, would result only in limited Maroon influence of a rather superficial sort. For the people who hold *Kumina* and *Convince* as their own traditions are, after all, *obroni*s — and, as such, are not entitled to learn the deeper levels of Maroon knowledge. Even today, Maroons who have lived outside their communities for several years are generally loath to discuss the details of the *Kromanti* tradition with the *obroni*s amongst whom they live, despite the unrelenting curiosity of the latter.

Kromanti Dance and Maroon Identity

It seems clear enough that the tradition of *Kromanti dance* serves to reinfroce a sense of distinct Maroon identity among its participants. Nearly all of the most important symbols of Maroon identity — the *Kromanti* drum, the *junga*, the *Kromanti* 'language', and most importantly, the complex patterns of institutionalized behavior connected with spirit possession — are brought into play in *Kromanti* ceremonies. The exclusory nature of the institution itself defines the boundary between Maroons and outsiders, who in most other contexts mingle freely, with a minimum of distinction. In fact, it is impossible for an outsider, without previous knowledge of an individual, to know whether or not this person is a Maroon — unless the latter engages in the patterns of symbolic behavior which distinguish Maroons from outsiders, most of which are integrally connected with the *Kromanti dance* complex. Only after a Maroon externalizes these symbols does his unique identity become apparent to outsiders.

Many visitors to Moore Town and other Maroon communities have been struck by the peaceful aspect of the contemporary


settlements, in contrast to the militaristic societies described in the historical accounts of the early Maroons. To these observers, it seems that the Maroons have undergone a thorough metamorphosis, a volte-face in life-style which has severed them from their past. On the contrary, in present day Moore Town historical consciousness is not lacking; in fect, the unique history of the Maroons is essential to their identity. As LEANN MARTIN (1973: 180) states: 'it is clear that the primary cultural tool as well as the primary ingredient in their cultural identity, is history.' The living past is crystallized nowhere more clearly than in the context of *Kromanti Play*, in which the long-deceased of past generations return for a short time to the realm of the living to offer their aid. In the drama which ensues, they act in ways thought to represent the behavior of past generations of Maroons, who lived during a time when relations between Maroons and outsiders were fraught with violence and distrust. Like the earlier Maroon society to which many of them are said to have belonged, the ancestors possess a fundamental militaristic orientation which is reflected in the institutionalized aggression of possessed individuals. All of the important ritual objects and motions in *Kromanti Play* are thought to mirror the practices of past generations of Maroons. And the stress placed on secrecy is said by present-day Maroons to hark back to the days when the success of Maroons in war depended on their exclusive knowledge of the *Kromanti* traditions — which lent them spiritual strength in their struggles against the British.

The *Kromanti dance* complex represents the chief nexus in time and space of the symbols and attitudes which define and support traditional Maroon identity. As the tradition wanes in importance among the younger generation, there is a corresponding attenuation of traditional Maroon identity. This process is a complex one, and it is difficult to single out all the causative factors. But it is certain that *fete-men*, and those who participate regularly in *Kromanti* ceremonies, possess the strongest sense of traditional Maroon identity in the Moore Town area today. In the community of Charles Town, the *Kromanti dance* tradition has long been moribund, and there has been a near-complete loss of traditional Maroon identity among the inhabitants. In Scott's Hall, on the other hand, the *Kromanti* tradition survives, but is gradually decreasing in importance,

and Maroon identity is weakening throughout the community, particularly among younger persons.

In all of the Windward Maroon communities, the distinctive Maroon cultural heritage — all of those cultural features which set the inhabitants apart, as individual Maroons, from other Jamaicans — are connected intimately with the *Kromanti dance* complex. The *Kromanti* 'language', the music, the songs, the dance, the whole belief system articulated through *Kromanti Play*, and the imperative of secrecy attached to it, are the crucial features which, joined together, form a distinctive Maroon cultural identity. It is therefore difficult to conceive of the continued, long-range existence of the Maroons as a distinct people in the absence of the *Kromanti* tradition.

The years immediately ahead will tell whether the Maroons lose this tradition entirely and face final assimilation into the wider Jamaican society or, as is also possible, experience a renewed enthusiasm for the *Kromanti* tradition which would ensure a new lease on life for Maroon ethnicity.



Map of Jamaica showing locations of Maroon communities.

NOTES

1. This study was made possible by a Fellowship from the Organization of American States. The author wishes to express his gratitude to RICHARD PRICE, BARBARA KOPYTOFF, and GEORGE EATON SIMPSON for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. He would also like to make known the deep appreciation he feels for the generous help given by his many Maroon teachers.

2. 'Creole' here refers to persons born in the New World.

3. For an overview of Jamaican Maroon history, see KOPYTOFF (1973) and CAMPBELL (1977). Marronage, or flight from slavery, was common throughout the New World. For an excellent comparative examination of maroon societies in several parts of the Americas, see PRICE (1979b).

4. This paper is based on twelve months of field work in the Moore Town area (which includes several other smaller Maroon branch settlements, such as Comfort Castle and Cornwall Barracks). The author also spent one month in Scott's Hall, and a shorter period in Charles Town, gathering comparative data. *Kromanti dance* is still performed occasionally in Scott's Hall, and is similar in many respects to the Moore Town version. In Charles Town the tradition appears to have all but vanished, but reminiscences collected from older residents indicate that it was very close to the traditions of both Scott's Hall and Moore Town. Accompong, however, appears from all accounts to possess a *Kromanti dance* tradition which differs considerably from the traditions of the three eastern communities. See DUNHAM (1946) for a brief description of Accompong traditions.

   The information in this report on Moore Town is based on firsthand observation of *Kromanti dance* ceremonies in that community and the surrounding area, as well as numerous discussions with *fete-men* (Maroon ritual specialists). Ten practicing *fete-men* from the Moore Town area acted as the author's primary informants. For a brief description of *Kromanti dance* in Scott's Hall and Charles Town, based on short-term field work, see SCHAFER (1973).

5. The few extant historical accounts make no more than fleeting references to the religious or magical beliefs and practices of the Maroons. The following passage offers a good example: 'In common with all the nations of Africa, they believed..., as I have observed, in the prevalence of *Obi* (a sort of witchcraft of most extensive influence) and the authority which such of their old men as had the reputations of wizards, or *Obeah-men*, possessed over them, was sometimes very successfully employed in keeping them in subordination to their chiefs' (EDWARDS 1796: xxix).

6. MINTZ & PRICE (1976) explores in some detail the processes (historical and cultural) involved in the formation of Afro-American cultures in the New World, with a special focus on the Caribbean. The study includes a brief discussion of religion which is very relevant to an understanding of how syncretic complexes such as the *Kromanti dance* evolved over time. KOPYTOFF (1976), while dealing specifically with the Jamaican Maroons, touches on several important related issues.

7. This account of the early Christian impact is based on information found in CAREY (1970), as well as current oral traditions.

8. *Yankipong* derived from Twi, 'Onyankopon' ('God') (MOHR 1909: 86); *Tata Nyame* from Jamaican creole, 'Tata' ('Father') (CASSIDY 1971: 222) + Twi, 'Onyame' ('God') (MOHR 1909: 86).

9. Examples of such intermediate pantheons in the New World are the *loa* of Haitian *Vodun*, the *orisha* of Cuban *Santeria*, and the *powers* of Trinidadian *Shango*. For further information on these, see SIMPSON (1978: 62-94).
According to SIMPSON's classification of Afro-American religions, the *Kromanti dance* would fall under the category *ancestral cults*, which includes traditions such as the *Big Drum dance* of Carriacou or the *Kele cult* of St. Lucia (Ibid: 95).

10. Kojo (spelled 'Cudjoe' in the British literature) was the leader of the Leeward Maroons in the Cockpit Country of western Jamaica during the eighteenth century. Nanny was a ritual specialist and spiritual leader among the Windward Maroons during roughly the same period. Both leaders were almost certainly of Ashanti or Fanti descent, and it is said that Nanny was born in Africa.

11. Alternatively called 'Swiple-o-Mento' ('swiple' meaning slippery, or tricky).

12. The author is most grateful to BARBARA KOPYTOFF for bringing to his attention a published historical reference to Welcome (ELLETSON 1949: 107). The Governor's secretary, in a letter to CHARLES SWIGLE, Superintendent at Moore Town, dated May 3, 1767, refers to 'Capt. Welcome's Badge', which he is keeping for the present. Presumably Captain Welcome is dead by then and the question arises to whom to give his badge. A Maroon named Welcome, possibly the son of Captain Welcome, carries the letter to the Governor, and he is given the commission and rank of Lieutenant, but not the badge, at least not at that time. Presumably the Captain Welcome mentioned in this letter, who appears to have died shortly before it was written, is the 'Granfa Welcome' remembered by present-day Maroons, a warrior of pre-treaty times.

13. The development of separate 'nations' or religious societies among Africans in the New World, based on tribal or ethnic affiliations, was a common phenomenon, especially in Catholic countries. See SIMPSON (1978: 51-60).
The author has not been able to trace the derivation of the word 'Dokose'. 'Ibo' (or Igbo) is the name of a large ethnic group in Southeastern Nigeria. The word 'Mongola' was apparently used in Jamaica during the slavery period to refer to Africans from the region of Angola (CASSIDY & LE PAGE 1967: 303). The word 'Prapa' is most likely derived from 'Papaw' (sometimes spelled 'Papa'), used by Europeans in Jamaica to refer to slaves who originated in the Ewe-speaking area west of the Yoruba region (Ibid: 338-339). Some of the same 'tribes' are mentioned by Scott's Hall Maroons; SCHAFER (1973: 240) heard the following names: 'Congo', 'Papaw', 'Mandingo', & 'Ashanti'.

14. The word 'Chankofi' is most likely related to the word spelled 'Kencuffee' by DALLAS (1803: 31), used by the early Leeward Maroons to refer to one of the ethnic subdivisions within their group. Of the other tribes listed, only two are readily identifiable: Mandinga (Mandingo) and Nago. The former is the name of a large group in the Senegambian region, while the latter was the name used by Europeans to refer to Yoruba slaves from what is today Nigeria.

15. In several other Afro-American religions a distinction is made between different levels of intensity (or degrees of dissociation) in spirit possession, and sometimes these correspond to different categories of spirits. See SIMPSON (1978: 132-133).

16. *Asafo* derived from Twi, 'asafo' ('troop') (MOHR 1909: 201). 'Asafo' is also the name of the Fanti warrior associations in Ghana today.

17. While public ceremonies were held only a few times during the author's field trip, scarcely a week passed in which a small, private ceremony did not take place in the area. These ceremonies were almost always *Business dances* and were attended by no more than ten to twenty persons.

18. *Kumfu-man* most likely derived from Twi, 'o-komfo' ('fetish-priest') (MOHR 1909: 147).

19. For the sake of convenience, the male form, 'fete-man', rather than the female form, 'fete-woman', will be used throughout this paper.

20. Although the pronunciation of this word is identical with the Jamaican creole pronunciation of the English word 'pocket', it is spelled differently here, since informants insisted that these are two completely different words, without any semantic connection. They also asserted that the word bears no relation to the English word 'packet'. It is possible that the word is of African origin, but over time has changed into a homophone of the Jamaican English word 'pocket'. The spelling used is not intended as a precise phonetic representation. Throughout this paper, words of Jamaican provenience are spelled according to an informal approximation of standard American English spelling and pronunciation. There has been no attempt to use a consistent, systematized orthography.

21. This washing of the head is similar to ceremonies in several other parts of the New World, such as *laver-tete* in Haiti (METRAUX 1959: 200), or the head-washing practiced in the Shango cult in Grenada (POLLAK-ELTZ 1968: 59-60). It also bears a resemblance to headwashing initiatory rites in Yorubaland (West Africa) and Trinidad (SIMPSON 1962: 1209-1210).

22. In this respect, the concept of *pakit* seems to be somewhat unique in the Caribbean area. In Haiti, Trinidad, and elsewhere in the Caribbean, animals are sometimes associated with magical powers, but it appears that ancestral spirits are not believed to assume the forms of animals. The closest parallel to the Jamaican concept of *pakit*, it would seem, is to be found among South American maroons, such as the Boni, some of whose deities are said to have the appearance of particular animals, such as the jaguar, ocelot, or vulture (SIMPSON 1978: 209-210); or the Matawai, whose *Koomanti* deities are believed to habitually choose particular animals as vehicles for their earthly manifestations (GREEN 1974: 244).

23. *Ananka* derived from Twi, 'o-nanka' ('snake') (MOHR 1909: 175). *Opete* from Twi, 'opete' ('vulture') (MOHR 1909: 210). *Okrema* from Twi, 'akroma' ('hawk') (MOHR 1909: 91). *Sumans* possibly derived indirectly from Twi, 'asuman' ('fetish') (MOHR 1909: 75).

24. In *Kromanti dance*, possessed individuals speak a 'spirit language' which displays elements of what appears to be an old form of creole no longer used in normal speech. This 'spirit language' bears a strong resemblance to other New World creoles, such as Sranan, the language of coastal Suriname. For example, in Sranan the words for 'somebody', 'belly', and 'walk' (*suma*, *beri*, and *waka*, respectively) are the same as those used in the Jamaican Maroon 'spirit language'. Likewise, the Sranan word for 'fight' (*feti*) is very close to the Jamaican Maroon equivalent (*fete*). It should be noted that the Maroon term *fete-man* (pronounced 'feh-tay man') is not related to the French word 'fête'.

25. For discussions of the significance of spirit possession and trance in Afro-American religions, see SIMPSON (1978: 130-139) and BOURGUIGNON (1970).

26. These 'wandering spirits' are similar psychologically to *rérés* in Trinidad. See SIMPSON (1962: 1211-1212).

27. 'Myalism' was a nativistic movement which appears to have originated in Jamaica during the eighteenth century and to have contributed to several later religious developments, eventually blending with Christian forms to produce a unique form of native Revivalism which still flourishes throughout rural Jamaica. See BECKWITH (1929: 142-174), and SCHULER (1979b). Although it seems likely that some significant connection between the early myal movement and the early Maroon societies existed, the nature and extent of this link has yet to be established.

28. 'Yeye' = eye.

29. *Afana* derived from Twi, 'afana' ('sword') (MOHR 1909: 192).

30. *Granfa* and *pikin* belong to the Maroon 'spirit language', and signify 'grandfather' and 'child', respectively. *Pikin* is a Portuguese-derived word widespread in New World creoles. *Grandy* is used in Jamaican creole as a term of address for 'grandmother'. (*Granfa* is sometimes alternately pronounced *Granfara*).

31. Akan is a language group found in present day Ghana and the Ivory Coast, consisting of a number of mutually intelligible dialects, including Twi, spoken by the Ashanti people, and Fanti, the dialect of the neighboring Fanti people. The available evidence points to a predominance of Ashanti or Fanti individuals in leadership roles during the formative period of Jamaican Maroon society.

32. Much of the *Kromanti* 'language' (*Country*) is closely tied to speech-mode drumming. The phrase 'cutting Country' is derived from an analogy to the playing of 'drum language'. In local parlance, the lead drum used in *Kromanti dance* is known as the 'cutting' drum, because its rhythmic patterns 'cut' against those of the supporting (or 'rolling') drum.

33. The *jege* used in Moore Town is clearly related to the 'jiggey' described by BECKWITH (1929: 144) as a 'talisman' made of a bundle of herbs (used in conjunction with a glass marble), which was used by the 'myal people' of western Jamaica whom she investigated.

34. Free translation from Jamaican creole, taken from a tape-recorderd interview.

35. For a partial listing of plants used by the Moore Town Maroons for medicinal purposes, see COHEN (1974). In the same study, COHEN (:112-132) provides a description of *Kromanti Play* in Moore Town which, though incomplete and based solely on the second-hand reports of informants, is nevertheless accurate in most respects.

36. Several aspects of the Maroon tradition of herbal medicine — for instance, the use of plants, baths, and guards — are common in other parts of the West Indies; it is probable that these are derived from West African practices.

37. *Okoko* derived from Twi, 'akoko' ('fowl') (MOHR 1909: 80). *Oprako* from Twi, 'prako' ('pig') (MOHR 1909: 141).

38. The equivalents of 'thunder balls' are called *pierre tonnerre* in Haiti, and are known as *pierres* or 'thunder stones' in Trinidadian Shango (GEORGE E. SIMPSON, pers. comm., 1979).

39. A similar phrase, 'cutting and clearing', is used by Jamaican revivalist cult members to refer to the ritual clearing away of evil influences (GEORGE E. SIMPSON, pers. comm., 1979).

40. 'Busubrandi' can also refer to the gestures of threat which are used to test the courage of non-Maroons, who must be given a special oath if they are to attend and remain at a *Kromanti Business dance*.

41. Tying of spirits is also done in a similar manner in Haiti (SIMPSON 1940: 242).

42. *Printing* derived from Twi, 'o-perenten' (' a certain drum') (CHRISTALLER 1933: 389). *Adawo* probably derived from Twi, 'o-dawuru' ('a kind of bell to be struck with a stick') (CHRISTALLER 1933: 67). *Okrema* (as pronounced in Moore Town, a homophone of the word used to mean 'chickenhawk') probably derived from Twi, 'okyerema' ('drummer') (MOHR 1909: 68). For a perspective on the relationship of *Kromanti dace* to other Jamaican music and dance forms, see RYMAN (1980: 2-14).

43. 'Rolling' refers to the repetitive rhythmic patterns of the supporting drum, while 'cutting' refers to the sharp accentuation played on the lead drum to create excitement. This usage is also found in conjunction with other types of Jamaican drumming, such as *Kumina*, in which the lead drummer alternates between 'rolling' and 'cutting' on the same drum.

44. Free translation from tape-recorded interview.

45. A similar tradition of secrecy is to be found among Suriname maroons. For an engaging analysis of Saramaka secrecy, see PRICE (1979a).

46. *Jijifo* derived from Twi, 'gyigyé' ('to lead astray; to entice, decoy, cheat, deceive, delude') (CHRISTALLER 1933: 160-161). The corresponding noun is 'gyigyéfó'.

47. LEANN MARTIN, in her unpublished doctoral dissertation (1973: 134-154), accurately

describes some of the complex strategies used by Maroons to protect secret knowledge from outsiders.

48. The Maroon penchant for secrecy created considerable problems in the collection of data for this study, and it is possible this factor led to certain distortions or inaccuracies of data which slipped past the author unnoticed. However, all data were either culled through repeated direct observation, or were carefully cross-checked against the statements of a number of different informants. Therefore, the author feels that the picture presented herein displays a high degree of accuracy, in spite of the 'dodging factor' which is an inescapable fact in relations between Maroons and outsiders.

49. *Obroni* derived from Twi, 'o-buro-ni' ('European, white man, mulatto') (CHRISTALLER 1933: 54).

50. 'Niega' is the spelling adopted by CASSIDY (1971: 156), but the word has often been spelled 'neger' or 'naygur'. It is used throughout Jamaica to refer to black persons, and it often carries very negative connotations. It is used in this paper only because of its special usage among the Maroons as a classificatory term which distinguishes non-Maroon Afro-Jamaicans from Maroons. This classificatory usage was noted more than forty years ago by a casual visitor to Moore Town, who wrote: 'It should be noted that the term 'neagre' is not used by them to mean 'negro' as they claim that all black people are negroes of which they form a part. Neither is the term a complimenting one, but is disrespectfully used by them to describe all the blacks of Jamaica who cannot claim Maroon lineage...' (THOMPSON 1938: 476). The term 'nenge' is used in a similar way by Suriname maroons to refer to non-maroon Afro-Surinamers (RICHARD PRICE, pers. comm., 1979).

51. 'Miggle' = middle.

52. This exclusion of outsiders has been noted by a few earlier writers. One writer who lived in Moore Town for a short time recorded these impressions: 'Besides effecting a cure, they claim that much harm can be done to intruders by these dances. They claim that no person other than Maroons dare attend without special invitation, and as a matter of fact they seem to invite no such person. Any such person daring to attend is subject to severe penalty by the weird spirit' (THOMPSON 1938: 478).

53. It seems that when Suriname maroons are possessed by Kromanti deities they are similarly inimicable to outsiders (i.e., those who are not familar with Kromanti). HERSKOVITS & HERSKOVITS (1934: 322-323), for instance, state: 'The man who is actuated by Kromanti obia is feared by all who themselves do not have Kromanti. Obia Kromanti warns and protects and heals, but its powers are only for those who belong to the Kromanti group'.

    In the case of Moore Town, the furious behavior of possessed Maroons toward outsiders is conceptualized as being akin to a physiological reaction. It is seen as a sort of blinding rage automatically triggered by the 'smell' of a 'different blood' — a condition over which neither the possessing spirit nor its medium have any control. The possessing spirit must be allowed to 'cool' down gradually, while the *obroni* is kept behind a Maroon protector. It appears that the *Kromanti* traditions of Scott's Hall and Charles Town lack this element at present; although *Kromanti* dancers from both these communities sometimes perform mock threats toward visiting outsiders, and may

administer an oath, their behavior (from all accounts, as well as the author's own observations) lacks the urgency and violence which is characteristic of Moore Town dancers. Outsiders are not assigned Maroon protectors in these latter communities, and possessed Maroons do not appear to invariably react with the same sort of automatic uncontrollable rage toward 'different blood' as is the case in Moore Town. Some older Maroons in Scott's Hall and Charles Town indicate that in the past possessed dancers from their communities behaved more violently toward outsiders than at present. For a description of the behavior of possessed Maroons during a specific ceremony in Scott's Hall, see SCHAFER (1973: 230-232).

54. The author was required as an outsider to take this oath several times; however, he was later given consent by the *fete-men* involved to write about certain aspects of the ceremony. Certain other details have been omitted from this account out of respect for the wishes of these individuals. The author also observed several cases of non-Maroon Jamaicans from outside districts who were forced to undergo the same ordeal during private *Business dances,* at which they were being treated.

55. Two of the ten *fete-men* with whom the author worked closely made extensive use of oils, powders, and magic books (such as those published by DELAURENCE) in their work.

56. During his field trip the author attended both *Kumina* and *Convince* ceremonies outside of Moore Town, and developed a number of informant relationships with both *Kumina* and *Convince* devotees.

57. For evidence of the strong Kikongo influence in the *Country* of the *Kumina* people, see SEAGA (1956), LEWIS (1977), or SCHULER (1980). For evidence of the Akan influence in *Kromanti* 'language', see DALBY (1971), and SCHAFER (1973: 249-256). Although the latter study includes several misunderstandings, it also contains a good deal of useful information.

58. For a detailed description of the *Kumina* cult in the Morant Bay area, see MOORE & SIMPSON (1957).

59. In keeping with the idea that *Kumina* originated among the Maroons, several writers have erroneously taken the position that it represents essentially an Akan survival (see BARRETT 1974; LONG 1972: 18). BARRETT (Ibid: 61) goes so far as to state that *Kumina* is derived from 'the Ashanti form of ancestor worship'. PATTERSON (1969: 199-202), on the other hand, concludes that *Kumina* has primarily Dahomean origins. More recent studies by LEWIS (1977), BRATHWAITE (1978), and SCHULER (1980) have shown conclusively that the ritual language (*Country*) tied to *Kumina* is almost exclusively of Central African (largely Kikongo) origin.
In spite of the strong evidence of a Central African connection, BRATHWAITE (1978: 52) is not in full agreement with SCHULER's thesis that the *Kumina* tradition was introduced to Jamaica after slavery by Liberated Africans. However, the oral traditions collected by this author from *Kumina* devotees in several parts of St. Thomas parish strongly support SCHULER on this point. Nevertheless, BRATHWAITE's point would seem to have some validity, in the sense that what today is known as *Kumina*, although introduced to Jamaica after Emancipation, must be seen as a uniquely Jamaican synthesis which has over time incorporated many elements stemming from the culture

of pre-Emancipation Jamaica. For further background on this debate, and its larger theoretical significance, see SCHULER (1979a). Appended to the same paper is a commentary (Ibid: 150-155) by BRATHWAITE which also addresses this issue. SEAGA (1969: 4) anticipated SCHULER'S position when he earlier referred to *Kumina* as 'a purely African Religious cult which absorbed Myalism and became prominent in the second half of the last century, after introduction, it is said, by post-emancipation African migrants to the St. Thomas area in the 1850's.' See also RYMAN (1980: 4). At any rate, this recent work on *Kumina* confirms that it is clearly separate from the Maroon *Kromanti* tradition. SCHULER's informants viewed the Maroons as a different 'nation' from themselves — as did this author's *Kumina* ('Bongo') informants — and they had ambiguous feelings toward Maroons. SCHULER (1980: 150) states: 'Central African Kumina ritual vividly symbolizes the ambivalence of the African-Maroon relationship'. A detailed discussion of the interplay of distinct ethnic identities (Maroon versus 'Bongo') which often occurs when visiting Maroons participate in *Kumina* may be found in BILBY (1979: 124-203).

60. For a detailed study of ritual interaction between Maroons and outsiders in eastern Jamaica, see BILBY (1979).

REFERENCES

BARRETT, LEONARD, 1974. *Soul Force*: *African Heritage in Afro-American Religion*. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor/Doubleday.

BECKWITH, MARTHA, 1929. *Black Roadways*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

BILBY, KENNETH M, 1979. *Partisan Spirits: Ritual Interaction and Maroon Identity in Eastern Jamaica*. M.A. Thesis. Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut.

BOURGUIGNON, ERIKA, 1970. Ritual Dissociation and Possession Belief in Caribbean Negro Religion. *In* NORMAN E. WHITTEN, Jr. & JOHN F. SZWED, *Afro-American Anthropology*, p. 87-100. New York: The Free Press.

BRATHWAITE, EDWARD KAMAU, 1978. Kumina: The Spirit of African Survival in Jamaica. *Jamaica Journal 42*: 44-63.

CAMPBELL, MAVIS, 1977. Marronage in Jamaica: Its Origin in the Seventeenth Century. *In* VERA RUBIN & ARTHUR TUDEN, *Comparative Perspectives on Slavery in New World Plantation Societies*. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences *292*.

CAREY, BEVERLEY, 1970. *Portland and the Rio Grande Valley*. Montego Bay: Public Relations Advisory Service.

CASSIDY, FREDERIC G., 1971. *Jamaica Talk,* 2nd ed., London: MacMillan.

CASSIDY, FREDERIC G. & LE PAGE, R.G., 1967. *Dictionary of Jamaica English*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHRISTALLER, REV. J. G., 1933. *Dictionary of the Asante and Fante Language, called Tshi* (*Twi*). Basel: Basel Evangelical Missionary Society.

COHEN, MILTON, 1974. *Medical Beliefs and Practices of the Maroons of Moore Town*. Ph.D. Dissertation. New York University.

DALBY, DAVID, 1971. Ashanti Survivals in the Language and Traditions of the Windward Maroons of Jamaica. *African Language Studies 12*: 31-51.

DALLAS, ROBERT CHARLES, 1803. *The History of the Maroons*, vol. I. London: A. Strahan.

DUNHAM, KATHERINE, 1946. *Journey to Accompong*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

EDWARDS, BRYAN, 1796. *Observations on the Disposition, Character, Manners, and Habits of Life of the Maroons*. London: John Stockdale.

ELLETSON, ROGER HOPE, 1949. Roger Hope Elletson Letter Book, 1766-1768. *The Jamaican Historical Review 2*: 77-119.

GREEN, EDWARD, 1974. *The Matawai Maroons: An Acculturating Afro-American Society*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Catholic University, Washington, D.C.

HERSKOVITS, MELVILLE J. & HERKOVITS, FRANCES S., 1934. *Rebel Destiny: Among the Bush Negroes of Dutch Guiana*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

HOGG, DONALD, 1960. *The Convince Cult in Jamaica*. Yale University Publications in Anthropology *58*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

KOPYTOFF, BARBARA, 1973. *The Incomplete Polities: An Ethnohistorical Account of the Jamaica Maroons*. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

KOPYTOFF, BARBARA, 1976. The Development of Jamaican Maroon Ethnicity. *Caribbean Quarterly 22*(2,3): 33-50.

LEWIS, MAUREEN WARNER, 1977. The Nkuyu: Spirit Messengers of the Kumina. *Savacou 13*: 57-86.

LONG, JOSEPH K., 1972. Medical Anthropology, Dance and Trance in Jamaica. *International Committee on Urgent Anthropological and Ethnological Research Bulletin 14*: 17-23.

MARTIN, LEANN, 1973. *Maroon Identity: Processes of Persistence in Moore Town*. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of California, Riverside.

METRAUX, ALFRED, 1959. *Voodoo in Haiti*. Paris: Editions Gallimard.

MINTZ, SIDNEY W. & PRICE, RICHARD, 1976. *An Anthropological Approach to the Afro-American Past: A Caribbean Perspective*. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues.

MOHR, AD. TH., 1909. *A Dictionary: English-Tshi (Asante)*. Basel: Basel Evangelical Missionary Society.

MOORE, JOSEPH & SIMPSON, GEORGE E., 1957. A Comparative Study of Acculturation in Morant Bay and West Kingston, Jamaica. *Zaire 9-10*: 979-1019.

PATTERSON, ORLANDO, 1969. *The Sociology of Slavery*. Rutherford, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.

PRICE, RICHARD, 1979a. Kwasimukamba's Gambit. *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 135*: 151-169.

PRICE, RICHARD, 1979b. *Maroon Societies*, second edition. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

POLLAK-ELTZ, ANGELINA, 1968. The Shango Cult in Grenada, British West Indies. *Proceedings, VIIIth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences 3*: 59-60.

RYMAN, CHERYL, 1980. The Jamaican Heritage in Dance: Developing a Traditional Typology. *Jamaica Journal 44*: 2-14.

SCHAFER, DANIEL LEE, 1973. *The Maroons of Jamaica: African Slave Rebels in the Caribbean*. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Minnesota.

SCHULER, MONICA, 1979a. Afro-American Slave Culture. *Historical Reflections* 6 (1): 122-155.

SCHULER, MONICA, 1979b. Myalism and the African Religious Tradition in Jamaica. *In* MARGARET E. CRAHAN & FRANKLIN W. KNIGHT, *Africa and the Caribbean: The Legacies of a Link*, p. 65-79. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

SCHULER, MONICA, 1980. '*Alas, Alas, Kongo*': *A Social History of Identured African Immigration into Jamaica, 1841-1865*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

SEAGA, EDWARD, 1956. *Folk Music of Jamaica*. Folkways Ethnic Library, Album FE 4453. New York: Folkways Records and Service Corporation.

SEAGA, EDWARD, 1969. Revival Cults in Jamaica: Notes towards a Sociology of Religion. *Jamaica Journal 3* (2): 3-13.

SIMPSON, GEORGE E., 1940. The Vodun Service in Northern Haiti. *American Anthropologist 42*: 236-254.


SIMPSON, GEORGE E., 1962. The Shango Cult in Nigeria and in Trinidad. *American Anthropologist 64*: 1204-1219.

SIMPSON, GEORGE E., 1978. *Black Religions in the New World*. New York: Columbia University Press.

SPICER, EDWARD H., 1954. Spanish-Indian Acculturation in the Southwest. *American Anthropologist 56*: 663-684.

THOMPSON, I.E., 1938. The Maroons of Moore Town. *Anthropological Series of the Boston College Graduate School 3*: 472-480.

KENNETH M. BILBY
Department of Anthropology
The Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland 21218.



CHRIS ENGELS in discussie op een van de lezingen van de cyclus 'Biologie en Samenleving' welke op 23 september 1968 in het 'Cultuurcentrum' van Curaçao werden gehouden.

CHRIS ENGELS (1907-1980)

Wij zullen altijd uitzonderingen moeten blijven maken — uitzonderingen voor uitzonderlijke mensen en voor uitzonderlijke gebeurtenissen.

Terecht lijkt daarom deze korte herdenking, nadat de Redactie van dit tijdschrift had besloten tot een niet meer opnemen van aan personen gewijde bijdragen welke niet het karakter hebben van een studie of een uitvoerige documentatie. Want CHRIS ENGELS wàs een uitzonderlijk mens — en het verkeersongeval dat een einde maakte aan zijn bestaan op een ogenblik dat hij een nieuw hoogtepunt in zijn leven zag naderen, een zaak van uitzonderlijke betekenis.

Voor velen zal een Curaçaose samenleving zònder hem, veel van haar bekoring hebben verloren.

Men behoefde geen algeheel bewonderaar te zijn van zijn schilderijen om met geestdrift over zijn kunst te kunnen discussiëren, noch veel gevoel te hebben voor zijn poëzie om de grote betekenis van *De Stoep* te kunnen begrijpen.

Het was ook niet nodig dat men het geheel eens was met de wijze waarop hij '*Het Curaçaosch Museum*' bestuurde, om het bestaansrecht van deze instelling met vuur te verdedigen en te willen medewerken aan de verwezenlijking van zijn ideaal: een gebouw gewijd aan de kunst, met ruimten waarin men ook Curaçao's historie zou kunnen terugvinden.

Over CHRIS ENGELS is reeds veel geschreven. Wie een goede indruk wil krijgen van zijn rijke leven, kan het beste het boek doorbladeren dat ter gelegenheid van zijn zeventigste verjaardag werd uitgegeven: *Luc Tournier 70*, waarin alleen misschien wat weinig aandacht wordt gegeven aan de mensen voor wien hij als dokter zo veel betekende.
Over CHRIS ENGELS zal nog heel veel méér geschreven worden — waarbij de gedachten van zijn vrienden zullen blijven uitgaan naar LUCILA, zijn vrouw en medewerkster, die op 'Stroomzigt' de sfeer schiep waarnaar velen zullen terugverlangen.

P.W.H.

Luc Tournier 70, Meulenhoff, Amsterdam, 1977, 100 blz. — CHR. J.H.ENGELS werd geboren op 19 nov. 1907 te Rotterdam, vertrok na zijn artsexamen in 1936 naar Curaçao, waar hij in het huwelijk trad met LUCILA BOSKALJON, medeoprichter was van het Nederlands periodiek *De Stoep* en stichter van *Het Curaçaosch Museum*. Hij overleed ten gevolge van een verkeersongeval op 20 dec. 1980.



Dr. J.H. WESTERMANN – die meer dan iemand anders heeft bijgedragen tot onze kennis van de geologie van de Nederlandse Antillen en een onvermoeid strijder was voor het behoud van de levende Natuur – op 52-jarige leeftijd; redacteur van dit tijdschrift van 1951 tot 1981.

AFSCHEID VAN DR. J.H. WESTERMANN
(1.VI.1907 - 10.V.1981)

Al is men zich ook nog zo bewust van de tijdelijkheid van een samenwerking van personen die zich tot doel hebben gesteld het voortbestaan van een tijdschrift te verzekeren, de strengheid van dit gegeven wordt meestal pas goed duidelijk, wanneer men van één van deze — na vele jaren — afscheid *moet* nemen.

Nu was het redacteurschap van de (Nieuwe) West-Indische Gids (sinds 1951) voor JAN HUGO WESTERMANN zeker niet een èrg belangrijke zaak, daarvoor had hij in zijn leven al te veel gezien en medegemaakt; was hij er zich ook te véél van bewust dat zijn medewerking aan vraagstukken van groter orde noodzakelijker was. Onvermoeid was hij als strijder voor het behoud van de Natuur, niet alleen op de Antillen en in Suriname, maar ook in Indonesië en andere delen van de wereld. Hij was Officier in de Orde van Oranje Nassau, maar méér betekenend voor het karakter van zijn streven was ongetwijfeld zijn benoeming tot Erelid van het World Wildlife Fund International, en dat hij de eerste drager in Nederland was van de Orde van de Gouden Ark.

Toen WESTERMANN in 1930 — als deelnemer aan de Utrechtse Geologische Antillen Excursie van prof. dr. L.M.R. RUTTEN (zie *W.I.G. 13,* 1931) met De West kennis maakte, kreeg hij tot taak het schrijven van een proefschrift over *The geology of Aruba* (1932). Dit betekende geenszins dat verder zijn belangstelling tot de ondergrond van de Antillen beperkt zou blijven, ook al schreef hij nog een meesterlijk *Overzicht van de geologische en mijnbouwkundige kennis der Nederlandse Antillen* (1949), een beschouwing over *The water bore of Oranjestad 1942-1943* (1951), een *Beknopte handleiding bij de geologische verzameling van het Curaçaosche Museum* (1951) en een werk over *The geology of Saba and St. Eustatius* (1961, met H. KIEL).

Toen WESTERMANN directeur was van het Voorlichtingsinstituut voor het Welvaartsplan Nederlandse Antillen gaf hij *Richtlijnen voor de economische en sociale ontwikkeling der Bovenwindse Eilanden* (1953, met G.J. KRUIJER en J.S. VEENENBOS), een onderdeel van het omvangrijke *Bovenwinden-Rapport,* dat nog steeds een rijke bron is van gegevens voor hen die hun licht over deze eilanden wensen te laten schijnen. Zijn *Photo-geological observations and land use survey of Bonaire* (1956, met J.I.S. ZONNEVELD) bevat eveneens een grote verscheidenheid aan economisch belangrijke gegevens.

Als bestuurslid van WOSUNA, van WOTRO, en vooral als adjunct-directeur van Z.W.O. was hij een grote steun voor velen die uitgezonden wensten te worden, of een studie wilden maken van een onderwerp met betrekking tot Suriname en de Nederlandse Antillen — door zijn kennis van plaatselijke omstandigheden, zijn deskundigheid op natuurwetenschappelijk gebied en zijn ervaring op bestuurlijk en administratief terrein.

Als organisator en beschermer van de neotropische natuur bleek WESTERMANN wonderwel op zijn plaats in het bestuur van de Natuurwetenschappelijke Studiekring voor Suriname en de Nederlandse Antillen. De Jaarboeken (1945-1951) getuigen van zijn talrijke bemoeïingen op het gebied van jacht, fauna- en natuurbescherming. Hij publiceerde werkjes over *Conservation in het Caribbean* (1952) en *Nature Preservation in het Caribbean* (1953), gaf *Een korte beschouwing over het Brokopondo-plan Suriname* (1956), en zette zich o.m. in voor de bescherming van de flamingos op Bonaire.

In de *(N.) W.I.G.* publiceerde hij — behalve enkele kleinere stukjes — vier omvangrijke, uitvoerig gedocumenteerde en rijk geïllustreerde bijdragen:

— Natuurbescherming op de Nederlandsche Antillen, haar aesthetische, ethische, wetenschappelijke en economische perspectieven (*28*, 1947, p. 193-216, 6 pl.)

— De geologische geschiedenis der drie Bovenwindse eilanden St. Martin, Saba en St. Eustatius (*37*, 1957, p. 127-168, 10 pl.)

— Om het voortbestaan van de flamingo's van Zuid-Bonaire

1957-1968 (*46*, 1968, p. 195-231, 3 pl.)
— Historisch overzicht van de wording en het onderzoek van het Brokopondo-stuwmeer (*48*, 1971, p. 1-55, 16 pl.)

Een uitvoerig artikel werd gewijd aan de nagedachtenis van Mr. JOHANNA L.H. FELHOEN KRAAL, die eveneens in 1951 tot de Redactie van de *W.I.G.* was toegetreden (*44*, 1965, p. 154-161, 1 pl.).

Daar WESTERMANN niet alleen een bekwaam redacteur bleek te zijn, maar ook op de hoogte was van financieel-administratieve zaken, werd hij Penningmeester van het Fonds, dat tot doel had de verliezen welke de Firma Nijhoff op de uitgave van dit tijdschrift leed aan te zuiveren — tot op het ogenblik dat het Fonds hiertoe niet meer in staat bleek te zijn, en hij als penningmeester van de Stichting Nieuwe West-Indische Gids nog enkele jaren lang voor nieuwe moeilijkheden kwam te staan.

Wij herdenken in JAN HUGO WESTERMANN een harde en kundige werker op wetenschappelijk en cultureel gebied, die velen behulpzaam was en waarop steeds kon worden gerekend — iemand die in dankbare herinnering zal blijven bij de velen die hem hebben gekend.

P.W.H.

NIEUWE WEST-INDISCHE GIDS

Abonnementen per jaargang f 35,— bij vooruitbetaling (giro 32.97.608 t.n.v. Penningmeester Stichting Nieuwe West-Indische Gids (H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen), te Bosch en Duin.

De kopy moet, in machineschrift, persklaar worden ingezonden, bij voorkeur in de Nederlandse of Engelse, bij uitzondering in de Spaanse, Franse of Duitse taal.

Voor boeken ter recensie alsmede voor alle zaken de uitgave betreffende, wende men zich tot drs. L.J. Westermann-van der Steen of Dr. P. Wagenaar Hummelinck, Laboratorium voor Zoölogische Oecologie en Taxonomie, Plompetorengracht 9-11, Utrecht (030-317241).

Bijdragen worden niet gehonoreerd.

Uitsluitend de schrijver is verantwoordelijk voor de inhoud van zijn publicatie.

The *Nieuwe West-Indische Gids* (= New West Indian Guide) is a direct continuation of the journal of the same name (formerly *De West-Indische Gids*) which until 1973 was published by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.

Subscription price per volume Hfl. 35,— incl. postage (surface mail).
Payment by international postal money order or cheque to Treasurer Foundation Nieuwe West-Indische Gids (H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen), Biltseweg 17, 3735 MA Bosch en Duin (Netherlands), *or* by transferring the amount to our account with the RABO-bank at Zeist (kantoor Den Dolder), Netherlands, account nr. 37.52.44.239 *or* to our account with the National Giro (nr. 3297608).

The N.W.I.G. publishes well-documented papers in Dutch and English, occasionally in Spanish, French or German. Authors should submit their manuscripts to the Editor, dr. P. Wagenaar Hummelinck, Zoological Laboratory, Plompetorengracht 9-11, Utrecht.

Offprints may be ordered at the author's expense.

GJBL

ANTIQUARIAAT G.J. BESTEBREURTJE
Zinniastraat 38
3434 HD Nieuwegein
Holland
Tel. 03402-40941

Antiquarian books, in all languages, on

voyages, travels and expeditions
(America, Africa, Asia, Australia, Arctic and Antarctic)

geography

shipbuilding and maritime history

military history

and also
maps, plans and views

Specialising in books on the Dutch East- and West Indies.

Catalogues issued regulary.
Still available:
Cat. 2: Voyages, travels, expeditions, maritime and military history
(ca. 700 books and maps; illustrated.)
Cat. 4: will be issued in september:
Dutch East- and West Indies; voyages and travels
(ca. 1200 books and maps; illustrated.)

Cat. 2: Dfl. 3,50, cat. 4: Dfl. 4,- (foreign customers please add Dfl. 6,50 bankconversioncharges)
Postal account 4319068.

Please send us your list of Desiderata.

We are always interested in buying important single items or whole collections.

7 B-C

No 3/4
55ste jaargang
december 1981

NIEUWE WEST-INDISCHE GIDS

UITGAVE VAN DE
STICHTING NIEUWE WEST-INDISCHE GIDS
te Utrecht
ISSN 0028-9930

NIEUWE WEST-INDISCHE GIDS
onder redactie van
Prof. dr. H. Hoetink, Prof. dr. H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen, Dr. J.H. Westermann, Drs. L.J. Westermann-van der Steen en Dr. P. Wagenaar Hummelinck (eindredacteur).

INHOUD

van het derde en vierde nummer van de
vijf-en-vijftigste jaargang

J.A. SAMSON
Citruscultuur in Suriname (5 foto's) 109

R.A. RÖMER
Labour unions and labour conflict in Curaçao 138

FRANK BOVENKERK
Why returnees generally do not turn out to be 'agents of change': the case of Suriname 154

SCOTT V. PARRIS
Alliance and competition: four case studies of Maroon-European relations 174

OUDE JAARGANGEN zijn nog vanaf Jrg. 36 als volledige serie aan het redactieadres verkrijgbaar. Daarvoor verschenen jaargangen, alsmede de registers, zijn nog slechts in beperkte mate leverbaar.

Deze aflevering van de N.W.I.G. verschijnt met medewerking van de Vakgroep Culturele Antropologie der Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht.

CITRUSCULTUUR IN SURINAME

KONINKLIJK INSTITUUT VOOR TAAL-, LAND- EN VOLKENKUNDE 24-12-81

Ontwikkeling van de landbouw in Suriname *109*

Ontwikkeling van de citrusteelt *112*

Het onderzoek sedert 1950 *116*
- Cultivars en onderstammen *117*
- Vermeerdering en aanplant *119*
- Bodem en bemesting *122*
- Ziekten en plagen *124*
- Oogst, verpakking, transport en verwerking *128*

De plantages *130*

Het binnenland *131*

Huidige situatie *133*

Summary *134*

Literatuur *136*

Ontwikkeling van de landbouw in Suriname

De eerste bewoners van Suriname, de Indianen, leefden voornamelijk van jacht, visvangst en het verzamelen van vruchten. Ze verbouwden cassave en enkele andere gewassen; hun landbouw was geheel op zelf-voorziening gericht. Na 1492 begonnen Spanjaarden en Portugezen het westelijk halfrond te koloniseren. In Brazilië en op de West-Indische eilanden ontstonden plantages, vooral van suikerriet en tabak. In de 17e eeuw gingen ook Engelsen, Fransen, Nederlanders en Denen hier op zoek naar koloniën.

De eerste poging daartoe in Suriname wordt aan een Engelsman, captain MARSHALL, toegeschreven. Hij zou aan de middenloop van de Surinamerivier, vermoedelijk in de buurt van Baboenhol, getracht hebben tabak te verbouwen. Dat is mislukt. Daarentegen

kon suikerriet er goed groeien. Aanvankelijk nam men hiervoor de hogere gronden langs de Surinamerivier. Deze verloren echter hun ''oerwoudvruchtbaarheid'' binnen enkele jaren. De Zeeuwen die Suriname in 1667 veroverden, brachten ook hun poldersysteem mee. Op de vruchtbare moerasgronden van de jonge kustvlakte was het mogelijk jaren achtereen suikerriet te verbouwen.

Men ging nu plantages langs de rivieren aanleggen. De lengte van de voordam was per gebied vastgesteld, meestal op 600 meter. De achterdam lag 3 à 4 km naar binnen, zodat een plantage 180 tot 240 ha groot was. Van de rivier uit gezien, had het loos-stelsel de vorm van een U, het vaarstelsel (dat tevens voor irrigatie gebruikt werd) de vorm van een T; beide stelsels waren vertakt.

In de 18e eeuw ontstonden naast de suikerplantages ook cacao-, koffie- en katoenplantages. Bovendien waren er ''kostgronden'' voor voedingsgewassen en ''houtgronden'' om de suikerfabrieken van brandstof te voorzien. In 1785 was het aantal plantages 591, met een areaal van 180.000 hectare. Hiervan zal niet veel meer dan een derde deel beplant zijn geweest; er waren nl., na 10 tot 16 jaar suikerriet, braakperiodes nodig om de grond zijn natuurlijke vruchtbaarheid te hergeven. Gewoonlijk duurde zo'n braak zes jaar, waarna weer zes jaar riet geplant kon worden. Bij cacao en koffie lag de verhouding teelt:braak gunstiger.

Het hoogtepunt van de plantagecultuur in Suriname lag in 1765, toen de uitvoer 10.000 ton suiker en 7.000 ton koffie bedroeg. Hierna begon het verval; eerst zeer geleidelijk, maar na de afschaffing van de slaverlij (1863) steeds sneller. In 1903 waren er nog maar 79 plantages over, waarvan slechts 10.000 ha beplant was. Vele oorzaken hebben aan dit verval bijgedragen, b.v. (1) slechte behandeling van de slaven, met als gevolg grote sterfte en niet te onderdrukken opstanden, (2) slecht beheer van de plantages in afwezigheid van de eigenaren, (3) een beurskrach in Amsterdam (1773), (4) concurrentie van de suikerbiet, (5) concurrentie van Azië, na de opening van het Suezkanaal. Daarbij kwamen nog het verbod op de slavenhandel en ten slotte de afschaffing van de slavernij, die dwong tot import van nieuwe arbeidskrachten.

In de tweede helft van de 19e eeuw nam cacao de rol van belangrijkste gewas over van het suikerriet. De cacao werd voornamelijk geproduceerd door voormalige slaven die de plantagegronden in be-

zit genomen hadden. Helaas duurde dit maar kort omdat de krullotenziekte tegen het einde van de eeuw met rampzalige gevolgen ging optreden. Intussen breidde de koffiecultuur zich uit. Dit was niet meer *Coffea arabica,* maar de beter aan het surinaamse klimaat aangepaste *Coffea liberica.* Wat deze veranderingen voor de economie van Suriname te betekenen hadden, kan men uit de volgende cijfers afleiden:

Tabel 1

Belangrijkste produkten van Suriname en hun aandeel in de exportwaarde

periode	*produkt*	*aandeel (%)*
1863-1870	suiker	72
1881-1900	cacao	41
1921-1930	koffie	22
1931-1940	bauxiet	54
1966-1970	bauxiet *	88

* aluinaarde en aluminium inbegrepen.
Bron: *Encyclopedie van Suriname*(7)

Op de plantages hadden Brits-Indische en Javaanse immigranten het werk van de voormalige slaven overgenomen. Na afloop van hun contract vestigden zij zich in de regel op kleine landbouwbedrijven, waar ze overwegend de rijstcultuur beoefenden. Hierdoor werd rijst in de 20ste eeuw het verreweg belangrijkste gewas van Suriname. Het grootste exportprodukt was intussen bauxiet geworden.

Als gewas past de Liberica koffie beter dan de Arabica in het surinaamse klimaat, maar het handelsprodukt is van lagere kwaliteit. Men kan echter aan de smaak wennen en een markt werd gevonden in Noorwegen, Duitsland en Italië.

De wereldcrisis van de dertiger jaren veroorzaakte scherpe prijsdalingen, ook in de koffieprijzen. Hoewel de planters hun uiterste best deden om de uitgaven laag te houden, zakte de exportprijs gedurende lange tijd beneden de minimale kostprijs van 20 cent per kilogram. De surinaamse regering kon ten slotte niet langer werkeloos toezien en richtte in 1936 de Surinaamse Koffie Centrale op. Deze instelling heeft hulp verleend aan de noodlijdende plantages, op voorwaarde dat een deel van de aanplant in citrus werd omgezet.

ONTWIKKELING VAN DE CITRUSTEELT

Het geslacht *Citrus* stamt uit Zuidoost Azië, vanwaar het naar Afrika en het Middellandse Zee-gebied werd overgebracht. COLUMBUS nam op zijn tweede reis (1493) zaden mee, die hij op Hispaniola (Haiti) liet uitplanten. Vooral door toedoen van missionarissen is de citrusteelt van hieruit verder verspreid over de subtropische en tropische gordel van het westelijk halfrond.

Niemand weet exact wanneer citrus in Suriname is ingevoerd, maar omstreeks 1690 tekende MARIA SIBYLLA MERIAN verscheidene soorten in Suriname. Latere waarnemers meldden een grote verscheidenheid van citrusvruchten. Aan export werd niet gedacht omdat de vruchten de reis per zeilschip naar Europa niet zouden overleven.

In 1884 opende de Koninklijke West-Indische Maildienst (KWIM) een maandelijkse vaart met stoomschepen tussen Nederland en Suriname. Dit waren goede jaren voor cacao en koffie en het is te begrijpen dat niemand op het idee kwam daarnaast ook citrus te gaan exporteren. De cacaocultuur was al vrijwel ter ziele toen de heer GEFKEN, directeur van de plantage Voorburg, in 1907 een poging daartoe ondernam.

Een jaar later nam het in 1903 opgerichte Landbouwproefstation (LP) het initiatief van GEFKEN over. De eerste zending was geen succes: de vruchten waren ''te laat geplukt om te welken'' (wat nu eerder een voordeel lijkt), ze waren onrijp, onvoldoende behandeld (waarmee?) en slecht gesorteerd. Toch zette men door. Over volgende zendingen lezen we: onrijpe pluk, slecht sinaasappeljaar, boot liep te laat binnen, bleef toen vier dagen vastzitten, buitengewone droogte, schip voer met dichte luiken, en diefstal van vruchten.(14)

Ondanks deze reeks van ongelukken was men niet pessimistisch, men vond de resultaten zelfs ''alleszins bemoedigend''. Wel werd geadviseerd niet alleen op grootte, maar ook op kwaliteit te sorteren. Kennelijk sprak dat toen nog niet vanzelf. De KWIM beloofde ''aan de ventilatie zorg te laten besteden'', een kreet die later nog vaak gehoord zou worden.

Aanvankelijk ging het om vruchten van zaailingbomen, maar het LP had ondertussen klonaal plantmateriaal geïmporteerd uit Trinidad, Florida en Washington. Sommige cultuurvariëteiten (verder cultivars genoemd) werden zelfs vele malen ingevoerd. Men wist toen nog niet welke gevaren dit inhield. Ook in de dertiger jaren is dit herhaaldelijk gebeurd. Pas in 1950 werd de import van citrus plantmateriaal verboden.

De nieuwe cultivars bleken niet te voldoen. Intussen was het LP sedert 1904 bezig met het zoeken naar goede zaailingbomen. Het duurde echter tot 1922 voordat dr GEROLD STAHEL,(15a) na selectie op vier plantages, vruchten van 29 moederbomen ter beoordeling zond aan het Koloniaal Instituut te Amsterdam. De beste indruk maakten de vruchten van de volgende genummerde zaailingbomen: Kwatta 71, 75 en 202, Sorgvliet 20 en 23, La Liberté 110. In 1924-1928 zijn in de Cultuurtuin te Paramaribo proeven ingeplant met de cultivars Kwatta 71, Kwatta 202 en Sorgvliet 20. Later werd alleen Kwatta 202 vermeerderd; het is niet meer na te gaan waarom de andere cultivars geschrapt zijn. Het was echter een goede keuze en een van de weinige voorbeelden van een in de tropen geselecteerde sinaasappel.

In 1917 vatte de landbouwleraar LIEMS de toen aanwezige kennis samen in een boekje van 29 bladzijden.(14) Hierin wordt veel aandacht besteed aan het oculeren, de pluk en de verpakking. Vruchten mochten alleen geplukt worden als ze ''boomrijp'' waren, d.w.z. als ze ''juist een gele tint hebben verkregen''. En verder: ''tusschen plukken en verpakken moeten steeds een 4 of 5-tal dagen verloopen''. We zullen later zien dat deze subtropische regel in Suriname zeer nadelig werkte.

Tussen 1924 en 1940 heeft STAHEL ten minste 14 publikaties geschreven over onderwerpen als: het moderne pakhuis, geel kleuren door ethyleengas, de King mandarijn, selectie, verscheping en produktie van sinaasappels, de kringetjesziekte. De gemiddelde produktie van een volwassen sinaasappelboom berekende hij op 300 vruchten per jaar. Dit cijfer kreeg hij uit ver uiteenlopende opbrengsten, met als uitersten 1096 voor Mariënbosch en 23 voor Beekhuizen; het grote verschil verklaarde hij door de aanwezigheid van schaduwbomen op Mariënbosch. De foto van Beekhuizen laat echter een (nu) zeer duidelijk geval van zinkgebrek zien. Het is jam-

mer dat STAHEL hierop zijn advies om schaduwbomen te planten heeft gebaseerd.

Later is beweerd: ''als het van prof. Stahel had afgehangen, zou Suriname geen citruscultuur hebben''.[5] Maar, al heeft STAHEL zich tegen uitbreiding van die cultuur verklaard, zijn verdiensten als onderzoeker waren onmiskenbaar. Hij was echter een moeilijk mens en kreeg met de ene medewerker na de andere ruzie. In 1935 werd een nieuw Kantoor, later Departement, opgericht met de opdracht de citruscultuur krachtig te bevorderen. STAHEL kwam hierdoor zonder staf en vrijwel zonder fondsen te zitten, maar bleef doorgaan met publiceren, o.a. over zeefvatenziekte van koffie, bladvlekkenziekte van banaan en vermeerdering van cacao door eenbladige stekken.

In 1937 bestond de staf van het Departement van Landbouw-Economische Zaken (LEZ) uit een directeur (dr D.S. FERNANDES), een irrigatie ingenieur, een tuinbouwkundig ambtenaar en een landbouwleraar (W.E. HEWITT). In september 1938 kwam er een consulent bij: J.D. OPPENHEIM, een man met lange ervaring in de citruscultuur in Palestina. Kort daarna ging ir J. FLOOR bij de Surinaamse Koffie Centrale werken aan de conversie van koffie in citrus.

De activiteit van LEZ kwam vooral tot uiting in de snel stijgende produktie van plantmateriaal. In 1934 werd een stuk van de ''grond'' Dirkshoop, aan de Saramaccarivier, gehuurd. Later werd de hele plantage, groot 190 ha, gekocht. Hiervan kwam 5 ha in gebruik als kwekerij; op 25 ha werd een collectie cultivars aangelegd en de rest (65 ha) werd een z.g. produktieve aanplant. Tot eind 1939 leverde de kwekerij 145.000 plantjes. Het citrusareaal groeide van 200 ha in 1935 tot 950 ha in 1940. Waarschijnlijk zijn deze cijfers te hoog geschat, omdat geen rekening was gehouden met het (vrij hoge) sterftecijfer van jonge bomen.

De heren HEWITT, OPPENHEIM en FLOOR hadden echter nog meer pijlen op hun boog. Een in 1938 aan de planters verstrekte instructie[13] geeft vier wenken over terreinkeuze, twaalf over het uitplanten, negen over het onderhoud en veertien over de pluk. De meeste van deze wenken zijn overeind gebleven; slechts die over grondbewerking, gebruik plukschaar en het laten verwelken van fruit moesten een vijftiental jaren later veranderd worden.

Ook aan de verpakking en verwerking werd het nodige gedaan. Op Soekibaka, vlak naast het departement LEZ, werd een citruspakinrichting in gebruik genomen. De capaciteit was maar klein: 550 kratten in een 10-urige werkdag. In 1939 werd deze installatie door een machinaal aggregaat vervangen, maar de capaciteit nam nauwelijks toe, nl. tot 600 kisten per dag. De sortering was weliswaar beter, maar het bederf bleef hoog. Dit is te zien voor één plantage aan de bederfcijfers bij aankomst in Nederland.

Tabel 2

Bederf sinaasappels Mariënbosch in Nederland

Verscheping d.d.	*aantal kisten*	*bederf %*
10-01-'38	229	30,2
14-02-'38	117	8,8
08-08-'38	466	20,0
29-08-'38	408	18-20
19-09-'38	444	18-20

Het LEZ-verslag over 1939 noemt maar één zending van de plantage Mariënbosch, zonder datum of aantal kratten; het bederf was toen 64%. Andere partijen sinaasappels kwamen met 30, 35 en 53% rot aan. De machinale verpakking heeft dus, althans in dit opzicht, geen verbetering gebracht. Dat kon ook moeilijk: men trachtte de schimmel *Diplodia natalensis* met allerlei ineffectieve maatregelen op de plantages te bestrijden. Later zal blijken dat alleen een behandeling in het pakhuis helpt, mits zo snel mogelijk na de pluk uitgevoerd.

Voor export afgekeurde vruchten werden verwerkt in een sapfabriek naast het pakhuis. De capaciteit was 4000 vruchten per uur. Gepasteuriseerd sap bleek een kooksmaak te hebben, zodat men met chemicaliën moest conserveren. Het meeste succes had een siroop (''Suranje'') die ter plaatse en op Curaçao vlot afgezet kon worden. Uit het sap werden ook wijn en likeur bereid, uit schillen en pulp ook olie en essence.

In 1939 brak in Europa oorlog uit en de export naar Nederland hield op. Zij die er vroeg bij geweest waren hadden een grote strop, want juist nu kwam hun aanplant in volle produktie. Men kan zich

afvragen of niemand had voorzien hoe groot het risico was van overstappen van koffie (een stapelprodukt) op citrus in deze jaren van steeds toenemende oorlogsdreiging. De plantages hielden nu op hun citrusaanplant uit te breiden, maar het planten ging door; nu vooral bij de kleine boeren.

Na de oorlog werd de export hervat. De bederfcijfers waren nu echter nog hoger dan vóór de oorlog. Er waren partijen bij waarin men met moeite enkele gave sinaasappels kon vinden, drijvende op een brij van verrotte vruchten. Elke zending moest worden overgepakt voor de veiling. Dit heeft de surinaamse citrus een zeer slechte naam bezorgd. Ten gevolge van de schaarste lagen de prijzen aanvankelijk hoog, boven de *f* 30,— per krat, maar dat duurde niet lang. Toen bovendien in 1947 de nederlandse gulden devalueerde, maar de surinaamse gulden niet, daalde de waarde van de citrusexport snel van ruim een miljoen in 1947 tot *f* 400.000 in 1951.

Inmiddels was het ''Welvaartsfonds'' ingesteld, dat onder andere de Stichting Suriname Citrus Centrale oprichtte. Deze organisatie bouwde een moderne pakinrichting, alweer op Soekibaka, die eind 1950 werd geopend. De capaciteit was groot: 5000 kratten per 10-urige werkdag. Het heeft echter tot 1956 geduurd, totdat de ''Citrus-export-garantieregeling'' in werking trad, voordat deze pakkerij op volle capaciteit kon gaan werken.

In 1948 werden de departementen LEZ en LP verenigd tot één departement van Landbouw, Veeteelt en Visserij (LVV). Het werd nu mogelijk het werk te coördineren, al lukte dat niet in alle opzichten meteen. De landbouwvoorlichtingsdienst (LVD) kreeg de zorg voor de citruskwekerij en gaf voorlichting aan kleine boeren. Het LP werd belast met het onderzoek en kreeg (of behield) de contacten met de plantages.

Het onderzoek sedert 1950

Begin 1949 werd ik als onderzoeker bij het LP aangesteld, voornamelijk belast met de citruscultuur. Als gevolg van het bezoek van dr. A.F. Camp aan Suriname, kreeg ik de gelegenheid voor 3½ maand in Florida te gaan werken en wel bij het Citrus Experiment Station te Lake Alfred. Deze stage heeft grote gevolgen gehad voor de

richting waarin het citrusonderzoek zich voortaan ging bewegen. Tot die tijd waren de opvattingen nl. in hoofdzaak beheerst door Californische en Palestijnse toestanden; hetzij via boeken, of rechtstreeks door OPPENHEIM. Nu echter kregen methoden en denkwijzen uit Florida, een staat met een warm en vochtig klimaat dat het surinaamse vrij dicht benadert, een kans.

Als voorbeeld zullen we nagaan hoe vruchten bij en na de oogst behandeld moeten worden. In de subtropen gebeurt dat uiterst voorzichtig daar elke beschadiging ''mould'', aantasting door *Penicillium* schimmels, kan veroorzaken. Vandaar ook het lange verwelken. In Florida doet mould weinig schade, want door de hoge luchtvochtigheid sluiten wonden zich snel. Hier is ''stem-end-rot'', dat door de schimmels *Phomopsis* en *Diplodia* ontstaat, de voornaamste vorm van bederf. *Phomopsis* en *Diplodia* zijn zwakteparasieten; ze kunnen pas *na* de oogst de vrucht binnendringen. Ze zitten onder de kelk op een daartoe gunstig moment te wachten. Verwijdert men die kelk, dan is de kans op besmetting veel kleiner. Daarom werd in Florida niet met de plukschaar geoogst, men draaide de vruchten gewoon van de boom af. Dit gaat sneller en ontneemt de genoemde schimmels hun bescherming. Zo gauw mogelijk daarna moet met een passend middel ontsmet worden. Hoe langer men daarmee wacht, hoe meer kans dat stem-end-rot toch nog optreedt. Het lange verwelken is dus funest.

Dit alles geldt in nog sterkere mate voor Suriname. Tot 1950 werd het Californische voorschrift toegepast. Het heeft heel wat moeite gekost om planters en voorlichters, die waren opgevoed met de slogan ''handle them like eggs'', ervan te overtuigen dat het anders moest. Vooral de wijziging van het Uitvoerbesluit heeft veel voeten in de aarde gehad.

Wij zullen nu het in de jaren 1950 tot ongeveer 1975 verrichte speurwerk nader gaan bekijken.

Cultivars en onderstammen

De door STAHEL geselecteerde Kwatta 202 sinaasappel bleek uit verschillende lijnen te bestaan. Men had hele tuinen, in plaats van gemerkte moederbomen, gebruikt als basis voor verdere vermeer-

dering. In de jaren 1957-1958 werd op Dirkshoop verdere selectie toegepast. Uit ruim 10.000 bomen zijn, aan de hand van verschillende normen, ten slotte zeven rijk dragende bomen uitgezocht met goede boomvorm; de vruchten waren nagenoeg bolvormig, met niet te dunne schil, weinig zaden en vrij dunne tussenschotten. Later is ook de sapkleur als criterium ingevoerd.(20)

Tabel 3

Eigenschappen van geselecteerde 'Kwata' moederbomen

Boom	*D/H* *	*Oppervl. schil*	*Dikte schil (mm)*	*Aantal zaden*	*Vliezen*	*Kleur sap*
1	1,02	glad	4	4	zacht	oranje
2	1,01	matig	5	3	zacht	geel
3	1,03	ruw	5	4	matig	oranje
4	1,03	matig	4	5	matig	oranje
5	1,01	ruw	4	6	taai	oranje
6	1,02	ruw	6	3	taai	oranje
7	1,03	ruw	5	6	taai	geel

*D/H = diameter : hoogte. — In overeenstemming met de nieuwe spellingregel van het surinaams werd 'Kwata' met één t gespeld.

Nadat D.A. KAAIJENGA verscheidene virusziekten in citrus had ontdekt(15b) werd het noodzakelijk nieuwe selecties te maken. Een inventarisatie van goede zaailingbomen, waarvan men a priori mag verwachten dat ze virusvrij zijn, leverde de 'Alidjan' sinaasappel en de 'Hooghart' grapefruit op. Van de in tabel 3 genoemde bomen werd zaad uitgezet om ''new lines'' te verkrijgen. Dank zij polyembryonie zijn zulke zaailingen overwegend gelijk aan de moederplant in genetisch opzicht. Ze hebben echter jeugdeigenschappen zoals doorns, late vruchtbaarheid en steile groei, die men alleen na herhaaldelijk overenten kwijt raakt. In 1965 werd bovendien virusvrij enthout uit Florida ingevoerd, later ook uit Californië en Corsica.

In de jaren 1924-1928 zijn in de Cultuurtuin vier onderstamproeven geplant. Slechts één daarvan was na de oorlog nog te reconstrueren, nl. 'Kwata 71' op 11 onderstammen, grotendeels in twee herhalingen. Na enkele jaren bleken de 'King' en de 'Surino' mandarijn de beste onderstammen te zijn. Hun succes is voor een

deel te verklaren uit de waarneming dat ze beter zink uit de grond opnemen dan de andere onderstammen.

In 1953 werden nieuwe onderstamproeven ingezet en wel op drie plaatsen tegelijk: Dirkshoop (zand, jonge kustvlakte), Lelydorp (zand, oude kustvlakte) en Slootwijk (klei, jonge kustvlakte). De onderstammen waren zure oranje, 'Rangpur' en 'Cleopatra' mandarijn, alle geoculeerd met de 'Kwata' sinaasappel; op Dirkshoop ook met de 'Marsh' grapefruit. De bomen op 'Rangpur' bleven klein en vertoonden bastscheurtjes. Later bleken ze aan exocortis te lijden.

Vanwege virusziekten en de liquidatie van Slootwijk en het Lelydorpplan werd het nodig andere onderstamproeven op te zetten. Dat gebeurde in 1964-1965 te Dirkshoop, La Poule (klei) en Brokobaka (binnenland), ten dele met virusvrij materiaal. Tien jaar later rapporteerden FUNG KON SANG & NANDEN-AMATTARAM(10) dat op La Poule 'King' en 'Surino' de beste onderstammen waren voor met virus besmette 'Kwata'. Voor de virusvrije 'Alidjan' sinaasappel waren 'Sunki' en 'King' de beste en voor de virusvrije 'Hooghart' grapefruit was 'Rangpur' de beste onderstam.

Het is duidelijk dat de tristeza-gevoelige zure oranje onderstam eens plaats zal moeten maken voor andere onderstammen. Een goede vervanger is echter niet zo maar uit de grond te stampen. Die zal op zijn minst weinig last van voetrot en exocortis moeten hebben. Bovendien moet hij de kwaliteit en rijping van de vruchten gunstig beïnvloeden. Nog steeds geldt de uitspraak: ''Finding the best possible rootstock for each fruit variety in every location is so difficult as almost to defy accomplishment''.(1)

Vermeerdering en aanplant

Ten gevolge van de sterk wisselende vraag hadden de citruskwekerijen vaak overschotten en dan weer tekorten aan plantmateriaal, terwijl er nogal geklaagd werd over de kwaliteit van de plantjes. In 1957 ging de zorg voor het plantmateriaal over op het LP. In de Cultuurtuin werd nu een nieuw systeem ingevoerd dat o.a. voorkieming van zaad en uitplanten in plastic mandjes inhield. Er werd in het mandje geoculeerd en de uitloop werd niet door ''toppen'',



1. Geoculeerde citrusplantjes in plastic zakjes.

maar door ''loppen'' gestimuleerd. Dit had sterke scheutgroei recht omhoog ten gevolge, waardoor de levertijd aanzienlijk verkort werd. Plantmateriaal werd niet meer in mandjes maar met ''blote wortel'' geleverd. Door deze maatregel kon de kostprijs omlaag gebracht worden tot even boven de vastgestelde verkoopprijs van *f* 0,25.

Waarschijnlijk ligt de optimale plantdichtheid voor citrus tussen 200 en 300 bomen per hectare. Het is echter zeer goed mogelijk dat een (veel) dichter plantverband zo veel hogere opbrengsten geeft, dat de hogere kosten voor plantmateriaal, arbeid enz. ruimschoots terugverdiend worden. Er is in Suriname slechts één proef hierover genomen, nl. in 1940 op Dirkshoop. In 1952 werden deze vakken voor de helft uitgedund en gedurende een aantal jaren gaven deze steeds een hogere produktie dan de dichtbeplante vakken. Het is wenselijk zulke proeven te herhalen en daarbij verschillende onderstammen te gebruiken. Voorlopig lijkt 6 of 7 meter de beste afstand.

Ook het bodemonderhoud is onvoldoende onderzocht. In een proef moest het object chemische onkruidbestrijding spoedig gestaakt worden omdat ernstige erosie optrad. Het object bodemdek van koedzoe (*Pueraria phaseoloides*) bleek een goede en goedkope oplossing te zijn, die door de praktijk snel werd overgenomen, meestal met spectaculaire resultaten. Het gevolg was dat de stikstofbemesting verminderd, of zelfs achterwege gelaten kon worden. Bovendien kon men nu de schaduwbomen opruimen en kwam er een eind aan het ''rondvorken'', hetgeen op zijn beurt weer gunstig werkte tegen gomziekte.



2. Plantage Wederzorg, grapefruit op kleigrond, met koedzoe bodemdek.

Daarna is eens een onkruidbestrijdingsproef in de kwekerij genomen, waarbij handwerk veel goedkoper bleek te zijn dan spuiten, en eens een proef bij jonge bomen op Baboenhol, waarbij het spuiten met Gramoxone goedkoper bleek dan rondwieden. (15b)

Bodem en bemesting

Citrus kan op uiteenlopende gronden goed groeien, mits de juiste cultuurmaatregelen worden genomen. Vooral de verhouding van water tot lucht in de bodem is van groot belang. Ook kan een hoog zoutgehalte de groei remmen.

Op de surinaamse plantages vindt men in de regel bedden van zeven tot acht meter breed. In nieuwe polders is echter gebleken dat zelfs op 40 m brede bedden de citrus nog goed kan groeien,(15b) mits de klei maar doorlatend is. Dit hangt o.a. af van de wijze van ontginnen. Het gebruik van zware machines drukt de grond samen en beinvloedt de fysische eigenschappen ongunstig. Het verbranden van de pegasselaag werkt uitermate ongunstig.

Op vele bodemtypes is wortelonderzoek verricht. Daarbij bleek de bewortelingsdiepte toe te nemen met de diepte van ontwatering. De afwateringscapaciteit daarentegen, had geen aantoonbare invloed.(12)

Droogte veroorzaakt een rustperiode die in de kustvlakte langer duurt dan in het binnenland. Concentratie van de bloei treedt op als een voldoend lange droge periode door regen wordt gevolgd; dit komt aan de kust vaker voor dan in het binnenland. Wordt het na de bloei weer droog, dan zal irrigatie nodig zijn, vooral aan de kust. Verder zuidwaarts is dit zelden het geval.(27)

Bemestingsproeven met stikstof, fosfor en kali, genomen van 1936 tot 1939 en van 1946 tot 1948 te Dirkshoop op zandgrond, hadden vrijwel geen resultaat. Waarschijnlijk leden de bomen in vrij sterke mate aan zinkgebrek, een deficiëntie die toen nog niet als zodanig herkend was. Naar aanleiding van een door VERHOOG genomen oriënterende proef werd in de Cultuurtuin een proef ingezet met als objecten: geen zink, zink als mest, bespuiting met zink. De bespoten bomen werden binnen twee weken groen, terwijl de met zink bemeste bomen er een jaar over deden. In een ander veld werd

een soortgelijke proef genomen, nu met zink, koper en mangaan; alle drie ''sporenelementen'' bleken op deze zandgronden nodig te zijn. Pas als de gebreksverschijnselen zijn verdwenen, mag men succes verwachten van bemesting met andere elementen.

Voortbouwend hierop werd in 1950 te Dirkshoop een nieuwe bemestingsproef ingezet. Achttien rijen van tien bomen werden twee keer per jaar bespoten met zink-, koper- en mangaansulfaat en verdeeld in zes bemestingsobjecten, drie maal herhaald. Ernaast bleven zes rijen onbemest en onbespoten. Reeds in het tweede jaar waren de verschillen duidelijk zichtbaar. De beste objecten waren NKMg en NPKMg.

Tabel 4

Aantal vruchten per boom, Dirkshoop

Bemest	*Bespoten*	*1951*	*1952*	*1953*	*1954*	*1955*	*1956*	*gem.*
—	—	103	92	147	117	77	138	*112*
—	+	187	635	198	491	250	191	*350*
NKMg	+	190	870	340	626	493	604	*520*
NPKMg	+	189	770	345	742	514	470	*505*

De verschillen waren zeer betrouwbaar. Daarnaast bleek dat kali het vruchtgewicht verhoogt en stikstof het verlaagt. Vermenigvuldigen we het aantal vruchten met hun gemiddelde gewicht, dan krijgen we de volgende opbrengsten per hectare:

NKMg	NPKMg	NPK	NPMg	onbemest	N	onbespoten
23,9	23,4	15,6	13,5	11,4	9,2	3,7 ton

m.a.w. de beste behandleing brengt ruim zes keer zo veel op als de slechtste. In een serie bewaarproeven is ook het gunstige effect van kalium op het bederf aangetoond; na vier weken bedroeg dit gemiddeld 12,9% met en 19,9% zonder kalium.

De opzet van de proef werd in 1956 zodanig veranderd dat de invloed van fosfor kon worden nagegaan. Hiervan is echter gedurende vele jaren niets gebleken en ten slotte werd de proef beëindigd.

Een bemestingsproef op kleigrond te Slootwijk, moest na enkele jaren wegens liquidatie van het project afgesloten worden. Er was hier wel invloed van fosfaatbemesting merkbaar, zij het in vrij ge-

ringe mate. Een aanvankelijk stikstofeffect verdween snel nadat de bedden met koedzoe overgroeid raakten.

Andere proeven hadden tot doel de pH door bekalking te verhogen. Dat lukte snel op zand, maar op klei duurde het jaren om de pH van 4,5 naar 6,0 te brengen. Overige proeven gaven weinig tastbare resultaten. Op grond van dit alles is het volgende bemestingsadvies opgesteld:(19c)

(1) zorg voor een goed bodemdek van koedzoe,
(2) bemest op zand met patentkali, 2×1 kg per jaar
(3) geef op klei natuurfosfaat, 1 kg per 3 jaar.

Ziekten en plagen

Gomziekte is lange tijd als de ergste schimmelziekte van citrus in Suriname beschouwd. Vooral na ''rondvorken'' trad de ziekte in hevige mate op. Toevallig werd in een mierenbestrijdingsproef ontdekt dat een schone boomspiegel, t.g.v. opspattende gronddeeltjes, de ziekte sterk bevorderde. Een soortgelijke ervaring had men in Indonesië bij rubber opgedaan. Er is toen geadviseerd de koedzoe tot aan de stam te laten groeien. Sedertdien speelt gomziekte geen rol van betekenis meer, maar vervanging van de 'zure oranje' door andere onderstammen kan het probleem weer acuut maken.

In de kwekerij zijn twee bladziekten schadelijk: schurft en kringetjesziekte. De eerste is vrij gemakkelijk te bestrijden, de tweede niet. Bovendien worden nu ook oudere planten, vooral grapefruit, aangetast. Nog meer schade doet greasy spot. Vroeger dacht men aan een bij-effect van roestmijt, maar ook hier is een schimmel de boosdoener. Er bestaan echter nogal ingewikkelde betrekkingen tussen enerzijds de roestmijt en greasy spot en anderzijds een op roestmijt parasiterende schimmel. Dit heeft het onderwerp van de dissertatie van VAN BRUSSEL (2) gevormd.

Hij constateerde dat het aantal mijten in de regentijd sterk terugliep, maar reeds na enkele weken van droogte zijn maximale dichtheid kon bereiken. Dan begint een parasitaire schimmel (*Hirsutella*) zich snel te vermeerderen, waardoor de roestmijtpopulatie daalt. Daarmee neemt ook de schimmel die greasy spot veroorzaakt af. Koperbespuitingen ruimen zowel nuttige als schadelijke schimmels

op. VAN BRUSSEL bespoot de bomen met een *Hirsutella* oplossing, hetgeen de roestmijt drie weken lang binnen de perken hield. Het is niet duidelijk of deze methode ook in de praktijk wordt, of kan worden, toegepast. Zo'n biologische bestrijdingswijze zou sterke voorkeur verdienen boven een chemische.

Rond 1950 was vruchtrot *het* probleem van de surinaamse citrus. Om het op te lossen moest een groot aantal bewaarproeven worden genomen. Hiertoe was samenwerking nodig tussen enerzijds twee stafleden van het LP en anderzijds de planters, de citruspakkerij, de scheepvaartmaatschappij en twee instanties in Nederland: het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen in Amsterdam en het Bureau schimmelcultures te Baarn.

De schimmel *Diplodia natalensis* bleek verantwoordelijk te zijn voor ruim 90% van alle verliezen.(18) Het door deze schimmel veroorzaakte steelrot kan sterk beperkt worden door draaipluk en door ontsmetting in het pakhuis met Dowicide A. Dit laatste dient zo snel mogelijk na de pluk te geschieden; verwelken was dus taboe.

Een andere vorm van rot die meestal niet, maar soms catastrofaal, optreedt, is het bruinrot ten gevolge van een *Phytophthora* schimmel. Deze kan van vrucht op vrucht overgaan, in tegenstellig tot *Diplodia,* en is daardoor zeer gevaarlijk. Hiertegen moeten sanitaire maatregelen in de plantage genomen worden: goede lozing, opruimen van schaduwbomen, eventueel zelfs koperbespuiting. Als aanvullende veiligheidsmaatregel gebruikt men in het pakhuis een sodabad.

Het alleen tegen ''mould'' werkzame boraxbad in het pakhuis werd door twee baden vervangen: een soda- en een Dowicide A-bad. Plantages met bruinrot werden van levering uitgesloten, of kwamen pas aan het eind van een verscheping aan de beurt. Strakke leverings-schema's zorgden voor zo weinig mogelijk vertraging. Het gevolg was dat het bederf daalde tot de aanvaardbare gemiddelden van 8% voor sinaasappel en 5% voor grapefruit. Voor dit resultaat bereikt was, waren er 35 bewaarproeven met in totaal 105.000 vruchten genomen.

Onder de citrusvijanden nemen de schildluizen de eerste plaats in. Tussen schild- en bladluizen aan de ene kant en mieren aan de andere bestaan ingewikkelde relaties, terwijl ook schimmels en pre-

datoren een rol spelen. In proeven werd ontdekt dat tegen mieren beschermde bomen lange tijd vrij van schildluizen bleven. Ook zagen wij dat met koper bespoten bomen vaak te lijden hadden van een explosie van schildluizen. De mieren ''melken'' de schild- en bladluizen en jagen hun vijanden weg. Door nu alleen de stammen, maar niet de kroon, te bespuiten, kregen lieveheersbeestjes en zweefvliegen de kans de luizen in toom te houden. Zo ontstond *avant le mot* een vorm een geïntegreerde bestrijding.

Intussen was ook de bestrijdingstechniek ingrijpend gewijzigd. Het spuiten was op de surinaamse plantages een moeizaam werk. Per dag kon men zelden meer dan één hectare doen, met vijf à zes arbeiders. In 1954 werd de eerste nevelspuit ingevoerd. Dit draagbare apparaat bracht de te verspuiten hoeveelheid vloeistof van 2000 tot 100 liter per hectare terug, terwijl nu twee man het werk afkonden; de capaciteit steeg tot drie ha per dag. Natuurlijk moest de concentratie van de oplossing verhoogd worden om een vergelijkbaar resultaat te krijgen; echter niet 20-maal, maar slechts 10-maal.

Als richtlijn werd het volgende nevelprogramma opgesteld:(19c)

(1) januari (na de bloei)	—	zinksulfaat plus zineb
(2) maart-april (zo nodig)	—	zineb (tegen roestmijt)
(3) juni (vóór de pluk)	—	dieldrin op stam (tegen mieren)
(4) september (zo nodig)	—	zinksulfaat plus zwavel
(5) november (bij uitloop)	—	dieldrin op stam, event. lindaan op uitloop (tegen bladluis).

Zineb en zwavel zijn later vervangen door het meer specifieke chloorbenzilaat.

Virusziekten moeten al sedert het begin van de eeuw met de ingevoerde plantjes zijn meegekomen. Ze werden echter niet opgemerkt. In 1949 sloeg FERNANDES alarm,(8) vermoedelijk ten onrechte want noch CAMP in 1949, noch L.C. KNORR in 1954 kon tristeza, of een andere virusziekte, vinden. In 1962 toonde KAAIJENGA (15b) exocortis aan en een jaar later ook tristeza en psorosis. Zijn diagnoses zijn bevestigd door de internationaal vermaarde virologen CHILDS(4) en J.M. BOVÉ.



3. Insekten-vrije kas in de Cultuurtuin.

Het virusprobleem is uitzonderlijk ingewikkeld, want:
– er zijn nu ongeveer 30 virusziekten van citrus bekend,
– verscheidene hiervan hebben ''stammen'' met uiteenlopende virulentie,
– elke citruscombinatie reageert weer anders,
– slechts enkele van deze ziekten worden door insekten overgebracht; daaronder is tristeza,
– onder die insekten zijn er grote verschillen in de efficiëntie van de overdracht,
– exocortis kan door messen, scharen etc. worden overgebracht,
– overdracht door zaad is zeldzaam, maar niet onmogelijk,
– overigens is overdracht door oculeren het normale geval,
– temperatuur en andere uitwendige omstandigheden hebben ook invloed op de ziekte-verschijnselen.

Zure oranje was een bijzonder goede onderstam voor citrus in Suriname, zo lang er nog geen tristeza voorkwam. Van ziekten als voetrot, exocortis en psorosis bijv., hoefde men zich maar weinig aan te trekken. Wordt men echter gedwongen ten gevolge van tris-

teza een andere onderstam te kiezen, dan worden al die andere virusziekten opeens heel belangrijk. Men zal nu over virusvrij enthout moeten beschikken. Ook voetrot gaat weer een rol spelen.

Hoewel BOVÉ een zeer virulente vorm van tristeza heeft gevonden, is de in Suriname meest voorkomende vorm weinig virulent. De ziekte uit zich bij sinaasappel door een geleidelijke daling van de produktie; bij grapefruit is het ziekteverloop acuter. Bij een telling vond FONG POEN dat na 13 jaar de helft van de bomen afgestorven zou zijn (9, 15b, 17).

Na het vertrek van FONG POEN is het werk door FUNG KON SANG en KLAS overgenomen; de laatste legt zich meer toe op de fundamentele aspecten.

Oogst, verpakking, transport en verwerking

Suriname kent een ''Citrusuitvoerbesluit'', waarin diverse zaken in verband met de oogst en verpakking van citrus geregeld worden. Dit besluit is enige malen gewijzigd. Helaas komt in de laatste mij bekende versie niet tot uiting hoeveel onderzoek op dit punt is gedaan. Het moet mogelijk zijn termen als ''boomrijp'' en ''inwendig rijp'' exacter te definiëren dan hier wordt gedaan.

Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat onderstam, bemesting en bespuiting weinig invloed hebben op het rijpingsverloop. De vruchtkleur is onvoldoende maatstaf voor de rijpheid. Om een gunstig tijdstip voor de oogst te kiezen, kan men het beste uitgaan van de gehalten aan sap, suiker en citroenzuur. Voor de 'Kwata' sinaasappel zijn de optimale gehalten ongeveer 50% sap, 13% suiker en 1% citroenzuur; deze toestand wordt normaliter eind juli bereikt. De vruchten kunnen dan echter nog maanden aan de boom blijven hangen zonder kwaliteitsverlies. Men kan reeds in juni oogsten, maar dan zijn de gehalten aan suiker en sap lager en aan zuur hoger(21).

De pakkerij van de Citrus Centrale heeft jaren onder zeer moeilijke omstandigheden gewerkt. Het is daar altijd hollen of stilstaan. Als een schip citrus komt inladen, moet men drie tot vier dagen bijna continu doorwerken om een 20.000-tal kratten aan boord te krijgen. Daarna volgen twee tot drie weken van stilte. Buiten het seizoen is er nauwelijks genoeg werk om de vaste staf, ongeveer 20

man, bezig te houden. Het andere personeel wisselt sterk en is voor een deel ongetraind en zeer moeilijk in de hand te houden. De aan- en afvoerschema's, vooral die over water, zijn ingewikkeld en lopen zelden foutloos; daarbij wil nog elke plantage onder eigen merk verpakken.

Gezien al deze moeilijkheden en het grote gebrek aan technisch goed opgeleid personeel kan men zich erover verbazen dat alles nog redelijk goed liep. Nu echter zijn de machines, na dertig jaar, zo versleten dat algehele vernieuwing noodzakelijk is. Verplaatsing van de pakkerij van Soekibaka naar de haven, of naar het industrieterrein aan het Saramakakanaal wordt aanbevolen (11, 25).

Het transport over zee zou eigenlijk in gekoelde ruimen moeten plaats vinden, maar daarvoor zijn de aangeboden hoeveelheden te klein. De minimum temperatuur waarbij *Diplodia* nog groeit is 15 °C en het is dus wenselijk de ruimen zo snel mogelijk onder die temperatuur te brengen. Daarvan is echter geen sprake als het transport in geventileerde ruimen geschiedt. Ook de ideale relatieve luchtvochtigheid van 85% wordt lang niet altijd gehandhaafd. Controle op dit alles is vrijwel onmogelijk en de scheepvaartmaatschappij aanvaardt geen aansprakelijkheid voor hoge bederfcijfers.

Sapverwerking heeft gedurende vele jaren op kleine schaal plaats gehad bij de Afdeling Agrarische Technologie. Vooral grapefruitsap was een populair produkt.

In 1962 richtten drie ondernemers uit Florida, met steun van surinaamse belanghebbenden, een grote sapfabriek op Blauwgrond op. De capaciteit van de fabriek lag hoger dan de totale produktie van Suriname, zodat de regering ertoe over moest gaan de export van vers fruit tijdens het hoogseizoen te verbieden. De planters maakten daartegen in meerderheid geen bezwaar. Weliswaar was de prijs vrij laag, nl. 5 cent per kilogram, maar de afzet was verzekerd en de kosten waren lager.

Reeds in 1964 zag de fabriek zich gedwongen tot sluiting wegens "bedrijfstechnische, bedrijfsorganisatorische, juridische en financieel-economische moeilijkheden".(19c) Het land nam de fabriek over, maar slaagde er niet in hem in bedrijf te houden. De verloren gegane exportmarkt moest nu opnieuw veroverd worden. De vraag of we hier te maken hadden met een al te grote voortvarendheid, dan wel een onverantwoorde speculatie, is nog niet beantwoord.

De plantages

Wij zagen reeds in welk een penibele situatie de citruscultuur in de jaren rondom 1950 terecht was gekomen. Toch staat in een rapport van 1954(26) te lezen dat de vooruitzichten goed waren; tegen een prijs van één cent per vrucht zou lonend gewerkt kunnen worden, de moeilijkheden lagen aan te hoge scheepsvrachten, ongunstige koersverhoudingen en te lage lokale afzet.

Eveneens in 1954 verklaarde een welingelichte buitenstaander: ''Surinam has not been able to develop its seasonal advantages, because of poor transport facilities and lack of discipline within the industry''.(3)

Een commissie, benoemd om een en ander te onderzoeken, bezocht daartoe 22 plantages, beplant met 448 ha sinaasappel en 238 ha grapefruit. Van slechts één plantage beoordeelde de commissie de produktie als bevredigend, nl. boven de 20 ton/ha. Op vier plantages was de produktie matig: van 10 tot 20 ton/ha. Er waren dus 17 plantages met een nog lagere produktie. Op elke plantage werd de situatie beoordeeld aan de hand van een aantal vragenlijsten. Ten aanzien van 12 factoren bleken er moeilijkheden te bestaan.

Toch was de commissie verre van pessimistisch; spoedige rehabilitatie leek mogelijk, indien aan de volgende zes punten aandacht zou worden geschonken: verbetering van de lozing, planten van koedzoe, bemesting, bespuiting, aanschaf van meer veldkratten en inboeten. De kosten werden per plantage geschat en een prognose van te verwachten produktie werd opgesteld.(16)

Op grond van dit rapport besloot de regering begin 1956 om gedurende vijf jaar een garantieregeling voor de citruscultuur in te stellen. De garantieprijs was *f* 4,75 per krat fob en de planters verplichtten zich hun aanplant te verzorgen volgens de aanwijzingen van een ''plantagecommissie'', te benoemen door het bestuur van de Suriname Citrus Centrale.

De verbetering trad nog sneller in dan verwacht was en de prognoses werden zelfs iets overschreden. Reeds in 1959 was de export terug op het hoge niveau van 300.000 kratten met een waarde van 1,4 miljoen gulden. De regeling werd tot april 1962 verlengd,


maar daarna moest hoofdzakelijk aan de sapfabriek geleverd worden. Hoe dit drama afliep, is al verteld. De export heeft zich daarna maar ten dele weten te herstellen. Suriname heeft maar een klein aandeel in de nederlandse citrusimport en het is duidelijk dat zulke avonturen weinig bevordelijk zijn voor de goede naam van het surinaamse fruit.

Dit is echter niet de enige, of zelfs belangrijkste, reden voor de teruggang. Het wordt steeds moeilijker arbeiders op de plantages te houden. Velen zijn naar Paramaribo, en enkele jaren later naar Nederland, vertrokken. Het is dringend gewenst de levensomstandigheden op de plantages zodanig te verbeteren, dat deze tendens wordt tegengegaan. Met name zal men het werk, waar mogelijk, dienen te mechaniseren. Dat vereist echter hoge investeringen, vooral wat betreft het interne transport op de plantages. Ook het probleem van de tristeza moet energiek aangepakt worden, evenals andere problemen van produktie, transport, verpakking en verwerking. Jammer genoeg zijn er weinig aanwijzingen in die richting. Aan plannen ontbreekt het niet(11,17,23,25), maar geen enkel plan is, of wordt uigevoerd. Dit geldt trouwens niet alleen voor de citruscultuur in Suriname.

HET BINNENLAND

De 17de-eeuwse planters verlieten het binnenland omdat de ''oerwoudvruchtbaarheid'' snel opraakte. In de 20ste eeuw gaat dit niet meer op. We kunnen nu bodembedekkers planten, kunstmest toedienen, irrigeren en draineren. Daarom wees VAN EMDEN(6) op de noodzaak de mogelijkheden van het binnenland te onderzoeken. Einde vijftiger jaren, toen een weg naar Afobaka werd aangelegd, kreeg het LP een stuk van 400 ha voor proeven toegewezen.

Proeftuin Brokobaka ligt in een gebied met lage, lateritisch verweerde heuvels die chemisch weinig vruchtbaar zijn; de fysische eigenschappen van de grond zijn echter goed. Van alle onderzochte gewassen groeiden citrus en oliepalm hier het best. Dit heeft geleid tot de oprichting van twee grote bedrijven: de citrusonderneming Baboenhol en de oliepalmonderneming Victoria. Beide liggen ech-



4. Proeftuin Brokabaka, jonge citrusbomen.

ter niet op heuvelgronden, maar op de (betere) terrasgronden langs de rivier.

Baboenhol werd gefinancierd door de Stichting Experimentele Landbouwbedrijven uit de bedrijfsoverschotten van de Prins Bernhard Polder; deze bedroegen jaarlijks ongeveer *f* 200.000. Een interne nota stelde voor in vier jaar 140 ha te beplanten en later even-

tueel uit te breiden tot 500 ha; bovendien kon men dan kleine bedrijven geven aan Bosnegerarbeiders met ervaring. De economische calculaties waren gunstig.

Ook dit plan is mislukt. In 1964 begon de ontginning en enkele jaren lang liep alles goed. Maar, de opbrengsten bleven onder de verwachtingen en omstreekst 1975 brak een ziekte met onbekende oorzaak (''blight'') uit. Nogal overhaast is toen het besluit genomen het project om te zetten in een veeteeltbedrijf. Te vrezen valt dat hiermee het doodvonnis voor de citruscultuur in Suriname getekend is.

HUIDIGE SITUATIE

Het Nationale Ontwikkelingsplan(23) voorzag een citrusareaal van 3.680 ha in 1974, waarvan 500 ha in het binnenland, met een produktie van 94.000 ton. Hiervan is niets terecht gekomen; integendeel de produktie werd gehalveerd en de export is nagenoeg tot stilstand gekomen. Men vraagt zich af of er nog wel genoeg citrus is om aan de lokale vraag te voldoen.

Tabel 5

Beplant areaal, produktie en export van citrus

Jaar	*Areaal(ha)*	*Produktie(ton)*	*Export(ton)*
1970	2.173	12.499	5.888
1971	1.762	14.181	2.887
1972	1.721	16.621	1.501
1973	1.846	16.345	8.809
1974	1.725	15.050	6.292
1975	2.023	13.830	3.951
1976	1.980	12.940	3.747
1977	2.000	15.220	1.524
1978	1.894	6.613	811
1979	1.899	7.351	

Bron: *Afd. Landb. Statistiek, LVV.*. Produktie en export waren in aantal vruchten opgegeven; omrekening 1 sinaasappel = 180 g, 1 grapefruit = 400 g, overige citrusvruchten = 200 g.

Uit tabel 5 blijkt dat de opbrengsten (in ton/ha) een scherpe daling

vertonen en dat ook het exportaandeel gestadig vermindert. Voor deze ontwikkelingen zijn drie hoofdoorzaken aan te wijzen:
(1) het vóór 1940 beplante areaal moet nu als afgeschreven worden beschouwd, maar telt vermoedelijk nog steeds mee,
(2) het steeds meer om zich heen grijpen van ziekten, vooral tristeza,
(3) het voortdurend toenemend gebrek aan arbeidskrachten op de plantages.

Dit laatste punt wordt toegelicht door tabel 6.

Tabel 6

Emigratie en immigratie van Suriname, 1973-1975

Jaar	*Emigratie*	*Immigratie*	*Verschil*
1973	9.267	2.442	6.825
1974	17.820	2.138	15.682
1975	39.722	3.037	36.685
Totaal	66.809	7.617	59.192

Bron: art. Demografie, *Encycl. van Suriname*(7).

Het is te hopen dat er op korte termijn een oplossing gevonden kan worden voor het emigratieprobleem. De toekomst van Suriname hangt daarvan af. Dan zal, naar te verwachten is, de citruscultuur in belangrijke mate kunnen bijdragen aan de toekomstige ontwikkeling van Suriname. Voorwaarde is echter dat daar een goed gefundeerd onderzoek aan vooraf gaat en dat de grootst mogelijke samenwerking wordt verkregen van alle belanghebbenden.

SUMMARY

Citrus growing in Surinam

Surinam was first colonized by the English around 1630, but became a Dutch colony in 1667. A plantation economy developed in the coastal plain with sugar cane as main crop and Arabica coffee, cacao and cotton as secondary crops. After a climax in the second half of the 18th century, plantations began to decline. When slavery was abolished (1863) cacao became the main crop, soon to be replaced by Liberica coffee and rice.



5. Baboenhol, eerste aanplant met *Crotalaria* groenbemester.

During the 1930's the price of coffee fell to an extremely low level and citrus was expected to become the main export crop. World War II arrested this development, but in 1946 export was resumed. However, fruit quality was low, decay on arrival in Holland usually exceeding 30%. A modern packing house was built in 1950, but this did not improve matters immediately. Only after research had shown what fungi caused decay and how to control it, rot sharply dropped.

Research before and after 1950 is reviewed. Main subjects were: cultivars and rootstocks, propagation and cultivation methods, soils and fertilizers, control of pests and diseases and post-harvest handling. In 1962 virus diseases were discovered, making new stock-scion trials and import of virus-free budwood necessary.

When a road made the interior accessible, an experimental station was set up at Brokobaka. This eventually led to the foundation of a large citrus enterprise at Baboenhol. Due to low yields and a disease called ''blight'', the project had to be converted into a cattle breeding station. During the 1970's the development of Surinam was greatly hindered by a huge emigration wave. At present, citrus production has dropped so far that there is hardly enough for local consumption.

LITERATUUR

1. BATCHELOR, L.D. & ROUNDS M.B., 1948. Choice of rootstocks, in *The Citrus Industry II.* Univ. Calif.

2. BRUSSEL, E.W. VAN, 1975. *Interrelations between citrus rust mite, Hirsutella thompsonii and greasy spot on citrus in Surinam.* Wageningen, 1975.

3. BURKE, J.H., 1956. *Citrus industry of Surinam.* USDA For. Agr. Reports *89.*

4. CHILDS, J.F.L., 1964. Observations on citrus culture and problems in Surinam (Dutch Guiana). *Surin. Landb. 12,* 57-61.

5. *Dagblad Suriname,* 9 maart 1962.

6. EMDEN, J.H. VAN, 1961. Landbouwkundig onderzoek in het binnenland. *Surin. Landb. 9,* p. 48-50.

7. *Encyclopedie van Suriname.* Amsterdam, 1977 (J.A. SAMSON, Landbouw, p. 361-370).

8. FERNANDES, D.S., 1947. *Is er in Suriname een nieuwe ziekte in de Citrus opgetreden?* LEZ Med. 6.

9. FONG POEN, I.E., 1969. Citrus onderzoek, *Surin. Landb. 17,* p. 11-21.

10. FUNG KON SANG, W.E. & NANDEN-AMATTARAM, T., 1975. Citrus rootstock performance with old and nucellar orange tops on heavy clay soils of the coastal plain of Surinam. *Surin. Landb.* p. 109-118.

11. HVA, 1970. *Studie inzake uitbreiding citruscultuur in het binnenland van Suriname,* 2 delen.

12. KAMERLING, G.E., 1974. *Bodemfysisch en agrohydrologisch onderzoek in de jonge kustvlakte van Suriname.* Wageningen.

13. LEZ *Jaarverslagen 1936-1945.*

14. LIEMS, J.A., 1917. *De cultuur van sinaasappelen in Suriname.* Dept. Landbouw Bull. *35.*

15. LP *Jaarverslagen: (a) 1904-1932* en *(b) 1958-1976.*

16. LVV, 1955. *Verslag van de commissie belast met het onderzoek naar de toestand op de citrus-plantages.*

17. LVV, 1972. *Rapport Werkgroep Citrus.* Jan. 1972

18. SAMSON, J.A., 1955. De invloed van verschillende factoren op het bederf van citrusvruchten. *Surin. Landb. 3,* p. 306-312.

19. SAMSON, J.A. *et al.*, 1956-1966. Handleiding voor de citruscultuur in Suriname. *(a) LP Meded. 19, 1956.(b) LP Meded. 24,* 1961. *(c) LP Meded. 39,* 1966.

20. SAMSON, J.A. & BYRON, D.G., 1958. Veredeling van sinaasappels in Suriname. *Surin. Landb.* 6, p. 98-102.

21. SAMSON, J.A., 1959. Over de rijping van citrusvruchten in Suriname. *Surin. Landb.* 7, p. 103-119.

22. STAHEL, G., 1935. *Gegevens over de productie der sinaasappelbomen in Suriname.* LP serie overdr. *5.*

23. STICHTING PLANBUREAU SURINAME, 1965. *Nationaal Ontwikkelingsplan Suriname,* deel *2.* Paramaribo.

24. SUCHTELEN, N.J. VAN, 1954. Het bederf van ons citrusfruit. *Surin. Landb. 2,* p. 61-67.

25. SUNECON, 1976. *Onderzoek inzake het oprichten van een pakcentrale annex koelhuis t.b.v. de citrusindustrie in Suriname.*

26. VERENIGING SURINAAMS BEDRIJFSLEVEN, 1954. *Rapport Werkgroep Citruscultuur.* Paramaribo.

27. WEERT, R. VAN DER, *et al.,* 1973. *Opbrengst van citrus in relatie tot bodemvocht.* LP Bull. *90.*

Ir J.A. SAMSON, Vakgroep Tropische Plantenteelt
Landbouwhogeschool, Wageningen

LABOUR UNIONS AND LABOUR CONFLICT IN CURAÇAO

The history of labour unions in Curaçao is a field which has been little explored so far. True, several writers have indirectly paid attention to it within the framework of other studies, but a systematic analysis which takes into account the different economic, socio-structural, and political factors bearing on the birth and development of collective and organized actions by the working class is lacking as yet. This paper does not intend to fill this gap. It is rather an attempt to give a bird's eye view of the history of the development of trade unions, and to point out some blanks which are still to be seen. *

In the history of labour unions in Curaçao in the 20th century three stages can be identified. The first stage runs from 1922 till the end of World War II. In this period the beginning was marked of organized labour action. However labour unions in that time were patronized by the R.C. clergy and middle class leaders, and their approach was very conformistic.

At the end of World War II (1945) there was a brief intermediate period in wich newly organized political parties tried to found labour unions under patronage of the parties. This was not successful and by 1955 new independent labour unions started to emerge. Although independent they had a strong liaison with political parties. This can be called the second stage. This went on till the riots of the 30th of May 1969, when there came a difinitite breach between the labour unions and the political parties. Labour unions

* Paper presented at the Eleventh Conference of Caribbean Historians, Curaçao, April 5-10, 1979.

from that time on started to take an independent stance vis à vis the political parties.

The present situation is one in which we can clearly perceive a power game between political parties and labour unions or maybe I should say: between political leaders and union leaders.

The history shows further that in at least two occasions the development of trade unions has made a leap forward in consequence of serious labour conflicts debouching into riots. In 1922 it was a dock workers strike which marked the beginning of trade unionism. In 1969 again it was a labour conflict, which developed into riots, that rang in a new era. Looking at trade unions from a sociological point of view one can state that just like political parties, after the second World War they have become channels for social mobility. Being a union leader now means belonging tot a new kind of élite.

Before going into this, however, it would be desirable to attempt to introduce a definition as regards our subject of study : labour unions. To define their goals as ''collective and organized actions by the working class'', as we did earlier, does not cover our purpose here because it would include labour movements with very general objectives, such as the political, social and cultural interests of wage-earners (HENRY, 1972 : 32). Labour unions in the strict sense have very often originated from these organizations, however. Such was the case with the ''R.K. Volksbond'' (R.C. People's Union) in Curaçao, as we shall see later. But there were similar processes in the former British colonies too (HENRY, 1972; LEWIS, 1939).

Though it is difficult to fix exact boundaries, the concept of labour union calls up a more limited picture. By a labour union I would like to understand an organisation of wage-earners with the explicit aim of pursuing the betterment of their socio-economic position. Though not considered to be their explicit aim, this definition does not exclude political actions by the labour unions. In other words, labour unions do not have political objectives, but their influence on political development can be very great. Thus labour unions in other parts of the Caribbean had a distinctly anti-colonial undertone in the past. As far as Curaçao is concerned, the

voting advices given sometimes by the labour unions before the elections have unmistakably influenced the voting behaviour of the labourers.

Labour unions in Curaçao are of recent date. Before the great dock strike of 1922, there was no question of collective, organized actions by the labourers to promote their socio-economic interests.

The dock strike of 1913, which as far as can be traced, was the first strike by free people in Curaçao, was an unorganized wild cat strike, which had but little effect (HARTOG, 1961: 781). The employers took no account of the labourers, and brought in manpower from St. Thomas and Venezuela. The strike passed off without any resort to organized opposition on the part of the labourers. The question which arises, and which may in fact be asked as regards labour unions in general, is whether this should be attributed to the fact that the labourers were not prepared yet for such a form of organization, or that they were afraid of repressive measures by the Government and their employers.

The dock strike of 1922, which followed a dramatic course, shows that the second possibility is not to be neglected. Yet it could also be concluded from developments around and after this strike, that the Curaçao labourers had not sufficiently wrestled themselves free from nineteenth century paternalism, characteristic of slave societies, to take actions against their (white) employers. What were the facts?

In February 1922 it was announced by the agent of the ''Koninklijke West-Indische Maildienst'' (Royal West Indian Mail-service) on behalf of the several shipping-companies, that wages would be lowered as per April 1st, from 50 cts to 40 cts an hour, and from *f* 1.— to *f* 0.75 an hour for overtime. It was alleged that in the war years (1914-1918) the dock workers had exacted excessively high wages from the companies; these wages were too high in proportion to earnings of craftsmen. A carpenter, for instance, earned *f* 2.50 a day, before the war, and *f* 3.50 in 1922, which was a rise of more than 40%; the wages of a dock worker had, however, risen from 20 or 25 cents an hour to 50 cts, that is by 100% or more. As was to be expected the labourers went on strike at the beginning of April. No serious attempts had been

made to solve the problem before that date. The labourers themselves were not organized, and none of them had dared to take the initiative in this, fearing reprisals.

After the problem had become acute on April 1st, the Board of the ''R.K. Volksbond'', established in 1919, offered to mediate. This ''R.K. Volksbond'' was in fact not a union, but rather a middle-class social organization which tried to promote the cultural, including the religious, interests of the people. The offer by the ''R.K. Volksbond'' was accepted by both parties. The proposal by the ''R.K. Volksbond'' not to lower the rates to 40 cts, but to 45 cts, was rejected by the dock workers in a meeting held on April 6th. They stuck to 50 cts an hour, which was notified to the employers by letter that same day. But the employers stuck to their guns too. There was a busy correspondence between the ''R.K. Volksbond'' and the employers as the strike dragged on. But the employers were in no hurry, because, apparently with the consent of the authorities, and just like in 1913, they had sent for Venezuelan labourers to do the work.

Meanwhile a 'Dock Workers' Union had been constituted per July 1st, because of dissatisfaction with the course of events. The provisional Board of this union and the employers came to an acceptable package of labour conditions, including wages of 45 cts an hour between 7 and 12 a.m., and between 1 and 6 p.m.; all other hours were to be paid at 80 cts an hour as overtime.

At this stage a problem which was to recur later (in 1969) made itself felt, namely that local agents or representatives of foreign companies have but little power to accept the labour conditions negotiated. For this they must turn to the general management abroad. In this case the opinion had to be heard of the general management of the Red D. Line in New York. On July 14th, a negative reply came in by cable. The dock workers, who were tired of waiting, took the initiative into their own hands, and proceeded to take actions on July 17th. From the square in front of the town hall, where they had assembled for a conversation with the Attorney General, they marched through the streets of Willemstad to the Office of the Koninklijke West-Indische Maildienst (Royal West Indian Mail-service. Police officers who wanted to stop the crowd, were dispersed or struck down by clubs. The strikers penetrated

into the K.W.I.M. office, where the staff, but especially the agent, was roughly handled. The police only succeeded in restoring order by calling military troops into action. The balance was 4 people killed, and 19 wounded.

On July 18th the Dock Worker's Union reached an agreement with the employers: the Union would do everything to induce the strikers to resume work at the wages fixed by the company of 40 cts for normal working-hours and 80 cts for overtime. The companies on their part promised to raise their wages as from August 1st, to 45 cts and 80 cts respectively, thus accepting the proposal by the dock workers, which had been rejected by the companies on July 14th. These wages remained in force well into the forties.

This labour conflict — the first clear awakening of the Curaçao labourers, which did not depend on the patronage system of employers or the Church — did not mark the beginning of independent labour unions, although it was the first push to this. The ''R.K. Volksbond'', under whose influence the 'Dock Workers Union' remained, was still too much steeped in post-emancipation paternalism. Thus it strikes us that a pamphlet published by the ''R.K. Volksbond'' on this conflict says that they had advised the labourers to resume work at wages of 40 cts per hour, to save the prestige of the employers. The attitude of the Government was indicative of the spirit of the time: refraining completely from any interference in the conflict, until disturbances broke out (RÖMER, 1978: 64-68).

Initiative for the further development of labour unions afterwards came to rest completely with the ''R.K. Volksbond'', which was mainly led by R.C. clergymen. This often resulted in a projection of a religious issue into the social problems of the labourers, thus delaying the solution of these problems, rather than speeding it up. Still, the ''Volksbond'' should receive credit for the fact that they had a share in establishing several labour unions in the thirties, which, though strongly patronized by the clergy, helped in laying the basis for developments which were to start after the Second World War.

The ''Vakbond voor Winkel- en Kantoor personeel'' ''Sceom'' (1934), and the ''Chauffeursbond'' ''San Cristóbal'' (1935), (respectively Shop and Office Workers Union and Drivers Union) should be mentioned here, while a ''R.K. Arbeiders Unie'' (R.C. Labourers Union) which was founded on the occasion of the 1936 Shell strike, finally joined under the wings of the ''R.K. Volksbond'' in 1940. When this strike broke out the Governor, with the labour conflict of 1922 probably still in mind, immediately called in troops to strengthen the police. Needless to say that no disturbances did arise. The ''R.K. Arbeiders Unie'' originally was a reaction to the hardly militant attitude of the ''R.K. Volksbond''. The leaders wanted it to be a real union, not just a movement with broad objectives. The possibility was even there. With the new constitution of 1936 granting limited suffrage to the Colony, certain union goals could now be achieved through political pressure in the ''Staten'' (House of Representatives). The Union's more agressive approach was not understood by the labourers. Moreover, both the colonial government as the R.C. clergymen opposed the union with the final result that it was absorbed in the R.K. Volksbond. The other Unions mentioned here all lacked the necessary drive, on one hand because they were being tutored by the R.C. Church, on the other hand because the labourers had not yet freed themselves from the 19th-century paternalistic pattern of labour relations. Therefore, regulations for the legal protection of labourers did not originate with these unions.

What was the situation in this field? In spite of the prevailing opinions in Europe, no trace of labour legislation was to be seen yet in Curaçao at the end of the twenties. Concerning an important subject such as the labour contract, the provisions of 1863, the year of abolition of slavery, were still operative. Article 3 of this regulation of 1863 stated that the master's word was law as regards the most important elements of labour relations, such as wages and working hours.

Labour legislation, which began to take shape in the thirties, was clearly the initiative of W.T. VAN SLOBBE, the Governor at the time. The first Act in this field was the ''Winkelsluitverordening'' (Shop Closing Act) of 1932. Then followed the ''Ongevallenregeling'' (Sickness Insurance Act) of 1936. The regulation of the

labour contract in the Civil Code was not effected until 1941. By far the greater majority of the companies had no labour contract until that year. It was not until 1958 that the Act on Collective Labour Agreements followed. Though the colonial Government's actions in its endeavors to maintain order were decidedly repressive as regards the labourer, the initiatives to improve the latter's position mainly originated with this same Authority.

When we review the development of labour unions before the Second World War, both internal and external factors appear to have slowed it. Within the group of labourers there was too little inclination to organize. As said before, there was too little awareness of class position, and people were still cocooned by post-emancipation paternalistic labour relations. They themselves obviously did not object to the fact yet, that the master was taken at his word as regards the determination of labour conditions. Apart from this sociological factor, economic considerations also played a part within the group of labourers, namely, their relative economic progress achieved since the mid twenties.

Though Curaçao had been dealt a severe blow at the time of the crisis of 1930, the recession had already been overcome in 1934, a development which continued at an accelerated rate in the years to follow. Whereas, due to economic misery which made itself felt as the aftermath of the crisis until the Second World War, there were disturbances in the British colonies at the end of the thirties, which resulted in the formation of labour unions in the different island societies (HENRY, 1972:46), in Curaçao, as compared with the surrounding area, there was a relatively favourable economic climate for the labourer. This also manifested itself clearly in the flow of emigrants to this island, as shown by the table below:

POPULATION OF CURAÇAO 1935-1939

Year	*Total*	*Increase or Decrease*	*Excess of Births*	*Settlement and Department*
1935	55463	+ 2667	+ 941	+ 1726
1936	58233	+ 2770	+ 1239	+ 1531
1937	60883	+ 2650	+ 1133	+ 1517
1938	62798	+ 1915	+ 1208	+ 707
1939	65231	+ 2433	+ 1401	+ 1032

This, however, also shows a third important factor active within the workers' group: it was heterogeneous. In 1938, for instance, 54% of the labourers employed at Shell refinery were from Madeira or one of the British colonies in the area (VAN SOEST, 1976 : 365); in 1945, 56%. It is quite understandable that the labourers of foreign nationality did not feel called upon to start union activities right away. They were too well aware of their marginal position. Yet they were to play an important part later, in the second stage of the development of labour unions.

There were adverse forces outside the labouring group too. Both the Government and the major employer, Shell, acted rather repressively against actions undertaken by the labourers, thus trying to prevent an improvement in their labour condition.

The actions by the soldiers and the police in 1922, and later in 1936, have already been mentioned. The Governors of the thirties were potentates who were perhaps willing to do something for the labourers, but then, in any case, without consulting them. Their attitude in favour of labour legislation was mainly prompted by developments in the Mother country. Legal barriers should be mentioned too, namely, article 138 bis of the Penal Code, which put limitations to union activities. Union leaders were punishable by penal law if they were to instigate labourers to strike, knowing or assuming that disturbance of public order could be the result (DA COSTA GOMEZ, 1957). Only in 1956 were these limitations abolished. Finally in 1977 the compulsory recognition of labour unions was legally established (HENRIQUEZ, 1979).

But the employers too, in particular Shell which had a domi-

nating position with some 30% of the working population, were decidedly not in favour of any participation on the part of the labourers. As late as the fifties Shell would try to frustrate the creation of independent bodies for representation of the labourers. The tide had already turned then, however. The labourers had meanwhile gone through a change of mentality. The turning-point lies in the period 1940-1945, the years of the Second World War, in which there had also been quite a change on the political field.

The relative independence of Curaçao from the metropolitan country during the Second World War had created political leaders who were convinced that they could manage things themselves, and that it was not necessary to remain tied to the Mother country's apron strings. A process of political awakening had begun with a small group of leaders, during the war years. The group was also partly motivated by feelings of frustration, because of the dominating position of ex-patriates and Roman Catholic Clergy (the latter, in fact, also consisting of ex-patriates).

This new group was made up of the old white élite and of coloured people who had risen socially, and whose aspirations were blocked by the colonial administration and the R.C. Mission. They secured the backing of the negroid population, without having to make concessions to their own middle class political and social aspirations. This pattern was maintained until the disturbances of May 30th, 1969, after which we can speak of a third stage in the development of labour unions. This will be dealt with later.

Faithful to good Caribbean practice, the political parties which had emerged from the above-mentioned movements in the forties, tried to secure the backing of the labourers through labour organizations allied to the parties. The ''Democratische Partij'' (Democratic Party), established in 1944, organized the ''Democratische Arbeiders Unie'' (Democratic Workers' Union) in 1945, again in connection with a dock strike, and later (1948) the ''Unie van Petroleum Arbeiders'' (Petroleum Workers Union). The ''Nationale Volkspartij'' (National People's Party), which in 1948 had split from the ''R.K. Partij'' (R.C. Party), established in 1936, gradually undermined the old R.K. Volksbond, by having executive members of the party form and guide separate labour organizations. AMADO RÖMER (1976) rightly observes in this

connection that the labour unions fell from the paternalism of the Church into the patronage system of the political parties.

Yet, these attempts were not very successful. A structure which is quite often found in the Commonwealth Caribbean Countries, in which political parties and labour unions are closely allied and in which labour unions often serve as training-schools for political leaders, did not develop in Curaçao. The Democratische Arbeidersunie became defunct as early as 1949; the Unie van Petroleum Arbeiders did not show much activity, while the N.V.P. did not succeed in really getting a firm grip on labour organizations either. Nor was there, however, a complete division and an independent development of labour unions.

Relations between labour unions and political parties took a new turn around 1955. New labour unions came into being, with political figures participating to maintain contact with the political figures participating to maintain contact with the political parties. Though the unions which were established after that period were not allied to a specific political party, clear connections with the political parties always existed, until May 1969.

ANDERSON & DYNES (1975:75) point to the fact that labour unions in developing countries very often court the Government, looking forward to government measures to strengthen their position and to safeguard the interests of their members. This is said to be connected with the fact that in developing countries economic problems often require political decisions, because of thh central part played by the Government as stimulator and guide of economic development. Also important seems to me the circumstance, however, that labour unions in these countries are of fairly recent date, and try to enlist the support of the political parties to safeguard their interests because of their weak position with respect to the employers. Experience in Curaçao is illustrative in this respect.

In the *Rapport 30 mei* (Report on May 30th) relations between labour unions and political parties have been characterized as ''flirtations'' without any commitments, but not without expectations. In the long run, the obscurity characterizing such expectations not further defined, led to frictions and a gradual drifting

apart between the two groups, reaching a climax in the confrontations of the May days of 1969.

The disturbances of those days were induced by a strike at the steel construction contractor Wescar, which was carrying out work on contract for Shell. Labourers employed by this company earned less than their Shell colleagues, sometimes working side by side with them on the premises. It is therefore not surprising that the Wescar labourers demanded equal pay at the ''C.A.O.'' (C.L.A.) negotiations. Being tied to a fixed contract price for their projects, Wescar did not dare to simply meet these demands there and then. Negotiations did not run smoothly, and at one point were broken off for the second time. A strike by the Wescar workers followed, soon receiving expressions of support from employees at several other companies.

After a tumultuous meeting at ''Casa Sindical'' (the Central office of the unions) on the evening of May 29th, during which the members of the union of petroleum workers (P.W.F.C.) decided to strike at Shell, the strikers, whose numbers had meanwhile grown to some 4000 as a result of strikes at several other companies, gathered in front of one of the main entrances of the Shell Company premises. Soon there were disturbances there, in which cars of Dutch Shell employees were the target at first, but later also those of Dutchmen not working at Shell. Later the crowd moved off in the direction of the town, to express their displeasure at the fact that the Government had not taken any action in this labour conflict. Irregularities during this march increased; the crowd caused destructions at businesses on their way to town, and there were cases of lootings. When one of the leaders was hit by a bullet in a confrontation with the police, and had to be taken to hospital by the other leaders, complete chaos broke out. Policemen were knocked down, and the crowd streamed along several roads into the commercial centre of Willemstad, plundering, causing destruction, and setting fire to buildings. It was striking that aggression was deliberately aimed at companies and businesses, not belonging to native people. After marine troops were put into action, order could be restored.

This confrontation between the labour unions and the Government, in fact the leading political parties, in which the political

leaders were accused of letting the labourers down, and of not even shrinking from using armed soldiers against striking labourers, brought about a process of the unions rapidly becoming independent. If before they had sought protection with the Government or the parties in power, since then, the labour unions assumed an independent, sometimes radical position towards the Government. On the other hand, the political parties began to realize that organized labour movement had grown into a force to be reckoned with in the Curaçao society.

This recognition of the labour unions as independent organizations with their own functions in society, later assumed shape in the appointment of union representatives in a great number of Government bodies and committees. Political parties and labour unions have gone separate ways since the May days of 1969, although efforts are being made on either side to influence each other's policy. These efforts, however, now have the character of a power conflict between two groups each with their own identity. A similar relation has also developed between labour unions and employers, whether they have their own organizations or not. After initial opposition, sometimes accompanied by reprisals against militant labour union leaders, recognition also came on the part of the employers, finding expression in their willingness to discuss labour problems with the unions and to lay down labour conditions in collective labour agreements.

If we look at the structure of labour unions in Curaçao, it strikes us that they present a pluriform picture. In general, three ''pillars'' are to be distinguished: the so-called independent, the free, and the Christian labour unions. This division, which is a legacy of the Mother country, is partly based on ideological differences; it finds expression, among other things, in international affiliations. Thus, the ''Central General di Trahadornan di Corsou'' (General Workers Centre Curaçao) is affiliated with the ''Central Latino-Americano de Trabajadores'' (C.L.A.T.), a federation of labour unions in Latin America, which takes a quite radical stand, whereas the ''Algemeen Verbond van Vakverenigingen'' (General Congres of Labour Unions) is affiliated with the ''Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores (O.R.I.T.), and the

''Caribbean Congress of Labour.'' Their collaboration with the Dutch labour union world was channelled through the ''Nederlands Katholiek Vakverbond'' (N.K.V.) (Dutch Catholic Trade Congress), and the ''Nederlands Verbond Vrije Vakverenigingen'' (N.V.V.) (Dutch Trade Union Congress), respectively. The changed situation in the labour union world in Holland, resulting in a federation comprising both above mentioned organizations will undoubtedly lead to new kinds of affiliations.

Affiliatons with Dutch trade unions have been very important for the training of union leaders from Curaçao in the past. Dutch trade unions have been instrumental in this field both by sending Dutch union leaders in technical assistance and by inviting union leaders from Curaçao to training courses in Holland. The affiliation with Dutch trade unions in fact developed out of early contacts with the ''International Confederation of Free Trade Unions'' (I.C.F.T.U.) which asked a Dutchman to assist the emerging unions in Curaçao after the Second World War. But apart from ideological points of difference between the Unions in Curaçao, differences of opinion about the methods to be used, and personal antagonism among the leaders play an important part in their continued fragmentation. Needless to say that these frictions are disadvantageous to the labour unions themselves. The unity of the labour front, which had developed in the May days of 1969, proved to be short-lived. The Chamber of Labour Unions, established only recently after laborious deliberations, points to renewed solidarity.

Within the Curaçao labour unions it strikes us that after the Second World War non-natives, to wit Surinamese and British West Indians, occupied an important place. Apart from their possibly greater experience with labour unions in their native countries, it would appear to me that especially their marginal position in Curaçao society has led to a militant attitude, after an initial period of wait-and-see. Moreover, social mobility within the labour union was one of the few ways open to them.

As was the case with political parties, there has been a oligarchial development within the unions which resulted in a labour union élite. Through their serving in Boards, coupled with attending training courses abroad, a small group of labour union leaders de-

veloped, who are a cut above the rest. This in turn promotes the continuity of their positions of leadership. As representatives of the labourers they maintain frequent contact of consultative bodies and committees, which further increases the distance with the rank and file. One of the reasons why these pioneering leaders are reluctant to give up their positions to others, is the loss of social prestige and material prosperity it would bring in a small society with few alternatives. Of late an increasing protest against this state of affairs can be noticed; within these organizations a struggle for power involving the executive positions is now going on.

The above considerations on the development of labour unions do not pretend to be more than an outline which evokes many more questions. For instance, relations between the development of trade unionism and the ups and downs in the economy have only been hinted at. Have economic factors, such as the recession in the economy which began at the end of the fifties, influenced the development of independent labour unions? Has the degree of participation by the labourers in union actions increased because of that? The impression is that the Unions have assumed a more aggressive attitude. Although no serious labour conflicts occurred after 1969, there have been many strikes to underscore unions demands.

Mention was made of the 19th-century pattern of paternalistic labour relations as one of the factors that stunted the rise of labour unions. A logical question in this connection would be whether labour unions have contributed towards the emancipation of the labourers. Have the unions contributed to the concientization of their members by giving them a deeper understanding of their position vis à vis the employers within the context the island's economic system? The courses given by the A.V.V.C. and especially those given by the C.G.T.C. tend to be too much inspired by foreign types of labour education courses, such as those organized by the C.L.A.T.

Another point is to what extent we can speak of a political emancipation of the labouring group. Aren't they swung to and fro between the different parties, while union leaders seek to strengthen their position vis à vis the political leaders in a power game?

This is one of the dangers of the so-called ''voting-advice'' given at election time by the Boards of some labour unions.

It is equally desirable to go into the relations between labour legislation and labour unions. How far has the development of labour legislation promoted, or perhaps interfered with, the growth of labour unions? On the other hand, labour unions have no doubt influenced the development of such legislation.

These and possibly other questions have been insufficiently discussed in this article, or not at all. They deserve further elaboration based on thorough research.

REFERENCES

ANDERSON, A. & DYNES, R.: *Social movements, violence and change : The May revolt in Curaçao*. Columbus, 1975.

BROECK, A.J.M. VAN DEN: *Visies op Vakbonden en politieke partijen op Curaçao en Aruba*. Curaçao 1970.

Curaçaose R.K. Volksbond: *Het bootwerkersconflict in de haven van Willemstad*. Curaçao, 1922.

DIP, C.: *De ontwikkeling van het Arbeidsrecht in de Nederlandse Antillen*. Curaçao, 1975.

FUYKSCHOT, F.P.: Suriname en Curaçao, zoals een arbeidersleider die zag. *West-Indische Gids 30,* 1949.

GOMES CASSERES, B.: *Economic Development Social Class and Politics in the Caribbean*. (Senior thesis, B.A. Vrandies University) 1976.

GOMEZ, DA COSTA, M.F.: *Naar nieuw arbeidsrecht*. Curaçao, 1957.

HENRIQUEZ, N.E.: *Enkele aspecten van Collectieve Arbeidsverhoudingen*. Curaçao, 1979.

HENRY, Z.: *Labour relations and industrial conflict in Commonwealth Caribbean Countries.* Trinidad, 1972.

LEWIS, A.W.: *Labour in the West Indies.* London, 1939.

MARIA, M.N.: *Obreronan di Korsow.* Nijmegen-Den Haag, 1977.

Rapport Commissie tot onderzoek van de achtergronden en oorzaken van de onlusten welke op 30 mei 1969 op Curaçao hebben plaats gehad. Curaçao, 1970.

RÖMER, A.: *Sindikalismo na Korsow.* Curaçao, 1976.

RÖMER, R.A.: *Naar de voltooiing van de Emancipatie.* Curaçao, 1974.

RÖMER, R.A.: *Un Pueblo na Kaminda.* Zutphen, 1979.

SOEST, J. VAN: *Olie als Water.* Curaçao, 1976.

VERTON, P.C.: *Politieke dynamiek en dekolonisatie.* Meppel, 1977.

VERWEY, R.A.: *Rapport betreffende sociale toestanden in Curaçao 1937-1938.*

Dr R.A. RÖMER, Curaçao
University of the Netherlands Antilles

WHY RETURNEES GENERALLY DO NOT TURN OUT TO BE ''AGENTS OF CHANGE'': THE CASE OF SURINAME

The future looked rosy when Romeo Pengel (the name has been changed) left the Netherlands in 1972 to return to his native country of Suriname. Romeo, a boy from a middle-class Creole background, had been sent to the Netherlands three years earlier on a Surinamese scholarship for the police academy. He was now 26 years old and a police inspector; he was to serve on the police force in the country's capital, Paramaribo. There were very few police officers in Suriname with the inspector's diploma, and in addition to a high salary for Surinamese standards, his status was to be high as well. Pengel was specialized in dealing with the drug trade and the illegal possession of arms. ''If they give me the chance to set up my own drugs department in Suriname, then you'll really see something!''

At our first interview, just before he left the Netherlands, there were some doubts in his mind. What would it be like to work in a less highly developed country with the police methods that he had learned in the Netherlands? Would his Dutch wife be able to adjust? In Suriname, people often say: ''you can't compare Holland with Suriname'', but still... There were a lot of things that made Suriname more attractive than Holland. ''There is plenty of money in Holland, but it is not a good life. When I'm away at work all day, I don't want my wife to be shut up on the fourteenth storey of a pile of bricks taking tranquilizers. I don't want my children to have to play in a corner of the room and I don't want their Daddy to come

home in an evil mood from all those millions of cars all around him. I want to live life my way, not like in Holland.'' During our interview his wife expressed her agreement and stated that she was willing to do her utmost to adjust to the Surinamese way of life. ''I don't want to behave like a colonial. You won't find me in those all-white swimming pools.'' And another point: ''You should go back, our country would never amount to anything if we all just stayed in Holland.'' Pengel resolutely said no to an attractive job offer at a large Dutch police department. ''It will be all right in Suriname, there are a couple of boys on the police force there who studied at the academy, just like me.''

Our second interview took place a few months later, in Suriname now. The Pengel family was living in a roomy wooden house with a beautiful garden. The salary was more than enough to live on, and it was very pleasant to sit on their balcony, where a soft breeze blew in the tropical heat. The contact with Holland was still intact. They subscribed to Dutch newspapers, ''otherwise you lose touch, with the culture too. A theatre or a concert, you don't have that here.'' Except for this one aspect, life seemed to be quite satisfactory.

But after a few months' experience on the Paramaribo police force, things did not turn out to be as easy as Pengel had thought. The atmosphere among his colleagues was not good, and this was largely due to the faulty promotion policies. ''I know that when there weren't any inspectors on the force here who had been trained in Holland, they didn't use to have much to choose from. But nowadays the people who are promoted are just promoted on the basis of seniority or because they have politicians behind them, and not on the basis of their capacities.'' According to Pengel, the police force was dominated by an atmosphere of traditionalism. ''We always did things this way, why should we suddenly do things differently just because of that new guy?'' ''And if you ask them for something like their patrol schedule, they just don't know what you are talking about.'' Another point was that he had to do without the equipment he was used to, ''I didn't get a desk for months, if you ask for a folder you don't get it, because you just got two of them last week. There aren't enough cars and there are hardly any walkie-talkies.''

In the following months, Pengel and I saw each other often and there was no end to his complaints. He sometimes stressed the humorous side. It was difficult to apply the Dutch kind of universalistic criteria in this small society (Suriname has a population of about 300,000), where so many people know each other and where everybody seems to know the members of the elite. ''I was standing behind a tree trying to teach a policeman how to give somebody a traffic ticket. When he stopped somebody, the man opened the window and said 'Don't you know that I am Dr so-and-so?' So I growled from behing my tree, 'give the guy a ticket, even if he is the good lord himself, give it to him.' But I saw what a tricky situation that cop was in. People here are not used to treating everybody the same, no matter who they are.'' And there was also the corruption. ''They have gradually realized that there are some young inspectors here who have come back from Holland and who aren't in for corruption. But the other day a restaurant-owner come to bring us some food, and that man was one of the people being questioned in a police investigation. We sent the food right back.''

Pengel did view it as a challenge to combat this kind of thing and introduce new techniques to the police force. They learned to conduct ''directed'' campaigns, the driving test was modernized, and a system of position evaluation was introduced for judging the personnel. It was not easy to challenge the authoritarian and traditionally organized police bureaucracy. ''We do give each other support, and we visit each other at home, because the older officers don't understand us at all. When we talk about the profession, they often don't even know what we are talking about. The way we act with the people who are below us in the hierarchy is also much more relaxed. The patrolmen really look up to us, up till now all they ever got from their superiors was authoritarian behaviour, orders are given in the imperative and there are never any reasons given at all. The older men experience this as a threat and, quite honestly, we haven't been able to make many changes yet, our group is still too small.''

I later interviewed his superior, the police commissioner of Paramaribo. He had returned to Suriname 11 years earlier, with the first group of graduates from the police academy in the Netherlands. He thought the younger men were in too much of a rush,

that they would be wiser to let the older officers be. ''I have learned that if you want to introduce changes, then you appoint a commission with one of the men of the old school as chairman. You make a young inspector the secretary, and you simply let him do everything. That way, they will accept it.'' He stated that he had learned to make do with the old Surinamese system. During our interview, various of his inferiors came into the room and he spoke to them very cordially. But no one entered the room without first energetically clicking his heels, and when the commissioner picked up a cigar, they rushed up to light if for him. He was one of the few men left in the police force from that first group of Dutch police academy graduates. A number of his colleagues had switched to commercial jobs in the world of trade and industry, where they were much in demand because of their organizational capacities. In the period from 1969 to 1972, a second group of young inspectors had arrived (Pengel was one of them), and the temptation to abandon the daily frustrations on the police force for a better-paid job elsewhere was also very great for them.

Early in 1973, Suriname experienced the most violent civil tumults in its history. Rioters set fire to a school, and the Paramaribo tax office also went up in flames. For weeks, thousands of people demonstrated in the streets and the police was faced with the task of maintaining some semblance of law and order. Day and night, the police were forced to resort to violence to control the crowds, tear gas was regularly used. It was a political battle between the trade unions and the Surinamese government, and many weeks later there was still no prospect of any solution to the situation. To some of the young police officers, this was the straw that broke the camel's back. According to Pengel, the older men accepted the situation without objections. But the younger men who had returned from the Netherlands resented being used as if they were military troops against the population, while the government itself wouldn't even take the trouble to seek a political solution. What was one to do? There was also the commercial world of trade and industry, and there was a good chance of getting a job in the Netherlands. When the social conflict finally came to an end, Pengel left the police force.

This story of Pengel and the young police inspectors who had studied in the Netherlands is not the only one of its kind. Numerous educated returnees have been faced with similar frustration, and in general their main complaint is that they have so little opportunity to put the things they learned in the Netherlands into practice in Suriname, a country still in the process of developing. And Suriname, in turn, is not the only country of its kind. The literature about return migration (BOVENKERK, 1974: 33-38) is filled with examples of the problems facing citizens of a wide range of developing countries who have been educated abroad, problems in utilizing their knowledge and skills in behalf of modernization. LEVINE (1965): 198) wrote about university graduates returning to Ethiopia: ''It must be said that the returnees as a whole have so far done little to modernize their country (...) they have been little more than misfits.'' BALDWIN (1963:276) seemed to agree with ''the more thoughtful Iranian intellectuals'' that ''foreign study unfits the typical young Iranian for a useful career at home.''

But it is striking how often the idea that returnees will be the driving force behind progress in the developing countries is propagated by such a wide range of authors and with such optimism. I shall cite a number of examples with respect to the Caribbean area. FRIEDLANDER (1965) believed that the large number of Puerto Ricans who had attended school in the United States and had been trained in the industrial labour processes, and then returned to their native country, would contribute to the development of Puerto Rico. GONZALEZ (1976) was of the opinion that the same applied to the women who returned to the Dominican Republic from the United States. In an official agreement with the Republic of Suriname, which had just become independent (1976), the progressive Dutch Minister of Foreign Development Aid stated that the Netherlands would support the returnees in their efforts to utilize their knowledge and skills for the modernization of Suriname.

The one thing which all these optimistic views have in common is that they are not backed by any thorough empirical research. FRIEDLANDER was interested in developing an economic model, GONZALEZ really did no more than sum up the difficulties, and the Dutch Minister of Foreign Development Aid appealed to the political aspirations of the Surinamese population in the Netherlands.

In reality, however, most of the researchers have come to the conclusion that returnees make no more than a negligible contribution to the modernization of their native countries in the Third World, and they have given a number of reasons why. These reasons all sought the cause of this ''failure of the returnees'' in the returning emigrants themselves or in shortcomings of this category as such. I shall mention a number of reasons that are often

cited. The people who returned were the ''wrong'' ones, they were a negative selection of the least enterprising and least successful emigrants. They came back for the ''wrong'' reasons: they either failed as emigrants or came back for their actual retirement or simply because they wanted to live the kind of life associated with retirement. The kind of education they had had was not really suitable for a developing country. Too many students had chosen majors which were not practical (e.g. law instead of agricultural technology), or had had an education which was too specialized to be applicable.

No matter how accurate these comments might be in a large number of cases of return migration, there is still one important element missing, without which it is impossible to comprehend the issue in its full dimensions. In this paper, I would like to devote attention to *the dynamics of the process of return migration itself.*

It seems plausible to me that in those cases where the ''good'' migrants returned, where returning migrants had had an adequate education and where they were willing to make certain sacrifices, it *still* turned out to be very difficult for them to exert the influence they had in mind on the modernization process. I would like to illustrate this with the example of the return migration to Suriname. Among the returnees, there was a definite contingent of such people who more or less fit the educational specifications given above. Why, then, have even they so often been excluded from playing a role in the social development of the country?

It struck me in Suriname how people tended to speak of ''the returning migrants from Holland'' in such generalizations. This tendency was sometimes also evident in descriptions of returnees to other countries. It seemed (in Suriname) as if people viewed them as a kind of new (ethnic) minority; there were a lot of stereotypes pertaining to the returnees, particularly about their arrogant conduct. In the following sections, I shall try to show that, in a certain way, the returnees to Suriname did, indeed, meet with the minimum requirements needed to classify a social category as a real minority. I want to show how difficult it has been for them to cope with the social prejudices, and how that obstructed the effectiveness of whatever they might have tried to do.

On the other hand, there is the fact that minorities, certainly

when they consist of well-educated people, can develop a certain strength of their own on the very basis of their minority position. It would be feasible for them to exploit their status as a minority, by means of their solidarity and the utilization of a certain monopoly position, to achieve their common goals. However, no such thing has taken place in Suriname. Numerous conditions can be cited which make this social category too heterogeneous to be able to act jointly as a group. *The tragedy of Surinamese return migration is that the returnees experience the disadvantages of the minority status without exploiting the advantages.*

Before further elaborating upon this proposition, it is necessary to make a few comments on the nature and the composition of the migration from Suriname to the Netherlands and of the subsequent return migration.

Characteristic features of the migration from Suriname to the Netherlands

The migration from Suriname to the Netherlands was of a somewhat different nature than the labour migration from other parts of the Caribbean area. West Indians in the United Kingdom and Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in the United States are generally to be found rather uniformly in the lowest ranks of the labour market. Holland does have a similar kind of immigration of migrant labourers, but they come from Turkey, Morocco and other Mediterranean countries. The migration from Suriname to the Netherlands, however, has been a migration of people to the colonial mother country. In principle, they came to Holland to get the kind of education that would enable them to return to Suriname and attain a prominent position there, preferably in the bureaucracy. At least, this has been the nature of Suriname-Holland migration ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The elite of colonial society sent their children to Holland to get a European and, more specifically, a Dutch education. In the mid-1960s, the Surinamese middle classes also began to participate in the migration, in the 1970s they were joined by the urban proletariat of Paramaribo, and in the years just before the country become politically independent (1975), tens of thousands of Hindustanis and Javanese also came to

Holland, sometimes straight from the countryside. Although it was very clear that most of the migrants were mainly interested in improving their material situation, it was striking how many migrants viewed the socially successful elite of the past as the example they were following. Various surveys conducted among people about to leave Suriname showed that ''studying'' was the main motivation for migrating (ZIELHUIS, 1973). Once again: this did not mean that all the migrants actually engaged in some kind of ''studying''; in fact most of them looked for a job. But it did mean that people still measured the success of their migration according to the Dutch diplomas which they attained. The successful Surinamese migrant was the one who got a good education in the Netherlands and then returned home.

All things considered, the extent and the diversity of the migration from Suriname to Holland has been enormous. When Suriname became completely independent in a political sense (1975), the number of emigrants was estimated at 130,000, which was about a third of the total population of Suriname at that time. In that same year, the governments of Suriname and the Netherlands signed an agreement pertaining to the residence rights of both of their subjects in each other's countries. In its haste to be rid of this troublesome colony, the Netherlands accepted conditions regarding the emigration question set by the Surinamese government which meant, in fact, that virtually all the people of Suriname could still leave for the Netherlands. At the moment about 2000 people migrate every month and if it goes on at this rate, by the end of 1980 no less than about half the population of Suriname will have migrated (BOVENKERK, 1980).

I have already described how this began as an elite migration, and how the social level gradually declined. By 1972, the migration had ''ripened'' (Cf. for this term BÖHNING, 1972) to the point where a cross-section of the population was taking part in it. The migration not only became heterogeneous with respect to social class and sex, the ethnic background of the migrants now exhibited the same diversity as that of the entire Surinamese population. The migrants included Creoles, Hindustanis, Javanese, and small numbers of bush negroes, Chinese, whites and Indians.

Characteristic features of the return migration from the Netherlands to Suriname

Ever since the Second World War, return migration has been a prevalent topic of discussion among Surinamese people in the Netherlands. Before then, many intellectuals had returned to Suriname. However, with the decline in the social level of the migration, there was a rapid decrease in the number of people who returned. In the 1950s, I would estimate that about a quarter of the emigrants returned, in the 1960s this fell to about 10%, in the 1970s to less than 5%, and at the moment the number of Surinamese who return from the Netherlands is less than 2% a year. The number of Surinamese people who return to Suriname from the Netherlands is now less than a tenth of the number of people who emigrate there. The fact that so few people return to Suriname does *not* mean that the desire to return home is negligible. Various superficial opinion polls conducted among Surinamese people in the Netherlands by commercial research firms have all shown that about 2/3 of the people interviewed did plan to return to Suriname some day. However, this type of opinion poll can not be viewed as a reliable predictor of what people will actually do in the future. The results of these polls can be viewed as a reaction to what these people view as the regrettable decline in return migration. This phenomenon — the discrepancy between what people really do and what they say about it — has been referred to by VAN AMERSFOORT (1974) as ''return ideology'', and I later (1976) interpreted this phenomenon in a similar fashion.

In a numerical sense, return migration to Suriname might be much less significant than the ideology around it, but even if only a relatively small number of people do return, this can definitely be of significance within the small population of Suriname (approx. 300,000). What is more important, however, is the qualitative effect. Within the group of returnees, there is a relatively high percentage of well-educated people (for instance people who have had the kind of specialized education which is not available in Suriname at all, thus giving them a kind of European monopoly), people who have come into contact with different kinds of political ideas, and people who are accustomed to the way of life in an industrialized, urban society.

I estimate that at the moment, there are between 20,000 and 30,000 people in Suriname who at one point in their lives lived in the Netherlands, and that is between 7% and 10% of the Surinamese population. But as I said before, their quality is the important point. Many of them would be capable of playing a very functional role in the Surinamese development process. It would not surprise me if Suriname had the highest percentage of intellectuals of all the developing countries.

In 1972 I began to conduct a longitudinal study among 75 returnees and their families (or other dependents), a total of 147 individuals who returned to Suriname from the Netherlands in that year. They were selected in such a way that they constituted a reasonably representative cross-section of the people who returned to Suriname that year.

This study differed from the more common single interview of the returnees because I followed them during a long period of time. The longitudinal study is still being conducted, although I have already written several papers on the subject (e.g. BOVENKERK, 1976). In the course of the past eight years, I have come to know these people quite well (during 4 visits to Suriname), and what began as conversational interviewing has turned into something very close to participant observation. This type of research method makes it clear how much more complicated the migration process is than most studies show. It not only provides insight into the initial motivation for emigration, the reasons for returning and the process of re-integration into the original society. It also shows that some people leave Suriname for the Netherlands a second time, that some of them make a second attempt to re-migrate back to Suriname; it shows how people's motivations can alter in the course of time, how they can even change their versions of events that took place in their own past.

This study made it clear that the returnees came from a wide range of social backgrounds (as was also the case with the emigrants). The group I studied included Creoles and Hindustanis, Chinese and an Indian. There were older people (the oldest was 70) and younger people; people from the very highest circles (e.g. a former cabinet member) and people from the very poorest urban proletariat of Paramaribo; their occupations ranged from prostitutes and welders to journalists, teachers, economists and sociologists. They had lived all over the Netherlands.

If we look at the entire group as a whole, it can be said that about two-thirds of them belonged to the category of ''unsuccessful emigrants''. They were people who had predominantly come from the poorest classes; none of them had succeeded in finishing any kind of

education or training course in the Netherlands; many of them were unable to find work or were fired; some of them had returned to Suriname because of marriage problems; and a number of them returned to Suriname as a result of the pressure of psychological problems which were often directly due to their status as migrants. Most of them suffered a painful loss of face when they returned. There is hardly any point in asking how much potential this category of unsuccessful migrants will furnish for the modernization of Surinamese society. Most of them did not bring anything back but their frustrated emigration expectations.

However, about a third of the returnees (22 of the 75 in the sample) had completed their studies at Dutch universities or technical colleges and were clearly ''successful''. They included a number of very striking success stories: boys from a humble background who went to Holland and came back as important men with good degrees. A successful return is very closely associated with a good education. The type of migrant who earns a lot of money somewhere else and then comes back to set up a business of his own is virtually unknown in Suriname. But for the people with college or university degrees, the prospects in Suriname are excellent. It is very easy for them to find a job suited to their capacities, and although they usually do earn less than they would have in the Netherlands, the social status which they hope to attain in Suriname is much higher than would have been the case in the mass anonymity of the Netherlands.

With respect to this category of successful, well-educated migrants, the question as to whether they would be capable of acting as ''agents of social change'' was very relevant. The answer, however, was generally a negative one. With this general answer, I am expressing the opinion prevalent among the returnees themselves: their general complaint was that people in Suriname paid very little attention to their expert knowledge, nor did anyone seem to be especially interested in their opinions. This brings me back to the central issue of this paper: Why were these well-educated and successful returnees not capable of bringing about modernization? The first part of the answer is based on the fact that in Suriname they were viewed as a new minority and, as such, were confronted with social prejudice.

Returnees as a new minority

When migrants returned from the Netherlands 20 years ago, it was a special event, they could count on a cordial reception and a sharp rise in esteem. Ever since the 1960s, however, the ''democratization'' of the emigration process has taken the glamour out of return migration. It became a routine matter, and the fact that a person had lived in the Netherlands no longer automatically meant a rise in prestige. One of the returnees commented sadly: ''Everybody used to admire you if you came back from Holland, it isn't like that any more.''

A lot has changed, the general opinion of the returnees has changed for the worse.

Let us note what it said about them in *De West,* one of the most influential daily papers of Suriname. Returnees were repeatedly referred to in the editorials, where they were called ''good-for-nothings'', who have been ''spoiled by the easy life in Holland'' and were often depicted as criminals. ''In Suriname, the last thing we need is the return of thousands of *bums, pimps, drug dealers* and other *gangsters.* It would be a calamity for the country if these people were to return to Suriname'', was how *De West* put it on September 29, 1976. Another prevalent theme was that the returnees always thought they knew everything better: ''The feelings of hostility which the returnees are faced with in Suriname are often caused by the arrogance of people who have spent some time in Holland and think they know everything better than the people who stayed here'' (*De West,* March 24, 1977).

It was striking how greatly this daily paper indulged in generalizations. It was not an isolated case, public opinion did the same. For example, the distinction was rarely made between permanent emigrants to the Netherlands, Surinamese people who have only come back for a short vacation, and permanent returnees. All kinds of unflattering comments about the people who turned their back upon Suriname were often heard, and people liked to confirm their unfavourable impression by focusing their contemptuous attention on especially arrogant tourists. The returnees were then said to be ''high and mighty'' and they ''liked to show off''. A group of people back in Suriname on vacation who promenaded about in the centre of the city in fur coats were even referred to on the opinion page of another daily paper. The returnees were thought to act phony and put on a strange Dutch intonation, they showed off with their expensive clothes and they were thought to have replaced consideration for other people with cool and calculating behaviour.

All this indicated that we are dealing with a category that had been attributed the status of a minority. I want to take the term minority to mean a relatively small number of people who: (1) are generally viewed within a society as belonging to one and the same group on the grounds of certain socially relevant features, (2) who themselves also experience these features which they have in common as

a binding principle and (3) who bear a relation to society as a whole or to certain parts of it in which more or less fixed patterns of conduct have developed pertaining to the treatment of the group by society and vice versa.

From what has been said above, it is clear that the first condition has been met with. Was there also an internal recognition of this minority status? This condition has also been fulfilled, be it much less clearly. It could be ascertained that there was indeed some form of personal interaction on the grounds of common experiences in Holland. In particular the returnees from the higher classes regularly sought each other's company, they met each other in certain bars, restaurants and clubs, which were sometimes given a Dutch nickname. There was relatively little evidence of mutual ties and solidarity. There was nothing among the Surinamese returnees to compare with the exuberant and organized way that Japanese academics who studied in the United States regularly meet each other (BENNETT et al., 1958:72) or the very marked way that Middle Eastern students who have returned from studying in Germany still persist in hanging out at the local Goethe Institutes (FRÖHLICH & SCHADE, 1966:283).

The third condition, however, was very clearly met with: a wide range of more or less fixed patterns of behaviour have developed between Surinamese who have never been away and returnees. The latter are the target of ridicule (''He is so Dutch he took along his radiator.''), the subject of numerous stereotypes (spoiled, arrogant, conceited) and certainly also the victims of discrimination. I systematically questioned employers about their willingness to hire returnees. If there was no one else available, they were willing to hire returnees with the necessary qualifications, but for the rest they had a marked preference for people who had never been away. The opinions were widespread that the returnees would expect to earn too much, that they would have become estranged from the Surinamese way of doing things, that they would make their colleagues jealous by constantly bragging about how wonderful everything was in Europe, that they would be arrogant (''They act like they aren't Surinamese any more, as if they are better than you and they look down on you as if you were a piece of dirt.'')

No matter how determinedly some returnees resolved not to take

any notice of this kind of discrimination, they too were tempted to react now and then. They couldn't keep a remark about ''you people'' or ''this country'' from slipping out, they complained about the slow work rate, the rigidity of the bureaucracy, the authoritarian interpersonal relations within the various organizations and about the lack of a sense of responsibility. One returnee, a teacher, was so tormented by the backwardness of the Surinamese educational system that he said to his colleagues: ''If a man from the Middle Ages were transported to Suriname, he would wonder what it was all about. But at the school he would say: I know all about that, that is a school.'' The irritation was also sometimes expressed when people publicly took it upon themselves to perform a pedagogic task: ''In Holland we do it like this!'' Or: ''They speak such bad Dutch here and when I hear it I sometimes make some little corrections. But they don't appreciate that one bit, they say you suddenly think you know everything if you come back from Holland. They just don't want to hear the truth here.''

A strategy often used in an attempt to combat the antipathy towards returnees consisted of putting forward the claim that one had left the Dutch fleshpot to bravely return to Suriname ''to build up the country''. This phrase might be very suitable for propaganda purposes, but anyone who used it in daily conversation was looking for trouble. The response would be furious: ''These people come back and they think they can say anything here.'' Or: ''That might be very well and good in Holland, but we are in Suriname here,'' or ''If it is so wonderful in Holland, why didn't you stay there?'' Another classic comment was ''If it is good for Holland, that doesn't necessarily mean it is good for Suriname.''

I deliberately only gave examples of the reciprocal interaction between the people who had never left and the returnees which bore witness to the form and not the contents of the conflict. A great deal of the antipathy towards returnees was based on their status as members of a minority. It was not the modernization proposals in themselves which gave rise to antipathy, it was also important who thought them up and who put them into words. The returnees were told again and again that they were no better for their Dutch experience.

There were two main reasons for this hostile attitude towards the

returnees. In the first place, in various ways the returnees did present a real threat. They were competition on the labour market and on the housing market. In the tiny country of Suriname, some occupations only had perhaps a few people practicing them, so that one more colleague could be a direct material threat, especially when it was someone who had just finished a vocational training course and was familiar with the most modern techniques and methods of the occupation. In the second place, this antipathy was also the result of a certain degree of resentment towards people who had once turned their back on Suriname. They made it clear that they didn't think their own country was good enough to build up a life there. The returnees — no matter how much enthusiasm there might be about their new preference for Suriname — now had to pay for their transgression in the past. So the antipathy towards returnees had a material as well as a moral motivation.

Returnees as a divided social category

We have seen that the minority status of returnees was defined within Surinamese society as a whole, and that a more or less fixed pattern of personal interaction had developed between the returnees and the rest of Surinamese society. In addition, there was very little evidence of a sense of belonging together, and even less evidence of mutal solidarity. Internally, the ''minority'' of returnees did not really have much in common with what we usually think of as a minority, it was an extremely heterogeneous collection of people. The following three main factors were responsible for this phenomenon: 1. as a result of the complexity of the composition of the stream of migrants, there was no real common basis for common conduct; 2. in the course of time, various generations of returnees had come into being with conflicting interests; 3. there was an attractive alternative: re-emigration to Holland.

1. — We already noted that all the various social classes of Suriname participated in the emigration to the Netherlands. The same was true of the return migration, though here the two extremes of the social stratification system were over-represented. A disproportionate number of returnees were the highly educated

people who filled the country's leading positions, and the ''failures'' who mainly returned to the lowest social ranks. This was not a good basis for organization and joint action.

Moreover, there was the issue of ethnic segmentation. Suriname is one of the most heterogeneous multi-racial societies in the world. All the various ethnic groups were represented in the emigrants, and the same held true for the returnees. The various church associations, political parties and other organizations, each representing a specific ethnic group, formed their own social frameworks for a compartmentalized re-integration.

According to public opinion, the returnees might all exhibit the same attitude of conceit and arrogance, but in reality a wide range of re-adjustment patterns could be distinguished. There were certainly returnees (and even more so, people on vacation!) who behaved arrogantly. However, there were also many who returned with very little show of self-confidence, or who did their best not to attract any attention at all. There were also people who were willing to go to a lot of trouble to show that they were ''still Surinamese'', they did their very best to not act like a *blaka bakra* (white Dutchman). This was also not conducive to the development of mutual solidarity.

Practically all the returnees came back individually (with their immediate families or other dependents); I do not know of any cases of a group of any substantial size returning together in an organized manner.

2. — Return migration is a phenomenon that has been in existence for a very long time. Among the intellectuals, various generations of returnees could be distinguished. There was a generation of people who had returned before or immediately after the Second World War, and who were generally quite conservative. They had played an important role in the colonial and neo-colonial system, but had now ceased to do so. A second generation had returned to Suriname in the fifties and sixties, and it was in their ranks that Suriname nationalism was born. They now held the most important positions and belonged to the established elite in the young republic. The generation of more recent returnees sometimes had nationalistic ideas, but they were also often politically quite left-

wing. One of the main reasons for the antipathy which the most recent returnees were faced with was the very fact that the previous group of well-educated returnees had already filled the key social positions. This subsequent return of new generations did not provide a basis for solidarity; instead, it was a source of inter-generational conflicts.

3. — In his paper about return migration to Jamaica, TAILOR (1973) noted that returnees consciously or unconsciously tended to constantly evaluate their position against the background of the ''foreign'' frame of reference. Returnees had had one more experience, life abroad was a real alternative to them. We have seen how different the reactions of individual returnees were: from the very beginning, some of them were very unassuming and unobstrusive and simply accepted their new situation. Others were initially recalcitrant and rebellious when their attempts to introduce changes met with failure, but later did manage to find some kind of *modus vivendi*. However, there was also a category of returnees who had met with so much opposition and antipathy and frustration that they had no choice but to re-emigrate to the Netherlands. And this was a sizeable group: of the 75 returnees (and their families and dependents) in my 1972 sample group, no less than 45 have re-emigrated to the Netherlands by now (1980).

A recent development: the coup d'état on February 25, 1980

I have shown how difficult it was for returnees to cope with their minority status, and how they were too segmentalized to be able to utilize this minority position for purposes of joint action. That was the situation up until very recently.

On the night of 24-25 February, 1980 a group of young non-commissioned officers in the Surinamese army (SKM) succeeded in carrying out a coup d'état. It is still too early to evaluate this ''intervention'', as the officers euphemistically referred to it. The newspapers did their best. One reporter viewed it as a move against inefficiency and corruption, another saw it as an attempt to alter the course of the economic development model, and a third

thought that the whole point was to eliminate the ethnic conflicts within the country. All the commentaries expressed the hope that Suriname's great problems would now be solved.

However, up till now there has been very little evidence of this solution. The ''boys'' (as the new men at the top are referred to) did not have a blueprint for a new social system. They summoned representatives of the various political groups and had them explain how they thought things ought to be organized in the future. The sergeants even put up a suggestion box at the gate to the army base, so that anyone who had a good proposal could drop it in. A civil council was appointed to take over the management of the administration, but it was not exactly a group of people from whom a fundamentally different political line could be expected. It looks as if the sergeants have been taken by surprise by their own victory.

It is interesting to note what the immediate cause was that led to the coup d'état. It was a conflict between the non-commissioned officers and the people in command of the army, who were supported by the Surinamese government. The disputed issues involved legal rights, salaries and promotion policies in the army. The commanding officers reacted in all the pertaining demands to these issues in an extremely condescending manner. The Surinamese government viewed it as insubordination and took legal action, which was to result in disciplinary punishment. Just before a new court judgement was to be passed, the non-commissioned officers seized power.

In an article written by a Dutch journalist, a remark was made that seemed much more to the point than all the essays in depth about the true background of the coup d'état. JANSEN VAN GALEN (*Haagse Post,* March 1980) remarked that it was a rebellion of returnees from the Netherlands. And it was true: all the new men in power had had their military training in the Netherlands. There they had come into contact with the Dutch way of doing things in the army, with the existence of a real trade union of soldiers (unique in the world) and with a military organization within which the privates and non-commissioned officers had a say regarding their own rights. This Dutch system was one of the attainments of the democratization of Dutch society in the sixties, and was very far removed from the way superiors treated their inferiors in

Suriname. A say in the matter? A fair discussion? It was all very alien to the kind of centralized and authoritarian type of social organization that Suriname had, a social organization that still exhibited numerous aspects of colonialism.

How can we explain the fact that these sergeants did succeed in gaining control of the country, whereas previous generations of returnees had always failed? Of course a very important element was the simple fact that soldiers have arms and know how to use them. But that was and is also true of policemen, and the example presented at the beginning of this paper showed that the policemen failed in their efforts.

It is still very difficult to analyse this question, but it does look as if a number of the conditions stated above were indeed met with in the case of the sergeants. In the first place, the antipathy which the non-commissioned officers were confronted with as a minority within the army was very pronounced. The attitude of the higher officers who had *not* had their military training in the Netherlands was very arrogant; one of the things they made the young non-commissioned officers do was polish the buttons of their uniforms. The younger men viewed their superiors as the exponents of a colonial, obsolete era.

In the second place, these sergeants exhibited a greater degree of social homogeneity than had ever been the case with other categories of returnees. All nine of them (that was all there were!) were young and the great majority was from the Creole proletariat. They all returned in one and the same year (1975), they all studied at the very same Dutch military academy and they knew each other quite well. The question remaines as to whether these sergeants really will introduce progressive changes, or at least make it possible for them to be introduced. This isn't really the kind of thing we have come to expect from military men. But who knows?

An earlier version of this article was presented at a panel on ''Return Migration'' at the Fifth Annual Caribbean Studies Association Conference and will be appearing in a collected volume of papers to be published by the Smithsonian Institution (RIIES Monograph series).

REFERENCES

AMERSFOORT, J.M.M. VAN, 1974. *Immigratie en minderheidsvorming* (Immigration and the formation of minorities). Samsom, Alphen a.d. Rijn.

BALDWIN, G.B., 1963. The foreign-educated Iranian: a profile. *The Middle East Journal,* summer.

BENNET, J.W. et al., 1958. *In search of identity. The Japanese overseas scholar in America and Japan.* Univ. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

BÖHNING, W.R., 1972. *The migration of workers in the United Kingdom and the European Community.* Oxford Univ. Press, London.

BOVENKERK, F., 1974. *The sociology of return migration : A bibliographic essay.* Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.

BOVENKERK, F., 1976. *Wie gaat er terug naar Suriname?* (Who goes back to Suriname). Anthropological-Sociological Centre, Amsterdam.

BOVENKERK, F., 1980. De nieuwe emigratie uit Suriname. (The new immigration from Suriname). *Intermediair,* June.

FRIEDLANDER, S.L., 1965. *Labor migration and economic growth.* M.I.T. Press, Massachusetts.

FRÖHLICH, D. & SCHADE, B., 1966. Zur Frage der Rückanpassung von Studenten aus Entwicklungsländern. *Kölner Ztschr. für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 18.*

GONZALEZ, N.L., 1976. Multiple migratory experiences of Dominican women. *Anthropological Quarterly 49.*

LEVINE, D.N., 1965. *Wax and gold: Tradition and innovation in Ethiopian culture.* Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago.

TAYLOR, E., 1973. *The social adjustment of returned migrants to Jamaica.* Paper 9th Intern. Congress of Anthrop. and Ethnol. Sciences, Chicago.

ZIELHUIS, L., 1973. *Migratie uit Suriname* (Migration from Suriname). Ministry of Social Welfare, Paramaribo.

Dr F. BOVENKERK
Sociologisch Instituut
Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht

ALLIANCE AND COMPETITION : FOUR CASE STUDIES OF MAROON-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

Introduction *174*
Case studies
Panama *179*
Jamaica *187*
Pernambuco *193*
Hispaniola *203*
Conclusions *211*
Notes *216*
References *222*

INTRODUCTION

Studies of black resistance to slavery have often discussed the case of maroons, or runaway slaves, as an instance of defiance of established systems of social control.[1] Yet historians and other social scientists have only recently begun the systematic investigation of maroon *societies* as a sociological phenomenon.[2] Part of the impetus for this new trend has been the recognition that the former slaves did not only organize themselves into groups, thus creating ongoing Afro-American cultures on the frontiers of European habitation. In forming alternative, nearly independent societies at various levels of social and political organization, runaways also challenged the authority of New World governments. Maroons embodied an Afro-American consciousness that refused to be limited by the whites' conception and attempted manipulation of it.

While the renowned Iberianist SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA may be justified in claiming that "...The Negroes never constituted a serious threat to the Spanish in the Indies," evidence continues to accumulate that rebellious slave groups throughout the Americas plagued the Europeans on a continual basis.[3] The attempt to destroy fugitive settlements over the years depleted the colonists of manpower and substantial revenues. Most degrading of all for them, the colonists were occasionally forced to come to terms with their former bondsmen. As the French scholar YVAN DEBBASCH concluded for Antillean cases of peace-making, "Slave societies only emerged [from dealings with the maroons] by [granting them] amnesty, or at worst, by negotiation."[4]

Where maroon communities existed long enough to become viable, their options grew regarding how to confront, or avoid, the colonial governments ideologically committed to their extinction. Constraints acted upon them as well. Maroon communities had to be sufficiently apart from the European settlements to assure the runaways of a large measure of physical independence, yet near enough to permit return in case of need or desire for tools, weapons, and often, women. At the same time, the proliferation of different European groups, comprised of rival economic interests — pirates, planters, ranchers, tradesmen — prompted certain Europeans to view the fugitives in a new light. By preference and perhaps by necessity, the maroon settlements held intercourse with particular groups of whites whom they found willing to defy the strictures of the ruling orders, which prohibited commerce with fugitive blacks. Together the two groups sought profit, as well as mutually exclusive benefits.

This essay attempts to shed light upon the conditions favoring exchange between maroon communities and particular European groups, at the expense of other European interests. Attention will equally be given to the consequences of such intercourse. Four instances will be presented, although cases could have been additionally drawn from the southern colonial frontier of the United States, Cuba, Dominica, the Guianas, and other locales.[5] First described are alliances and their consequences between Isthmian maroons and English pirates against the Spanish colonists of

Panama in the late 16th century; the shifting loyalties of "Spanish" maroons during and after the English conquest on Jamaica in 1655-1660 are then discussed. Hushed support of various *moradores* or Portuguese settlers for the maroons of Palmares, the bane of Pernambucan governors in the years 1603-1697, provides a third example. The final instance is the commercial entente between largely "French" maroons on the frontiers of Saint-Domingue on Hispaniola, with the Spanish settlers of rural Santo Domingo during the 18th century.

Discussion of the four case studies must be prefaced by a few remarks. European interests competing for resources in New World colonies were typically divided at two levels, one along national lines, the other along lines defined by different types of economic pursuits. In the first instance, for example, Spanish colonists attempted to inhibit the growth of French and English mercantile interests in the 16th century near their own centers of production and trade. A watchful eye was thus extended over rebellious slaves who attempted to co-operate with French and English pirates in order to pillage or circumvent the Spanish commercial monopoly in the Americas.[6]

Maroon communities took full, organized advantage of such divisions between European powers for over three centuries. Because they needed or preferred to obtain female slaves and goods from the colonial settlements, the runaways kept themselves informed of European activities. Maroons remained a part, however peripheral, of European colonial systems. When opportunities presented themselves to side with one European nation against another, the fugitive black groups were not slow to weigh the costs and benefits of alliance-making. In some cases, pacts were made. The maroons, at least for a time, consequently tilted the balance in favor of the European group whose side they joined in international struggles for resources or commercial markets. In turn, the fugitive communities received goods and won the reputation, touted or infamous, of being staunch partners of the European interests whom they aided.

The second level of inter- and intra-national European competition, that between types of economic pursuits, becomes relevant here. Particular economic features, that is, characterize the

European groups with whom the maroons made alliances — and the groups against whom the maroons fought. The white partners — English pirates, the Spanish farmers, ranchers, and merchants of Jamaica and Santo Domingo — represented certain kinds of national interests opposed to other kinds of interests of different national groups.

The maroons' allies, in brief, were engaged in less labor- and capital-intensive enterprises than were their common enemies in local contests. Their interests focused on ''settlement'' activities, on subsistence, petty trade, and even piracy, rather than long-term, large-scale investments in labor and capital epitomized by plantation monocultures. What is at issue here are competitive schemes of colonization, or at least of colonial economic pursuits. The partners of the maroon societies were underdogs in economic and political struggles against greater labor- and capital-intensive European interests, or what has been called ''exploitative'' forms of colonial enterprise. These include the Spanish commercial monopolists on the Isthmus in the 16th century, the English monoculturist-invaders of mid-17th-century Jamaica, and the French planters of 18th-century Saint-Domingue.[7] There is little wonder, then, that the ''underdog'' Europeans were constantly on the look-out to gain leverage over other European competitors; the maroons, through exchange and joint attacks on their common enemies, provided one such means of leverage.[8]

The importance of the socioeconomic factor in alliances between maroons and Europeans unfolds more dramatically in the intra-national struggle for goods and markets discussed below, that is, the case of Palmares. Here, differences in nationality were not in question; English and French pirates did not battle Spanish *vecinos* or colonists as in Panama, nor did Spanish ranchers and merchants quarrel over land with French *habitants,* chiefly planters, as in Hispaniola. Instead, certain Portuguese *moradores,* notably those engaged in ranching and subsistence activities on farms on the colonial frontier, held commercial intercourse with the black fugitive settlements at the expense of other Portuguese *moradores,* especially large-scale sugar cane planters and millers. The maroons, that is, were in general the escaped slaves of the planters. The fugitives' continued existence in freedom meant the continued loss

in labor and capital for their owners.[9]

At issue here is the intra-colonial competition between different forms and degrees of capital- and labor-intensive pursuits; between different approaches to the uses of land; in short, the classic contest involving cattlemen, small-scale farmers, and large-scale planters. These groups vied for land and resources as colonial expansion moved the frontier farther inland, closer to the maroons' own burgeoning holdings.[10] The *palmaristas,* as these maroons of Pernambuco were called, took advantage of the internal divisions between the Brazilian *moradores* and used them for their own ends. They traded with the frontier settlers who needed their produce, game, and handicrafts, yet repulsed those who pressed too far onto those lands which they considered their own. Such commerce took place throughout the 17th century, despite the stated policy of the Pernambucan captaincy to return the maroons to servitude in the planters' regime.[11]

One should not overstress the conscious concern of maroons or their European partners and antagonists regarding the specific nature of the economic pursuits in which each group was engaged. What mattered crucially were the actual goods and services which the groups offered each other, or which could be seized from their mutual enemies. Europeans and maroons changed sides in these international battles for resources, markets, and political control. Opportunism, in short, characterizes each of the four sets of alliances described below, tempered in the case of the pirate-maroon pacts by a spirit of friendship transcending the reciprocities of dealmaking.

It should be noted, for example, that maroons even allied with their former masters, when sufficient rewards were offered or when the safeguarding of their independence necessitated such action. Such is the case described below for Spanish Jamaica. In the wake of the English invasion, the Spaniards faced extradition or imprisonment in the event of an English victory, while the largely autonomous maroons were threatened with re-enslavement. The masters and their former slaves thus co-operated in the struggle against the imperialist designs of the English for five years.

When compacts of this kind were established, moreover, the former masters were engaged in less capital- and labor-intensive

pursuits than were the European groups to whom they were opposed. The ex-slaveholders on Spanish Jamaica were largely ranchers and small farmers who needed the maroons' aid for their economic survival, as well as political leverage over the English invaders; the latter arrived on the island with many more soldiers and supplies than the Spaniards had. Maroon groups who later joined the English forces only did so when threatened with the destruction of their resources for survival. As stated above, few maroon allegiances were so steadfast as to jeopardize the physical security of the fugitive communities.[12]

Although the data employed to depict comparable social and economic relations in this essay are admittedly sparse, it is abundantly clear that colonial groups of all statuses were constantly obliged to reckon with maroon societies as a potent force. But to pretend that the disparate maroon groups described here always acted in similar ways would be an oversimplification; there were as many differences between the organization of the settlements of the maroons in Panama and Pernambuco as there were between those of the slaveowners. Nevertheless, the essay tries to elaborate the uniqueness of each of these situations to the extent the data warrant while, at the same time, attempting to demonstrate that recurrent problems and solutions for maroons, their allies, and antagonists, make for meaningful comparisons.

PANAMA

To begin with the earliest of the four cases, one must examine the nature of the fluctuating alliance between English pirates and the maroons of the Isthmus in the late 16th century. The Argentine student of Africans in the New World, CARLOS GUILLOT, believes that sporadic contacts had been made between corsairs and rebel slaves in the Caribbean as early as the 1520's.[13] Runaways occasionally joined the crews of vessels pillaging gold and silver from the Spanish commercial monopoly. More often, however, they served the freebooters on land as informers, scouts, and guides.[14] Maroons did not fill these capacities unthinkingly, however. They were aware that these very corsairs often made their

fortunes as slavers and kept bondsmen in their Caribbean haunts. In raids on Spanish towns, moreover, the freebooters often killed both white and black defenders. What, then, ever attracted Panamanian maroons to take up, if intermittently, the cause of the English pirates?

Some knowledge of the social and economic organization of the Panamanian colony is necessary as background to answering this question. From the early decades of the 16th century onward, the Isthmus was exploited for its own mineral resources. After the discovery of larger deposits of ores farther south in Peru, however, Panama became the major thoroughfare for Spaniards in transit between the metropolis and the Pacific colonies. The search for gold and silver continued on the Isthmus itself, nonetheless. A number of important industries grew up around the bullion traffic and the mines, including shipbuilding, freight handling, road construction, and outfitting and hostelry services for the Peru-bound settlers. Hundreds of blacks were employed in these burdensome tasks and in agricultural pursuits.

By mid-century literally thousands of blacks worked for the several hundred whites, concentrated in the small fortified cities of Nombre de Dios on the Atlantic and Panamá on the Pacific. So lucrative was the slave trade and so troublesome the blacks that head taxes were placed on bondsmen entering and leaving the colony. The *vecinos* or white inhabitants provided themselves with police forces from these revenues to assure their own security.[15]

They had need to do so. With the discovery of new mines, fresh slaves were brought to the colony, industry of all sorts intensified, and so did the repercussions: slaves revolted from their masters as early as 1525. *Palenques* or runaway communities were formed and flourished for at least five decades thereafter. Prior to the alliance with the renowned pirate SIR FRANCIS DRAKE in the 1570's, these maroon settlements already contained hundreds of members. The largest, that of the "king" BAYANO, was comprised of 1200 "able-bodied" males and females, and sheltered young, old, and infirm maroons. Nearly six years of substained fighting by the Spaniards were required to subdue BAYANO and his followers.

Yet within two years of their defeat, the new viceroy of Peru, the COUNT OF NIEVA, wrote to the Spanish king that "... through the mountains and wooded hills of this kingdom of Tierra Firme run great numbers of blacks called maroons and that these live without law and are so many and daring that they rob and kill those traveling with their gold and silver and merchandise in order to take these from them; and that these [maroons] have their treaties and secret confederations with other blacks in service and freemen that there are in... Nombre de Dios and Panama; that [all these together] are [three-fourths] of the people that [live] in this kingdom; and if they so desired [as each day it is feared that they will do] with great facility they could cause a rebellion which would be difficult to put down..."[16]

The upshot of these remarks refers to the hostile gulf between blacks and their masters in Panama. Laboring in the mines and transport industries was sufficiently brutalizing to press thousands of slaves to flee in the period 1525-1580. The Spaniards alternately attempted to apply harsh and tolerant legal measures to keep the blacks at work and to encourage the return of runaways, but to little avail.[17]

Indeed, by the time of the arrival of DRAKE and his successor JOHN OXENHAM, estimates of the numbers of maroons had swelled to 3000, while the Spanish population still numbered in the hundreds. One document, found in the Spanish Archives of the Indies by the English scholar IRENE WRIGHT, claimed that Ronconcholon, the principal stronghold of the fugitives in the interior Vallano region, contained 1700 fighting men alone in the 1570's. Such figures may not be wildly egregious. In the depositions taken from the Spaniards following their attacks on the *palenques,* they reported having entered one village with some 217 large houses and many smaller ones. Other settlements included as many as 80 large houses and "numerous" small dwellings. DRAKE himself visited one maroon town with 55 houses, boasting streets, a wall for security on one side, and further protection from a dike eight feet wide. Cultivated fields and small livestock holdings adjoined these *palenques.*[18]

Despite the seeming autonomy of these settlements, Spanish correspondence reminds us that assaults by the maroons continued throughout the 1560's and 1570's. While their object primarily seems to have been the capture or cajoling away of black women and men, the maroons also stole gold and silver and killed the Spaniards who resisted them. Given their independent, relative success in committing razzias for obtaining what they could not

produce themselves, the question must be posed again. Why did the maroons periodically, and eagerly, join with the English pirates?

Some of the advantages of alliance are immediately clear. The corsairs represented a source of desired European goods in trade. The English would facilitate the maroons' acquisition of Spanish property on which the bullion-hungry pirates did not place highest priority, namely female slaves and scrap iron for tools and ritual purposes. Finally, the English pirates would serve the maroons as cohorts to visit vengeance on their common enemy.

Disadvantages of an alliance with the English corsairs were to be appreciated chiefly with bitter hindsight. While the maroons did not make all their resources available to DRAKE and later OXENHAM, their expectations from the partnership were not in the end realized. The maroons were in fact somewhat heady with regard to their fast friends. EDMUND MORGAN is quite right to conclude in his recent work on early English colonization that "The accounts suggest a camaraderie (between the pirates and the former slaves) that went beyond the mutual benefits of the alliance."[19]

The pact began fruitfully. DRAKE cultivated the maroons' friendship during reconnaissances of the Isthmus in the late 1560's with his fellow corsair SIR JOHN HAWKINS and on his own in 1570. It is evident from both Spanish and English contemporary documents that DRAKE simply could not have mounted his famous attack on the caravans carrying bullion overland in 1573 without the help of the maroons, led by their captains DIEGO and PEDRO. The English in fact had failed on their own to do so.

In the Anglo-maroon venture, however, several dozen blacks acted in the capacity of spies, trail-blazers, boat builders, porters, and soldiers for the pirates. The maroons also provided DRAKE and his crew of scarcely a few dozen men with food and shelter during the winter months of preparation for the attack. The fugitives counseled the pirates on effective means of highwaymanship. Although it took two attempts to seize the mule train carrying the bullion, thanks to the bungling efforts of a few of the English, the unprecedented confiscation of gold and silver on land succeeded. Waves of delight and shock were sent through the courts of England and

Spain. The maroons were duly rewarded and DRAKE sailed away, promising to return.[20]

The pirates' friendship had consequences unforeseen by the maroons, however. The Isthmian runaways' greatest feat, and their eventual capitulation, came about through renewing their alliance with DRAKE's successor, JOHN OXENHAM. With the blacks' help, OXENHAM and his men were able to enter the Pacific — hitherto untouched by marauding English ships — to capture pearls and bullion before these had been loaded at Panamá for shipment overland to Nombre de Dios.

Despite his apparent cordiality, bravery, and skill, OXENHAM paled in comparison with DRAKE. From the onset, the novice captain suffered difficulties. OXENHAM's flagship was captured by the Spaniards while he was away in the midst of contacting the maroons for aid. Such carelessness prompted the maroon captain JUAN VAQUERO to pact with OXENHAM in a more deliberate, opportunistic fashion than had PEDRO and DIEGO with DRAKE. The depositions given by OXENHAM at the time of his capture by the Spaniards clearly show that the corsair had terms dictated to him by the ex-slaves. These conditions included the awarding of all slaves captured to the maroons, as well as the killing of all Spaniards whom they met in combat. In exchange for these stipulations, OXENHAM was promised whatever bullion that he and the blacks captured together.[21]

The maroons were cautious enough to allot only limited supplies of men and goods to OXENHAM. They did not realize, however, that the discovery of the English flagship hastened the Spaniards to launch the largest offensive ever against the combined forces of pirates and maroons.

One *oidor* or magistrate expressed the typical Spanish fear of the *cimarrones* and their European allies when he wrote "And although at all times they [the maroons] are very harmful, when they join with Frenchmen or Englishmen with whom they are friendly, they are noxious, availing themselves of the industry and arms of these foreigners, for which reason this city is exposed to great danger by these enemies."[22]

Industry and arms were not the only qualities and goods which the maroons shared with OXENHAM and his men. They let their own fortitude and resolve slip in the company of these Englishmen. At

one point, a party of pirates and maroons were captured by pursuing Spaniards who came upon the allies feasting merrily and enjoying the shade. In another instance, a Spaniard captured by the allies begged the English not to allow a Negro to beat him, as the maroon prepared to do so. The pirates in fact did keep the maroon from striking the Spaniard, thereby violating one of the conditions of the accord between them.[23]

More significantly, the characteristic maroon concern with their own security was unwittingly relaxed. The Panamanian colonists, supplied with experienced troops from Peru, hunted down the English and the maroons with unprecedented determination. From the Spanish viewpoint, the founding of an Anglo-maroon "colony" or at least permanent alliance on the Isthmus was a distinct possibility. The enemies had to be reduced before such an anomaly became a reality.

Although the actual numbers of maroons caught by the Spaniards were few, others gave themselves up to the Spaniards and informed them of the whereabouts of the English. Needless to say, the overwhelming majority of maroons ceased to give quarter to the pirates and actually killed at least one of the English. Other blacks sought to kill ANTON MANDINGA, another maroon leader, who had helped the pirates. These maroons blamed him for the troubled conditions into which they had fallen as a result of the alliance.

The Spanish colonial soldiers burned the houses and crops of the maroons, obliging the ex-slaves to resume a true life-on-the-run. OXENHAM and most of his few dozen English comrades were captured or hanged. Those few who made their escape promised revenge for their joint defeat to the equally few maroons who continued to help them. These corsairs pledged to return with reinforcements led by DRAKE himself.[24]

Two consequences followed the rout of the English and the dispersal of their maroon allies. The remaining groups of runaways were approached by the Spaniards and asked to settle in two towns near Panamá and Nombre de Dios, under the indirect supervision of colonial officials. They were guaranteed their liberty as well as tools, livestock, and seed to raise their own crops. The maroons, however, were obliged to return any runaways who might attempt

to join them. Negotiations took a number of years, but a few hundred maroons did take up residence in the settlements of Santa Cruz la Real de los Negros Cimarrones and Santiago del Príncipe de los Negros Mogollones.[25]

The black rationale for such a decision is not hard to understand. The maroons could not defeat the Panamanians reinforced with Peruvian soldiers and arms, or hold them off indefinitely. Neither could they rely upon the English as a constant source of military or political support. In terms of the few positive benefits offered, the maroons' status as *horros*, or freemen, and means of livelihood, were assured.

Reasons behind the Spanish offer are less well understood. There seem to have been sufficient numbers of peaceable black *horros* living in the colony to convince the Spaniards that, given similar circumstances, the maroons would pursue an equally tranquil existence. A number of colonists, namely the military men who destroyed the maroons' own settlements, stated that these towns had been amply well kept, and that encapsulated freedom would yield commerce between the groups, rather than razzias against the whites. Most likely, the actual pursuit of the maroons demonstrated to the Spaniards that the fugitives' numbers were fewer than imagined; thus, the threat to Spanish life and property could best be reduced by containing at least some maroons in partly autonomous settlements.

As if to ensure further the end of substantial trouble with maroons, the Spanish Crown prohibited the importation of additional slaves into the colony, other than those in transit to colonies south of the Isthmus. With the former maroons in part encapsulated and the number of slave imports diminished, frequency of hostile maroon activities declined in the last two decades of the 16th century. The black population, slave and free, dipped to some 4000 by 1607, roughly a third of what it had been 25 years earlier. Maroons in that year were said to number only 94.[26]

The hopes to see the return of DRAKE and the revival of what GUILLOT has termed the *belle époque* of *marronage* in Hispanic America did not die totally. One of OXENHAM's captains, known as PETER CANOA or CHALONA, arranged for the maroon ANTON MANDINGA to settle on the north coast of the colony. There he

was to await DRAKE or some other corsair. A signal — a black flag — was agreed upon to alert the maroons of his arrival.[27]

More striking still is a Spanish report of the arrival of a small ship at the English port of "Fristol" in January, 1581.

> According to CAPTAIN SARMIENTO DE GAMBOA, the ship "which [claimed] to come from the Indies... carried nine creoles of those parts, mulattoes, mestizos, and others, [who intended to hurry] the corsair Francis Drake, telling him how long he was taking in [returning to the site] where they were awaiting him."[28]

Despite the misfortunes that the maroons had suffered with OXENHAM, the voyage of these "creoles" — apparently fugitives of all kinds — reflects the degree to which DRAKE had been held in esteem by the Isthmian Negroes. The alliance had been only a temporary one, but circumstances in the Spanish colony prompted some individuals to go so far as to cross the ocean to seek its renewal! DRAKE, however, did not return to Panama for another 14 years and died during a series of attacks there on the Spaniards. He did not seek the aid of the maroons — or their descendants — who had been of such help to him before. There may simply have been too few of them in 1595 to reconstitute the "internal" enemy hitherto so feared by the Spanish and so highly regarded by the English.[29]

The Anglo-maroon alliance of the 16th century, despite its final lapse into disharmony, can tell us something about the nature of cultural contacts which were to recur throughout the period of European colonization in the New World. The Americas did not merely provide a new arena for playing out older Continental political rivalries, but offered a setting for the participation of African, Afro-American, and indigenous groups. However much they tried, Europeans could not unilaterally control the political or cultural definitions of the social situations involving black and red peoples. In the quest for bullion, land, and new sources of human labor, Europeans were obliged to accommodate themselves to the social organization of the very groups over whom they sought hegemony.[30]

DRAKE and other English and French pirates thus reckoned with the Isthmian maroons as an independent, yet interdependent, party to the contest for effective political control of parts of the Panama-

nian colony. If the English were veterans of maritime competition with the Spaniards in European waters, the black fugitives had proved themselves to be powerful adversaries of the Spaniards on land — and it was there that the corsairs needed allies. In order to capture the highly prized Spanish bullion, then, DRAKE and OXENHAM had to adapt themselves to the maroons' programs and schedules for attacking the blacks' former masters. Success depended upon an intimate knowledge of the Spaniards' whereabouts and movements, on which the maroons — and their contacts among the slaves — typically kept a vigilant watch.

It would be hasty, however, to conclude that relations between the English pirates and the maroons were totally asymmetrical, in terms of goals or even means. Each group possessed technological resources and expertise which complemented the other's, sets of skills and materials functionally attuned to cope with the exigencies of the environment and the challenge of the Spaniards. Each in short marshalled elements from discrete cultural repertoires in order to gain leverage, if only temporarily, over a mutual foe.

The Anglo-maroon treaty thus reflected a joint awareness of the advantage of alliance in the face of Spanish military might and commercial wealth. Although the Panamanians and their reinforcements ultimately drove off the pirates, and dispersed or ''encysted'' many of the maroons, the pact against the Spaniards was not totally in vain. The treaty provided a precedent for alliance-making between corsairs and maroon communities over the course of three centuries of Caribbean history. Such alliances were concluded not only on the Isthmus during that period, but in 16th- and 17th-century Hispaniola, 19th-century Cuba, and in other locales at other times as well.[31]

JAMAICA

A significantly different situation between Spaniards, Englishmen, and maroons was played out in the installment of OLIVER CROMWELL's forces in Jamaica in the mid-17th century. As part of the English Lord Protector's imperialist ''Western Design'', the English firmly intended to establish colonies devoted to mono-

culture in the Caribbean. The Spanish colonists in Jamaica, to the contrary, devoted themselves to ''settlement'' activities rather than those of labor- or capital-intensive ''exploitation''. The island was chiefly devoted to ranching industries and to a limited amount of crop raising and milling. The Spaniards scarcely held rein over their slaves as had their compatriots on the Isthmus a century earlier.

One of the best indicators of the more relaxed Spanish regime in Jamaica is the fact that the blacks left on the island at the onslaught of the English did not turn against their former masters. On the contrary, they supported co-operatively and autonomously the efforts of the Spaniards to defeat the English for nearly five years in the period 1655-60. The decision by the leader of a substantial community of independent ex-slaves to join the English, however, turned the tide of war firmly against the few remaining Spanish troops. In spite of the invaders' victory, not all fugitive groups reached decisive accord with the English soldiers and planters. These maroons and their descendants troubled the new European occupants of Jamaica for many decades thereafter.

Historical background to this shifting wartime alliance can be only partially delineated here, given the sparsity of the documentation. Of the 2500-3000 residents of the island prior to the invasion in 1655, it is estimated that half of these were slaves. The majority was engaged in keeping and tracking cattle and hogs.[32] These blacks possessed an intimate knowledge of the settler colony which would later serve them well against the invading English colonists. Few cases of *marronage* were reported, and there appear to have been no *palenques* formed before 1655. Those instances of maroon activity which did occur, cited in one of the extant memoires of 1570, might have arisen as much as a result of the master's poverty or indulgence as of his cruelty. The population at the time of invasion included creolized slaves, free blacks, and mulattoes who were not only allowed to carry weapons but who were trained to serve in the Spaniards' militia. With the exception of a few leading families, or *hidalgos,* the Spaniards lived without large holdings of capital.[33]

The English invasion brought freedom to many blacks in a unique way. While many Spaniards fled with their families, slaves,

and possessions to the nearby colony of Cuba, numbers of them were obliged to free their slaves or simply to abandon them on the island. Others may well have been under such limited control that they chose to remain on the island, regardless of the departure of the masters. The Spaniards lacked the means to compel such slaves to join them, while others could not afford to transport their former bondsmen.

As a result, then, some blacks of Spanish Jamaica became maroons, or at least "independent ex-slaves" by default. These remaining blacks numbered in the hundreds, but the nature of their legal status is less clear. DON CRISTÓBAL DE YSASSI, the last Spanish governor and leader of the resistance, claimed to have settled the blacks in three "stockades" and promised them clothes and their freedom as rewards if they fought with him.[34] Alliance with the maroons was thus formally initiated and anxiously maintained by the Spaniards.

Extant English documents, however, emphasize another perspective, that of the blacks' independence from their former masters. Even if YSASSI had originally organized the fugitive blacks into their own communities, the latter not only proceeded to live apart from the Spaniards; they struck out against the invaders on their own as well. Evidence suggests that the black communities kept constantly on the move, rather that base their activities in a sedentary *palenque* or stockade. Although CROMWELL urged his forces to come to terms with the "Indians and Blacks," no entente was reached with the redoubtable maroons before 1660. Thousands of English soldiers and settlers, ravaged by disease and shortages of food, worried even more about attacks on their lives from the black guerrillas.

MAJOR-GENERAL SEDGWICK wrote that "Concerning the state of the enemy on shore here, the Spaniard is not considerable, but of the Blacks there are many who are like to prove as thorns and pricks in our sides, living in the mountains and woods, a kind of life both natural, and I believe, acceptable to them, and are enemies to us, looking upon us as a bloody people, giving no quarter... there scarce a week passeth without one or two slain by them, and as we grow secure, grow bold and bloody... they must either be destroyed or brought in upon some terms or other, or else they will be a great discouragement to the settling of a people here."[35]

S.A.G. TAYLOR's work *The Western Design* includes references to

the auxiliary performance of the blacks in the Spanish attacks. Their participation in the skirmishes was often crucial in giving victory to the Spaniards. Perhaps more significantly still, blacks seem to have been largely absent from the battles which the defenders lost.[36]

The problem of identifying which elements of the Hispano-maroon forces were most effective in defending the island is further complicated by the fact that some of these men were descended from both Spaniards and blacks. Groups attacking the English were occasionally cited as being comprised of members of mixed racial origin, although numbers of each in the combined forces are rarely clearly cited. In any case, the Spanish dependence on the autonomous fugitives was not limited to manpower alone. Resistance would have long since collapsed had the black troops not also supplied the defenders with meat and other provisions, taken from their fields in inaccessible locations in the hills.[37]

Three distinct fugitive communities are mentioned in the literature, although others may have existed as well. The first, ''a palinco of 150,'' was led by a maroon named JUAN LUBOLO and maintained itself in the uplands above Guanaboa Vale, at the site today called Lluidas Vale. There, crops were tended and cattle grazed in a natural enclosure obscured by the hills. A man named JUAN DE SERRAS headed the second group which inhabited the hills at Los Vermejales. The third mobile community, about which little is known, roamed the valley between the Clarendon Plains and the settlement at Porus.[38]

It is important to note that these maroons made incursions upon the English for reasons different from those of the Spaniards. Having won de facto freedom from their former masters, the ex-slaves warily avoided falling into servitude at the hands of the new European invaders. The arrival of English colonists exerted different demographic pressures on the blacks than it did on the few remaining Spaniards. The maroons had too much invested in the island, in the form of their crops and livestock, to leave with the handful of Spaniards struggling to ward off defeat. The defenders, meanwhile, were obliged to offer ''official'' freedom to the blacks in 1658 and again in 1659, as if to assure themselves repeatedly of the maroons' loyalty.

The decisive indications of black advantage over the Spaniards — and perhaps English leverage over the maroons — dovetailed in events in 1660. In that year Lieutenant COLONEL TYSON of the English forces reached Guanaboa Vale and discovered LUBOLO's stronghold, with its hidden 200 acres under cultivation. Access to the valley had significantly affected the course of the war, since its fields had yielded produce to the blacks and Spaniards for nearly five years.

LUBOLO was caught between growing pressure from the English, in the form of their ever-increasing numbers and their physical dissemination over the island, and his loyalty to the Spaniards. The black leader could not afford the threatened loss of his community's agricultural holdings at English hands, and thus came to terms with them. In exchange for freedom for his followers, loyal service to the English, and the title of Governor of the Vale for himself, LUBOLO joined the invaders' forces.[39] These rewards overshadowed the Spanish defenders' offering of clothes and freedom. On the verge of losing the island, YSASSI was unable to keep his pledges to the maroons.

The Spaniards could not hope to hold out without JUAN LUBOLO's company. They had lost an ally too well acquainted with their own hidden camps to offer much effective resistance. Within two months of LUBOLO's capitulation, YSASSI and the remaining Spanish forces fled to Cuba. As if to indicate which group genuinely constituted the most serious threat to the English, however, LUBOLO first marched against the maroon band led by JUAN DE SERRAS at Los Vermejales. DE SERRAS had apparently not wavered in his support of YSASSI, or in his independent campaign against the invaders.[40]

After the departure of the Spaniards, the Vermejales maroons continued to vex the English. New planters with their slaves were flocking to the island and had already begun to press upon JUAN DE SERRAS' "territory". The "exploitative" phase of English colonization, at least as far as the maroons were concerned, had already begun. JUAN LUBOLO and some of his followers once more attacked his former black allies in 1663, but DE SERRAS ambushed his troops and LUBOLO was killed. The rest of LUBOLO's community either died out or migrated farther to the west.[41]

The influx of English colonists and their slaves continued, however. Some 7500 blacks were brought to the island in the years 1662-64 alone, in order to work in the rapidly sprawling plantations.[42] The Vermejales community did not look favorably upon the overtures for peace made to them by the English until 1667. As conditions for the cessation of hostilities, JUAN DE SERRAS asked not only for freedom for his group, but for the right to trade with the English. This crucial aspect of economic intercourse was to recur in Palmares, where the seemingly capitulating maroons also asked for the exchange of goods with the Pernambucans. JUAN DE SERRAS further requested to be settled apart from the incoming slaves, since, it is recorded. "They (the Vermejales community) should never well agree with the Negroes about town."[43] Even in the event of surrender, maroon communities reserved the right to certain forms of autonomy.

The pact was short-lived, however. In 1668, the Vermejales group killed five hunters who had ostensibly come to their settlement to trade but who, they claimed, instead stole several back women. Two years later, the black community attacked and killed another five men in the Clarendon region. No motive was given for the action. One can speculate, however, that the advance of plantation cultivation, especially in the form of sugar cane monoculture, was regarded as trespass by the maroons who previously frequented such areas.[44]

A similar sort of clash was to occur between the maroon communities of Palmares and le Maniel, with the encroaching planters and ranchers of Pernambuco and Saint-Domingue, respectively. When pressed for land on which to grow their provisions and graze their livestock, or even the preservation of a buffer area, maroons all over the Americas fought to preserve their independence by taking the offensive. Europeans learned at great cost to keep their distance, unless convinced that negotiation or total warfare alone could resolve the hostilities. Not all solutions were quickly devised, however. The Vermejales community, it should be noted, was never completely reduced by the Eglish. Their descendants may well have been among the maroons who obliged the English to negotiate a major peace settlement in the 1730's.[45]

Two aspects of the changing alliance between fugitives and

Europeans prompt additional comment, despite the incomplete historical record. One is first struck by the tenacity with which YSASSI pursued his defense of the island, having at one point only 40 Spaniards in his company. The source of his resolution seems to have been his black allies. Informed of LUBOLO's desertion and subsequent attacks on JUAN DE SERRAS and on his own camp, the Spanish governor immediately wrote to the English, asking for terms of capitulation.[46]

Noteworthy, too, is the intensity of JUAN LUBOLO's dedication to the English cause, having previously served the Spaniards so well. Nothing has come to light in the historical record that the maroon leader was coerced into attacking his former ally JUAN DE SERRAS; rather, he seems to have done so willingly. The capture of runaways by former maroons occurs frequently in different places and at different times in the Americas, as mentioned in the case of the resettled maroons of Panama. Yet rarely did two groups of blacks, gaining their de facto freedom simultaneously and under identical circumstances, attempt to erradicate each other. The example of JUAN LUBOLO and JUAN DE SERRAS is a significant reminder that maroons in the same colony could and did pursue disparate strategies in confronting the same groups of Europeans.

PERNAMBUCO

Not only the maroons of Palmares, but the *moradores* living alongside them as well, devised different approaches for dealing with each other in the interior of Pernambuco, Brazil, in the 17th century. The fact is not surprising, given that the network of *quilombos* or runaway communities comprising "os Palmares" stretched over several thousand square miles and numbered between 16,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. Documentary evidence on the nature of the black communities is admittedly scanty. Sufficient data exist, however, for inferring that various sorts of commerce took place in the frontier between the black and white settlements. Despite the ideological commitment of the Pernambucans to keep slaves at their tasks, third parties of *moradores* put their immediate economic interests above those of the captaincy and traded with the

palmaristas. Such intercourse was to take place for many decades during the lifetime of Palmares.

A lengthy historical sketch of the development of the black communities will help elucidate the form that alliance-making took with individuals outside. It should first be noted that as early as 1580, prior to Brazil's sugar boom, the black population of the colony had already reached 10,000. By 1630, Pernambuco alone imported some 4400 African slaves annually, many of whom worked in the captaincy's burgeoning cane fields and its 150 *engenhos* or sugar mills.[47] Conditions in the captaincy for blacks were extremely harsh. As CHARLES BOXER has remarked, "If Pernambuco was an earthly paradise for the extravagant sugar-planters, it was also... an earthly hell for their Negro slaves."[48]

Numbers of blacks were trained to fight the Dutch invaders who occupied the colony in the first half of the 17th century, winning freedom promised for their efforts; the majority of the slaves, however, had no such avenues for gaining liberty and were kept in agricultural tasks. Some slaves fled to join the Dutch, but most blacks abstained from taking sides in these intra-European contests. Among these slaves, nonetheless, were many awaiting their chance to flee to the black stronghold Palmares. Over the course of the century, fresh numbers of slaves would do the same.[49]

As early as 1603, the third governor-general of Brazil, DIOGO BOTELHO, sent an expedition against the young fugitive settlement of Palmares. Mention is made of the *quilombo* again in 1613.

This citation in a "Report on the State of Brazil" claimed that "... some 30 leagues inland, there is a site between mountains called Palmares which harbors runaway slaves fleeing from work whose attacks and raids force the whites into armed pursuits which amount to little for they return to raid again... This makes it impossible to... end the transgressions which gave Palmares its reputation."[50]

Although no additional mention is made of the *quilombo,* or *quilombos,* during the subsequent two decades, the intrusion of Dutch forces into the captaincy gave some slaves the opportunity to flee into the bush. In their own pursuit of blacks, Dutch reconnaissances made significant inroads into the hinterlands, including a survey of the fugitive black communities. The Dutch found that the Palmares of the 1640's was comprised of two large *quilombos*

of 5000 inhabitants, and a number of smaller settlements whose total population was estimated at 6000. Prior to the entrance of the Dutch into the *quilombos,* the king of Palmares had been warned from unnamed contacts in the principal Pernambucan town of Alagoas that the European invaders were on their way toward the fugitive communities. The black leader thus proceeded to scatter his subjects into the bush. These tactics of espionage and evasion were to prove typical of Palmares' military strategy — as well as that of maroon communities throughout the New World — for years to come.

In their accounts of the explorations of the *quilombos,* the Dutch marveled at the "church," forges, and council house in the principal settlement, and at the richly planted fields of maize, manioc, beans, sugar cane, and other crops nearby. Admiration, however, did not preclude destruction. As the Spaniards had struck at their black enemies in Panama, so did the Dutch soldiers in Pernambuco. They burned the *palmaristas'* holdings in the hopes of reducing the threat from the maroons.[51]

With the retreat of the occupying forces in 1654, the Portuguese largely busied themselves with the rebuilding of the captaincy for the next decade, as did the *palmaristas* in their own settlements. Several historians of Palmares, including EDISON CARNEIRO, M.M. DE FREITAS, and DÉCIO FREITAS, state that in such periods of relative tranquility commerce of all sorts flourished between the *palmaristas* and various sectors of the *moradores.* The maroons traded produce, game, and handicrafts in exchange for tools, clothes, firearms, manufactured goods, and information regarding Europeans' movements against them.

Even town merchants, according to the noted Brazilianist ARTHUR RAMOS, joined in handling commerce on behalf of the *palmaristas*.[52] The historian SEBASTIÃO DA ROCHA PITTA, writing in 1730, claimed that some of the *moradores* exchanged firearms for gold and silver that the blacks had captured in razzias against the whites.[53] CARNEIRO goes so far as to say that "The blacks lived well with the *moradores*, ... so long as the latter did not become interned, with their corrals *(corrais)* and plantations *(plantaçoes)*, in the free lands of Palmares."[65]

Which sectors of *moradores,* however, were the maroons' actual

trading partners? The term *moradores* is a general one; it refers to all settlers in Brazil, from subsistence farmers to the *senhores do engenho*, the wealthy millers and planters of Pernambucan sugar cane. Likewise, the *plantaçoes* mentioned in the quotation from CARNEIRO denotes cultivated areas, ''plantings'' of any sort, whether these were the garden patches of ranchers or poor settlers, or the large scale monocultures. It is not recorded that any *senhor do engenho* ever held intercourse with the *palmaristas,* nor is such an economic alliance likely to have occurred. The large scale planters and millers were the principal owners of slaves in the captaincy, the local ''exploitative'' interests, who sought the return of the maroons rather than their economic flourishing.

We can only tentatively conclude, then, that those engaged in ranching and subsistence activities were the frontier allies of the *palmaristas,* to the total exclusion of any cane planter. The ranchers and farmers, however, would themselves have had interests at least spatially opposed to the large-scale planters' regime, given the competition for land between planters and ranchers or small farmers. The ranchers, employing fewer slaves in less labor-intensive tasks than sugar cane cultivation and milling, were more likely than the planters to have entered into trading relations with the *palmaristas* for three reasons. First of all, the maroons had fled principally from the harsh discipline of the plantocracy, not from work on the cattle ranges. They would thus have borne few specific grudges against the ranchers, from whom the domesticate-less *palmaristas* obtained supplies of meat. Secondly, some sort of working relations would have to have been established on the frontier, given that the ranchers could not demarcate the boundaries of their holdings as clearly as the millers and planters. As will be discussed below, however, even treaty-making in these instances between maroons and ranchers did not stop incursions between them. Finally, the poorer farmers and ranchers would have been eager to trade for the *palmaristas'* produce and goods which circumvented the standard — and costly — Pernambucan mechanisms of production and exchange.

Despite these reasons for reaching informal compacts, ranchers and farmers were obliged to weigh the benefits of trade against the costs of impinging on lands which the maroons considered to be in their purview. As CARNEIRO suggests, overstepping of these

bounds prompted retaliation. More conclusive evidence cannot be offered here, given the lack of data delimiting the actual distribution of ranches, small farms, mills, and large-scale plantations on the Pernambucan frontier in the 17th century.[55]

DÉCIO FREITAS, the Brazilian historian who spent five years researching the growth and defeat of Palmares, claims that Pernambucans were not the only colonists to hold commercial intercourse with the *palmaristas.* Cattle breeders from Bahia to the south did the same. In their expansion northward, Bahian herds were driven across the São Francisco River and onto lands within the domain of the escaped slaves. In exchange for informal grazing rights, the *palmaristas* demanded and received tools, arms, salt, and information. The alliance was one formed for pure convenience, mutually benefiting both parties.[56] The Bahian evidence, furthermore, supports the contention that ranchers, rather than *senhores do engenho,* were disposed to making pacts with the maroons.

Extended periods of peace between *palmaristas* and *moradores* were rare, however. By the mid-1660's relations between the groups were actively hostile once more. The reasons behind the revival of the cycle of *entradas,* or attacks by Europeans on the black settlements, and razzias, or those by blacks themselves, are no doubt varied, but several factors can be indicated. Competition with the growing sugar industries in Antillean colonies kept prices down in Brazil, while the price of slaves rose. Blacks were reported to run away on their own in greater numbers as well, partially in response to the intensified *rigor de cautiveiro,* the harshness of the slave regime.

In order to regain slaves who had fled or been abducted to Palmares in previous years and to avoid buying new Africans at inflated costs, moreover, greater pressure to attack the *quilombos* was brought to bear by the majority of *moradores.* Such a move coincided with the general expansion into new lands away from the coast, a thrust that had been retarded during the Dutch occupation. The advance of the frontier inland into Pernambuco did not stop until after the 1690's. The *palmaristas,* meanwhile, descended upon the plantations to take arms and seek slaves with a fury unparalleled in earlier periods.[57]

Following the devastating attacks by CAPITÃO-MOR FERNÃO

CARRILHO in 1676, a major wing of the *palmaristas* led by their king GANGA-ZUMBA sued for peace. In exchange for the cessation of hostilities and the return of all blacks not born in the *quilombos,* the *palmaristas* were promised their freedom and the desired right to trade with the *moradores*. The recent absence of such commerce, in addition to shortages of black women, were given as two principal reasons for the maroons' partial capitulation. Commercial intercourse, it seems, was a regular feature of peacetime social life on the borderlands between Palmares and the rest of Pernambuco. The *palmaristas* were to be resettled in Cucaú, a reportedly fertile site some 32 kilometers from the town of Serinhaém. The Pernambucans, it is clear, were eager to seize the even richer lands of Palmares as quickly as possible.[58]

Conflict did not come to an end, however. GANGA-ZUMBA had been overlord of ten major *quilombos,* but did not represent the only political sector of his populace. Led by his nephew ZAMBI, thousands of blacks refused to agree to the conditions for peace. ZAMBI's faction included many African-born maroons, who would have been returned to slavery under the stipulations of the treaty. The Pernambucans, ZAMBI's faction claimed, had failed to comply with the articles of the pact, by carrying off blacks from Cucaú. The desired commerce with whites had also proved to be a dead letter. GANGA-ZUMBA was poisoned by a conspiracy of black opposition leaders and ZAMBI returned to Palmares to make preparations for war.[59]

By the late 1680's, the Pernambucans committed themselves to a policy of razing the *quilombos.* No attempts at peace-making or even waging a limited war were to be made. Messages were sent to the famous *bandeirante* or frontiersman DOMINGOS JORGE VELHO, offering lucrative terms if he agreed to lead the struggle against the maroons. JORGE VELHO, himself a mestizo, was promised supplies and numerous troops for battle; payment for each of the captured slaves; entitlement to the royal portion of the slaves captured in Palmares; impunity from punishment for any crime committed in the attacks; and most significantly, a portion of the lands in Palmares itself.

The call to JORGE VELHO was a last-ditch effort to dislodge the blacks from Palmares. The half-Indian *bandeirante* led a force of

some 800-1300 bush-trained Indians and mestizos, and 50-80 *paulistas,* or inhabitants of the southern province of São Paulo. The Pernambucans considered JORGE VELHO's troops to be at best unruly, and at worst, intruders, spoilers, and thieves. More pointedly, those Pernambucans who had been promised lands in Palmares for services rendered in the past to the Crown looked disfavorably upon the carpetbagging *paulistas.* The *bandeirantes* were unforeseen competitors for the lucrative booty of Palmares.

The frontiersmen further angered the *moradores* by grazing their cattle on the lands outside Pernambucan towns, inciting clashes with the residents there. The complaints about JORGE VELHO and his men were so intense in the early 1690's that the Overseas Council of Portugal grumbled, "The *paulistas* are worse than the very Negroes of Palmares."[60] These objections notwithstanding, the Pernambucan government "could not do without the support of (these) undesirable auxiliaries." Whatever difficulties they did arouse, however, as DÉCIO FREITAS noted, "The *paulistas* ended up invariably submitting to the constituted authorities."[61]

Six years were required to achieve the aims of the captaincy to disperse the maroons. Despite valiant defensive measures on the part of ZAMBI and his men, they could not match the force of arms mustered under JORGE VELHO by the colonial government after 1691. The last major campaign three years later involved a siege of the *quilombos* lasting 22 days, and ended in the death or capture of nearly 1000 maroons. ZAMBI himself was taken prisoner and beheaded in 1695. An additional two years were necessary to reduce the remaining blacks.[62]

In the long years of settlement of claims for "war prizes" following the defeat of Palmares, DOMINGOS JORGE VELHO proved to be an astute litigant as well as a superior bush fighter. It is obvious that the legal case that he and his assistants prepared was in every way designed to depreciate the claims of other petitioners while putting his own in the best light. JORGE VELHO's contentions, nonetheless, support the scant evidence that the *palmaristas* had been involved in intercourse of various commercial sorts with different *moradores.* The *bandeirante*'s statements provide a useful point of departure for examining the nature of the collusion between particular sectors of white Brazilians and *palmaristas*.

One of the best examples of his accusations against other litigants for the spoils of Palmares is the following: "... when they [certain *moradores*] went out to settle them [the frontier lands adjoining Palmares] their ambition made them "colonists" [*colonos*] of the blacks, and actual enemies of the [borderland] settlements; for, so that the said blacks would consent to their settling such lands, they [the colonists] paid them tribute, in tools, in powder, in lead, in arms, and in everything else what they asked for; and when they abandoned them [the lands], it was because the said colonists defaulted in these things, or [in] the loyalty that they professed to them, and not because of the mere rebellion of the blacks; and these contributions have been the more occasional [*mais ocasional*] cause of the increase and strength of the said blacks; and as a result the hostilities, robberies, deaths, destruction, and expense that have occurred in this case..."[63]

JORGE VELHO went on to say that no less than one of the highest judicial authorities of Bahia, CRISTOVÃO DE BURGOS E CONTREIRAS, maintained cattle alongside or on the *palmaristas'* dominions. The livestock were supervised there by one MANUEL DE SOUZA. Failing to pay the customary fee alluded to by JORGE VELHO, DE SOUZA was forced to flee the region for fear of the blacks' reprisals. The *bandeirante* also stated that the *palmaristas* received lead and powder from certain *moradores* in exchange for bullion carried off in the razzias. JORGE VELHO further pointed accusingly to other *moradores* involved with the maroons, besides those acting as receivers of stolen goods. "Certain persons," he claimed, were "interested in the preservation of it [Palmaras] for the convenience and emoluments which they obtained from its existence, some in the benefits of farms [*da fazenda*], others for the execution of their misdeeds [*malefícios*] and vengeance."[64]

While there is little evidence supporting JORGE VELHO's claims that particular *moradores* used *palmaristas* as henchmen, or some comparable role, in personal quarrels, additional legal and contractual evidence for the other alliances mentioned by JORGE VELHO can be cited. Historian R.K. KENT clearly attributed a Pernambucan proclamation of 1670 prohibiting the carrying of firearms to the fact that these were being passed surreptitiously to the *palmaristas.*[65] The colonial government awarded a commission in February, 1680, to one ANDRES DIAS, *morador* of San Miguel, to apprehend fugitive slaves wherever he found them, even if they were sheltered in the homes of *moradores.*[66]

In the same year, Pernambucan governor AIRES DE SOUZA DE CASTRO issued a written proclamation to the effect that "those persons who by whatever means [are] able to communicate with

'Captain Zambi' [are] to instruct him that he was pardoned by the [Portuguese] king'' for his part in events following the capitulation of GANGA-ZUMBA in 1678.[67] Given that the document was printed, the government apparently recognized that some of its literate constituents did have dealings with the black renegade leader. Finally in 1687, the Pernambucans awarded JORGE VELHO the power to apprehend any *morador* merely suspected of aiding the *palmaristas,* however high the station of that *morador.*[68] The documentation, in short, points to complicity on the part of numbers of Pernambucans with the maroons.

No one was exempt from suspicion of collusion with the *palmaristas*. CAPITÃO-MOR FERNÃO CARRILHO, the leader of major *entradas*, was at one point accused of more than the mere failure to make effective ''cruel war'' on the fugitive blacks, following an unsuccessful campaign. According to charges brought against him by Governor JOÃO DE SOUZA in 1684, CARILLHO had not only agreed to a cease-fire requested by the *palmaristas* ''in order to safeguard [*porem em côbra*] their baggage and supplies [;] he even allowed the enemy blacks into his settlements...''[69]

The *palmaristas,* it was further charged, had reportedly been warned of CARRILHO's impending attack following the cease-fire. They therefore abandoned the site that they had been occupying and assaulted the colonial forces instead. Although two other officers independently claimed that CARRILHO had strictly and dutifully carried out his orders, the charges were upheld by the judiciary of the captaincy. Governor JOÃO DE SOUZA had CARRILHO removed in disgrace from campaigning against Palmares, and transferred without salary out of Pernambuco.[70]

The majority of Pernambucans, however, wished to rid of the *quilombos* which attracted their slaves and which cost them a fortune over the years in war taxes; commerce with the maroons was not available, or did not appeal, to the general white citizenry. They instead insisted upon the destruction of the black strongholds, claiming that any other course would establish a dangerous precedent for the proliferation of *quilombos*. Unlike the case of Panama, the attempts at peaceful encapsulation of the maroons had failed. There was no other course except to uproot the settlements.

To accomplish that task, it was estimated that the captaincy

spent the substantial sum of 1,000,000 cruzados — the contemporary price of some 2000-2500 adult slaves — on defensive and offensive measures in the campaign against Palmares. The towns of Porto Calvo, Alagoas, Serinhaém, and Penedo complained for years to the Crown about the razzias. Attacks were so fierce after the 1670's that the Pernambucan towns pledged mutual support in time of crisis. Clearly, given the fortune in supplies, revenue, and manpower that these Pernambucans were obliged to pay in the wars against Palmares, few would have been ardent, if secret, defenders of the *quilombos*.[71]

Although the government-controlled *entradas* against the network of maroon communities sapped the financial strength of the urban citizenry, wealthy *moradores* repeatedly mustered their own resources to send troops into Palmares, either to bring back their slaves or to take new ones. It is interesting to note that, despite reports of white lives being taken in the razzias, neither the historian ERNESTO ENNES nor EDISON CARNEIRO cites a substantiated case of a *morador* being killed in such an incursion. Ironically enough, deaths did occur in the *moradores'* private ventures into Palmares.[72] So long as the white Pernambucans kept their distance, it seems, trouble between the European and black communities was less likely to erupt. Intercourse between peaceable parties could then flourish.

The characteristic state of affairs between *palmaristas* and *moradores* was confrontation, however, and conclusions regarding the history of Palmares must account for the success the maroons had in staying off the Portuguese and the Dutch for as long as they did. The *palmaristas* held leverage over the Pernambucan government and its forces in at least three ways, even after the campaign for the total destruction of the *quilombos* had begun. In the first place, ties were kept with the slave community, like the ones which bound Panamanian maroons and slaves. However strong or tenuous their connections were with various *moradores,* the slaves who fled to Palmares informed the maroons there of activities in the white-controlled sectors of the colony. Those slaves who remained behind were considered the domestic or ''internal'' enemy of the Pernambucans, the potential if not active partners of the ma-

roons. The "Alagoans" who warned the *palmaristas* in 1654 that the Dutch were approaching may have been black, rather than white, allies of the fugitive slaves.[73]

Secondly, the Pernambucans' indecision and occasional ineptitude regarding effective procedures to reduce the blacks, constantly worked in the *palmaristas'* favor. Solutions of pacification and limited escalations were tried and discarded. The employment of outside auxiliaries such as JORGE VELHO cost Pernambuco dearly and gave the maroons time to consolidate their troops. The whites' ancillary forces also served to divide the political and economic interests of the non-black constituencies. As outlined above, at least some of the *moradores* took advantage of the buffer between the core areas of whites and blacks to make alliances mutually beneficial to the maroons and themselves.

Finally, the *palmaristas* were engaged in a struggle for their freedom. Ultimate defeat meant death or the return to servitude. Whatever may have been the role of European third parties in relations between white and black Pernambucans, the maroons in the end alone engineered their program for survival. Even after the *palmaristas'* dispersal, they left their stamp on relations between masters and slaves in Brazil. During the course of the subsequent two centuries, the colonial government consciously maneuvered to prevent the spread or conglomeration of *quilombos* to the degree which of Palmares had achieved.

HISPANIOLA

Another instance of alliance-making between maroons and Europeans, united against a common economic and political adversary, arose on the island of Hispaniola in the 18th century. There, slaves fleeing the rigors of the French plantation regime in Saint-Domingue established contacts for trade with settlers and merchants in the town of Neybes in Santo Domingo, the eastern Spanish part of the island. While it is not known when the commerce began between the fugitives of the maroon community le Maniel and the Neybeans, it is recorded that Spaniards had "stolen," or cajoled away slaves from the French as early as 1691

and again in 1695.[74] Given that the maroons of le Maniel were only granted their freedom in 1786, amity between Spaniards and runaways from the French may well have lasted over 90 years.

In order to appreciate how the commercial understanding between maroons and Spanish settlers was initiated, it is necessary to examine briefly the contrasting nature of French and Spanish schemes of colonization on the island. The Treaty Rijswijk of 1697 between the European powers in effect legitimized French claim to the western third of the island, which had been used as a pirates' haunt and privateering base from which to attack Spanish ports and ships. The French regime thereafter devoted itself to monocultural expansion and intensification, in indigo, cotton, coffee, and above all sugar plantations. The Spaniards, to the contrary, progressively involved themselves in "settler" activities based on livestock raising. Their own plantations had declined steadily during the 17th and early 18th centuries, due in part to the rigid Spanish commercial policies favoring the metropolis at the expense of certain colonies. With the expansion of French holdings, however, small-scale Spanish commercial activity increased. A market was created for salted meats, hides, and other products of animal husbandry.[75]

The contrasts between the two sectors of the island during the 18th century can be placed in greater relief still. In 1701, on one hand, 35 sugar plantations were in operation in Saint-Domingue, while 110 others were in preparation. By 1789, some 6500 sugar, coffee, and indigo plantations were producing revenues of $ 200 million livres, sustained by the labor of well over 450,000 slaves. The white population and that of the *gens de couleur* or people of mixed racial parentage on the eve of the French Revolution numbered 30,000 and 28,000, respectively in the French colony.[76]

In Santo Domingo, on the other hand, the total population of the colony in 1723 was recorded to be a mere 5000. Settlers had been steadily leaving the Spanish part of Hispaniola for other islands, since enforcement of the *asiento* laws limited the numbers of slaves permitted to enter the colony. By 1785, due to the stimulus of the French markets, Spanish population and commercial activity grew. In that year some 15,000 slaves worked for a non-slave population

of 100,000, including whites, free blacks, and free people of mixed parentage.

Envy of French plantation growth and the intensity of its production regime was widespread. A Spanish royal decree of 1785 expressed regret at the fact that only 760 Spanish slaves were employed in mills and another 314 engaged in the production of cane syrup. These figures represent less than ten per cent of the total slave population. The rest worked as herders on the small ranches, or *hatos*, in the colony, as domestics, or in other non-labor-intensive tasks. The royal decree went on to outline a program for the intensification of the Spanish slave regime, with the French plantation model in mind.[77]

Other differences between the orientation of the juxtaposed colonies can be mentioned, including attitudes toward manumission. While the numbers of *affranchis* or freed blacks and people of mixed parentage rose in Saint-Domingue over the course of the 18th century, the historian MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY wrote that a still more liberal atmosphere regarding color status and emancipation thrived in Santo Domingo. The Spanish decree of 1785, which attempted to make the slave regime in Santo Domingo more disciplined, accused the free blacks and slaves of "laziness, independence, pride, robberies, and the excesses due to these." MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY, who was acquainted with both sides of the island, however, believed that the harsh new Spanish code would or could not be enforced. Throughout the course of the 1700's, moreover, freedom seems to have been worked for, and bought, with greater ease in Santo Domingo than in Saint-Domingue.[78]

Finally, as in 17th-century Pernambuco, Saint-Domingue imported thousands of new slaves annually in the second half of the 18th century. In Santo Domingo, Spaniards were able to buy far more limited numbers of slaves. The Spanish colony constantly on the look-out for additional sources of capital growth and above all, labor.

Maroons from the French colony provided a periodic supply of individuals to work on the eastern side of the island, or as MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY put it, "to share in Spanish indolence there."[79] Blacks could purchase their freedom after five years' work in military guard duty; other slaves became eligible to gain their liberty

after a few years of tending the Spanish ranchers' herds. The French were deeply worried by the potential, constant loss of labor to the Spanish side of the island in the form of runaway slaves. They were also preoccupied by the political consequences of *marronage* and the Spaniards' welcome of the phenomenon.

> As early as 1721, administrators in Saint-Domingue complained that: "... this favorable reception [of the maroons in Santo Domingo] being spread among all the others, either by Spanish emissaries, or by the very Negroes themselves returned to foment this desertion, had created in the morale of the slaves an impression which tends toward a general revolt."[80]

Such officials were not speaking on an isolated incident. On numerous occasions the Spaniards and blacks on the island joined to harass the French. One such memorable event occurred in 1719. The Spanish colonial governor, RAMIREZ, wrote to the neighboring sector, inviting officials to take charge of the slaves sequestered away in the early raids of the 1690's into the French colony. The Spanish governor had been obliged to make the offer by an order from the Bourbon king PHILIP V. Yet at the moment when then the French arrived to apprehend the blacks, the Spaniards drew their weapons and armed their charges. The Spanish soldiers proceeded to declare the ex-slaves to be free, who in turn attacked the French party. After the skirmish, from which the French barely escaped with their lives, the blacks chose to settle as an independent district of the capital of Santo Domingo called San Lorenzo de Las Minas.[81]

The course of relations between the French and the Spanish colonists on the island is in fact marked by decrees and treaties related to the return of maroons. These sets of prescriptions, established in 1714, 1740, 1751, and 1762, were agreed to — and violated — repeatedly by the inhabitants and officials of Santo Domingo. Actual extraditions, according to YVAN DEBBASCH, were a dead letter throughout this period. The boundary between the colonies was not firmly established until the Franco-Spanish Treaty of Aranjuez delimited the line in 1777.[82] Even then, Spanish settlers of the interior continued to aid the maroons in the frontier region.

If conditions existed for an alliance between the Spaniards and the maroons, these conditions did not merely arise because of the presence of the fugitive slaves, or because of historical national

enmities. Competition between the French *habitants* and the Spanish settlers, to recapitulate, also derived from the differences in economic orientation, one colony based on plantation agriculture, the other on small-scale farming and ranching. Clashes between Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo stemmed from the ranging of cattle onto French holdings beyond the highly ambiguous colonial frontier, or, put another way, advances inland by coffee, cotton, and sugar planters impinged upon the Spanish areas devoted to grazing livestock.

Yet not all factors contributed to widespread co-operation between fugitive blacks and Spaniards. Two reasons can be cited here. As stated above, direct hostilities between many of the Spaniards and the French ceased when the thrust eastward of French holdings turned to the advantage of Spanish herders and merchants, in the form of a market for the products of ranch industries. This change of affairs notably appears in the third quarter of the 18th century.[83]

Secondly, if maroons did abandon the French plantations in order to start a new life elsewhere, not all of them headed for employment in the Spanish colony. Large numbers of slaves — especially creoles, or those born in the colony and those *faits au pays,* or those long-term residents ''seasoned'' there — sought work and shelter in urban areas of Saint-Domingue, especially Cap Français and Port-au-Prince.[84] Such slaves possessed skills which could best be marketed in populated areas; life on Spanish ranches or in a maroon community in the wilderness would not have appealed to them.

Still in all, hundreds of maroons attempted to pursue a viable, Afro-American existence in the interior of the island; they traded if they desired, or when they could, with favorably disposed Spaniards. Such maroon communities, trusting ultimately to themselves, organized their life-ways as autonomously as possible, drawing upon both skills learned in diverse African cultures and on the plantations. These societies, founded by runaways, fed by new recruits, and strengthened by members born into the groups, constituted an independent — yet interdependent — party to relations and growth on the frontier between the colonies.

If not all areas on the border between the Spanish and French

colonies provided a haven for slaves in flight, other niches had been exploited by maroons from the earliest period of colonization on the island. As early as 1519, fugitive slaves concentrated themselves in the southern area known as Bahoruco. In that year, a band headed by an Indian leader ENRIQUILLO found refuge from the rigors of captivity imposed by the first generation of European colonists on the island, vigors first abandoned by indigenous and later African and Afro-American bondsmen. ENRIQUILLO, now a subject for Dominican literature as well as Caribbean history, held off the Spaniards from his stronghold for 14 years before being captured.[85]

The maroon nemesis for French Hispaniolan colonists was the ''transient'' community of le Maniel, whose home base was the rugged fastness of Bahoruco. The French first sent regiments against their fugitive slaves clustered there in 1702. For the next 84 years or more, a single band or bands of maroons, now organized into partially autonomous maroon societies, effectively kept the planters from expanding their holdings into the area. Further attacks by the French in 1728, 1733, and 1740 failed to dislodge the maroons, among whose numbers were individuals ''born in the woods.'' As MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY would later report, certain members of the Bahoruco group negotiating peace terms with the French in 1786 had lived all their 60-year lives in the region. These were bearers of an Afro-American culture forged in part independently of both direct experience on European plantation life and the multi-cultural African heritage.[86]

The maroons of le Maniel employed various strategies to ensure their economic and social survival. They cultivated patches of sweet potatoes, bananas, and other crops, kept dogs and small livestock, and supplemented diet with hunting and fishing. If sufficiently pressed by French marshalries or colonists, the maroons would take refuge well within the Spanish side of the border, into which their adversaries could not follow them. While their huts and small fields might be destroyed — as has those of the maroons of Panama, Palmares, and had been so threatened in Jamaica — the existence of le Maniel as an ongoing community would not be terminated by their pursuers. DEBBASCH calls the maroons' mobility the ''trump card'' which they played repeatedly in avoiding the Europeans, a mobility also employed by Panamanian, Pernambucan, and Jamai-

can fugitives. The members of le Maniel only carried out raids onto plantations for female and male slaves, arms, and tools, in dire circumstances.

When their cultivating and hunting activities yielded a surplus, the maroons traded the goods with the Spanish inhabitants of the interior, especially those of the town of Neybes. The Spaniards in turn provided tools, arms, powder, bullets, and information concerning the whereabouts of French troops and colonists. At times, the Spanish even purchased the manufactured goods for the runaways in the French sector, little to the knowledge of the Frenchmen seeking those very runaways. The reasons behind the alliance were clear enough: the inhabitants of the interior "probably [aided the maroons] less out of sympathy with them than to protect the commercial exchange that had been set up at Neybes for small tradesmen, both among the settlers of the region and in the maroon community."[87] Such a situation resembles that of the entente between *palmaristas* and *moradores* in Pernambuco.

In time, however, the expansion of French plantations into the Bahoruco area forced their colonial officials to offer terms of peace to the le Maniel maroons. Fear that their enemy numbered in the thousands probably lay behind the French decision to initiate a formal treaty. Realistic appraisal of the size of their black adversaries typically followed the Europeans' commitment to making a settlement or all-out warfare. Through the mediation of certain Spanish colonists of mixed European and black ancestry, a tentative, bicolonial agreement was reached with the maroons in 1785. Those fugitives of "Spanish" origin, numbering five in the actual band of 130, were immediately given their freedom. The 125 "French" maroons were offered liberty if they pledged to live peacefully in French territory and to return any new slaves running to them. The maroons were to be paid a set fee for such service by colonial officials.[88]

Despite initial agreement with the plan, the maroons proceeded to retract their accord soon afterwards. The Spanish settlers at Neybes convinced the le Maniel maroons that some sort of trap was involved. The motives behind the Spaniards' deceit were abundantly plain. The maroons' commerce had become too valuable to give up; their departure from the area would bring French colonists

instead, colonists who were the market, not the source, for the goods for which the Spanish merchants traded. It was thus expedient for at least some Spaniards to have the maroons continue residing where they had been in the borderlands.

Eager for freedom and weakened by disease, nevertheless, the maroons finally capitulated in 1786. The French thus escaped the humiliation of having to plead for terms or the expense of having to disperse the maroons definitively. French colonial leaders were merely bound to enforce the legal recognition of a social reality. While it is not precisely clear where the maroons of le Maniel ultimately settled, the black community prompted no immediate hostilities afterwards. Their very proximity, together with reports of additional runaways in the area, continued to keep some French planters away.[89]

Little has come to light of specific aspects of the Afro-American culture of le Maniel — what language they spoke, how many had been born in the woods, or what constituted their socio-political organization. From the scant amount of evidence that exists, the society seems comparable to that of the Jamaican maroons, in terms of numbers, subsistence activities, and mutual alliances with Spaniards themselves largely engaged in ''settlement'' activities. Both communities, it should be recalled more importantly still, were among those who most saliently demonstrated mobility, independence, and adaptability in the light of the advance of hard-pressing Europeans.

The maroons of le Maniel, in short, found leverage between two competing groups of European colonists. They joined forces with the Spaniards against the French when it seemed worthwhile, and maintained their independence until recognition of freedom was finally conceded by the French in 1786. Within the next decade, moreover, the Europeans on the western part of Hispaniola were to witness the long-range consequences of having restricted the rights of the majority of the black population: they were to be expelled from the territory which would become the black republic of Haiti. Whatever the role of the maroons was in the uprisings of 1791-1804, their example had provided a stimulus and a model for action of which the rebellious slaves en masse could make use.[90]

CONCLUSIONS

The existence of maroon communities in the Americas represented a contradiction in slave societies. Those black individuals bound to their masters fled, declared themselves free, and created, or attempted to create, Afro-American cultures. The viability of these new social entities was hindered in at least two ways. In the first place, the maroons lacked or preferred personnel and goods which they could not produce themselves. They would or could not detach themselves from the colony at large — or the metropolis to which it was tied.

Secondly, and of equal importance, the majority of Europeans in the New World would not tolerate the rivalry of these alternative societies. Communal *marronage* to them implied the substantial loss of labor and capital, the flaunting of their individual and social authority, and the threat of organized, effective retaliation by the fugitives. On the whole, they committed themselves to the extinction of the nascent or mature Afro-American societies.

If the social division between whites and blacks in slave societies was predominant, it was far from complete, however. While these groups were distinct socially, economically, and politically, each was internally divided along these lines as well. Such intragroup differences fostered alliances across the lines of color and servitude. Through such connections, maroon communities received economic and political support and returned it to their partners. It is the nature of these ties to which this essay devotes attention.

Three of the four cases cited above — Panama, Jamaica, and Hispaniola — deal principally with relations between maroons and different European national groups in the Americas. Political divisions among the European groups allowed the maroons to enter the conflicts in order to seek their own ends. It is evident that the fugitive blacks joined the side of the European nation with fewer capital-intensive resources and less manpower; that is, they collaborated with the less ''exploitative'' colony or faction. They did not join necessarily or immediately with the colonists attacking their former masters, as is shown in the case of Jamaica. There again, the maroons' first allies were engaged in ''settlement'' activities.[91]

The common factor in the Euro-maroon alliance, as far as the whites were concerned, was the salient usefulness, even need, for maroons' aid. If only for a time, the fugitive blacks' technology and resources contributed to the success or survival of the less ''exploitative'' groups. Different kinds and degrees of need, however, were involved for each co-operating European group.

While Sir FRANCIS DRAKE and JOHN OXENHAM might have been able to capture bullion on the Spanish Main by themselves, they were not able to carry out ventures which involved crossing the Isthmus alone. The English pirates thus took full advantage of black skills in scouting and raiding to reach their ends. Spanish resistance to the English on Jamaica would have been crushed far sooner if JUAN LUBOLO and JUAN DE SERRAS had not collaborated with CRISTÓBAL DE YSASSI. There, European need for maroon auxiliaries provides the most striking example of alliance-making, albeit a temporary one. The commercial networks established in the interior of Hispaniola in the 18th century depended in part upon the maroons' supplying of game and provisions for the Spanish inhabitants. In that case, expediency more than necessity prompted a Hispano-maroon commercial understanding.

In turn, each group of maroons had wants or needs fulfilled by their pacts with Europeans. The runaway slave communities discussed above expected that these alliances would yield more desired goods than they could obtain alone. One notes, however, an absence of urgency on the part of maroons which better characterizes the European search for accord with fugitives in the first place. Alliances, from the perspective of maroons, were mechanisms which generally facilitated access to valuables, rather than creating that access.

Differences between maroon communities arose in the kind of materials that the fugitives sought as a benefit of alliance with the Europeans, as a result of disparate economic and social conditions prevailing in each colony and each maroon group. Despite — or perhaps because of — their large numbers, Panamanian maroons were most eager to obtain substantive gains, such as female slaves, scrap iron for metal-working, and to carry out vengeance on the Spaniards. The Jamaican blacks, to take another case, were significantly fewer in numbers, and had been organized far less time in

palenques, than had the Panamanian maroons. Given fewer resources of all sorts in the Jamaican colony, together with the autonomy of the Jamaican maroons, they seem to have desired little more than European clothes from the Spaniards — to say nothing of the crucial recognition of freedom from them. The maroons of le Maniel, as a final instance, survived without Spanish commercial aid through the first half of the 18th century. Economic intercourse with the Spanish settlers seemed all the more desirable, however, in order to obtain the tools, arms, and other goods so often mentioned in connection with maroons' needs.

That certain groups of Europeans were ready or compelled to overlook their partners' former slave status in forming alliances against common enemies provides the upshot of these remarks. Each group was obliged to reckon with the total set of social, economic, and political roles which its fellow actors were playing. The degree of European disposability to pact with the maroon communities was characteristically a product of the fewer resources wielded by less powerful European groups vis-à-vis those of more ''exploitative'' European national interests.

One should thus not correlate frequency of alliance-making with maroons on the part of any particular European group. Far more fruitful is the examination of the particular economic fortunes of that group at any given time, for understanding their readiness to hold intercourse. The wealthy *vecinos* of Panama, for example, who attempted to disband or encapsulate the maroons through much of the 16th century, formed a crucial link in the Spanish commercial monopoly of that era. They viewed maroons as lost property, not as potential partners in efforts to drive away marauding French and English pirates. The more humble economic conditions of other Spaniards in Jamaica and Hispaniola in the 17th and 18th centuries — vis-à-vis the economic and political strength of English and French competitors, respectively — suggested the usefulness of an alliance with runaway slaves, however. ''Exploitative'' colonial interests, whatever their nationality, envisioned intercourse or negotiation with maroon communities as distasteful, while ''settlement''-oriented groups more readily saw the advantages of pact-making with them.

The last statement obtains not only in competitions between dif-

ferent European national interests in the New World, but also in intra-national, sectarian contests. The case of Palmares reminds us that Portuguese farmers, ranchers, merchants, and other settlers held intercourse with the *palmaristas* at the cost of more "exploitative" planter and miller interests within the same colony. Economic self-interest on the part of certain groups of *moradores* was placed above that of the captaincy's avowed pledge to exercise strict social controls over enslaved blacks.

The instance of Pernambuco compels us to abandon any idea of a monolithic divide between *moradores* and *palmaristas*, Euro-Americans and Afro-Americans, whites and blacks, in intra-colonial relations. Instead one must seek to understand the social and economic conditions existing in 17th-century Pernambuco which made commerce with the *quilombos* not only viable, but perhaps preferable, for certain sectors of the population. Was economic instability so great, the circumspection of markets so limited, that all *moradores,* other than the *senhores do engenho*, kept open the possibility of trading with Palmares? How was this possibility to change over time? Was trading in kind, the reported norm of *palmarista* exchange, an effective means for ranchers and farmers to overcome shortages in capital? Was trading encouraged by the less agreeable alternative of paying high interest rates charged by middlemen in dealings within the captaincy and with sectors outside? How did the actual patterns of settlement in the frontierlands, the real social and economic distribution of *moradores,* affect commercial relations?

These sorts of concerns, when investigated, will provide a deeper understanding of the significance of Palmares in Brazilian history and for maroon studies, than the vignettes presented above. With more data coming to light, additional questions can be asked of the social and ethnic nature of relations between relevant constituencies. What role, if any, did free blacks and mulattoes play on the frontier between the *quilombos* and the *moradores'* holdings? How did the presence of Indians on nearly all sides affect relations between these groups? Again, the social composition of Pernambuco was different in the 1690's than it had been in 1603. How did race and class relations change in that century, and what effect did these have on the history of Palmares?

The *quilombos* of Pernambuco do not comprise an isolated instance of social and historical complexity. The questions posed above apply also to the economic and social relations between the maroon communities of Panama, Jamaica, and Hispaniola, and the engulfing European colonies. Although those instances present us with groups of Europeans seemingly less internally divided, differences *did* exist among the Spanish *vecinos*, English colonists, and French *habitants*. How did these internal, intra-colonial divisions affect the course of relations with the maroons? In each case, more significant similarities and differences will become clear with continued research.

Other themes treated above require fuller elaboration. More comparisons need to be drawn regarding similarities and differences between the maroon communities themselves. The available data are sparce, but additional patterns suggest themselves concerning the black societies' mobility, leadership, religious and horticultural practices, militant stance, and so forth. RICHARD PRICE's ''Introduction'' in the collection *Maroon societies* offers insight into the importance of each of these factors for cross-cultural analysis.[92] The role of non-white ethnic groups, too, especially those of Indians, free blacks, and free people of mixed parentage, bear to varying extents upon the cases of Panama, Hispaniola, and Palmares. Attention needs to be paid to the actions of non-white allies of the colonial government, such as the black regiments employed on occasion to attack the *quilombos*.

The present essay has limited itself to the investigation of relations between maroon communities and various European parties in the development of European systems of colonization in the Americas. Such groups did not ally themselves at random but rather pursued common, and mutually exclusive goals. These ends, in turn, are a product of compatible and disparate economic and political orientations of each of the parties involved, given their varied commitments to more or less labor- and capital-intensive economic pursuits, to ''settlement'' and ''exploitative'' schemes of colonial activity. It is hoped that some appreciation of the options and constraints under which different groups of maroons and Europeans acted has been advanced.

NOTES

1 See, among many others, BAUER & BAUER 1942, STAMPP 1956, FREDERICKSON & LASCH 1967, PATTERSON 1967, BLASSINGAME 1972. A previous version of this essay was presented to the Seminar in Atlantic History and Culture, The Johns Hopkins University, May 4, 1976. Comments from participants in the Seminar are gratefully appreciated, particularly those of IRA LOWENTHAL, GARY MCDONOGH, SIDNEY MINTZ, and TREVOR PURCELL. Special thanks are due to Professor RICHARD PRICE, for his warm encouragement in each step of preparation of this essay. The author assumes responsibility for its present content, however.

2 For the most comprehensive overview, see PRICE's "Introduction" in *Maroon societies*, 1973, pp. 1-30.

3 MADARIAGA 1945, p. 639. Translations made in the essay are mine.

4 DEBBASCH 1962, Part II, p. 118.

5 For the North American case, see PORTER 1971, and CRANE 1956; for discussions of the interplay between maroons, English colonists in South Carolina and later Georgia, and Spanish colonists in Florida. For Cuba, see FRANCO 1968, and PÉREZ DE LA RIVA 1946 and 1952, for brief discussion of relations between maroons, settlers, and pirates. English and French competion and alliance with maroons are described in ATWOOD 1791. DEBBASCH 1962, II, discusses European rivalries and alliances with maroons in the Guianas and other Caribbean locales under French influence.

6 GUILLOT 1961, pp. 168-170.

7 I will employ the term "settlement" activities to refer to those enterprises involving limited amounts of labor and capital, in which the allies of the maroons were typically engaged. I recognize full well that such enterprises include those of the early corsairs in the Caribbean, who, strictly speaking, never aimed originally at continuous, long-term settlement or subsistence in the New World. The pirates' activities in Panama are comparable to those of the Spanish settlers in Jamaica and Hispaniola, however, in the sense that these groups attempted to take advantage of gaps in the monopolistic schemes of European powers characterized by continuous large-scale capital inputs. I use the term "exploitative" activities to refer to these latter cases of large-scale inputs, often in the form of agro-industries. While "exploitative" activities or "exploitation" are ambiguous denotata, and while, too, all colonial activities contained elements of "settlement' and "exploitation," I believe we can draw at least some distinction between the two. With regard to the exploitation of slave labor, for example, one can point to differences between less and more "exploitative" activities, between what was required of slaves employed as ranch hands, on one hand, and as miners or plantation field hands, on the other. The former enjoyed greater freedom of movement, less supervision, and less repetitiveness in their everyday tasks than did the latter. Ranch hands, at least in the case of Santo Domingo, were also eligible to win their freedom after a few years' service on the range. The greater frequency of *marronage* from areas devoted to labor- and capital-intensive pursuits, than from those employing less capital and labor, or a less intensive regime, is one indication that greater exploitation of labor did indeed occur in Saint-Domingue than in Santo Domingo. See below.

I readily acknowledge, however, that it is more difficult to determine where conditions for slaves were most harsh among the recognized cases of "exploitative" regimes — whether these were to be found in Isthmian mines or bullion transport, or in the cane fields of Saint-Domingue and Pernambuco. In addition to actual physical labor, evaluation of the harshness of a slave regime must take into consideration slaves' day-to-day living conditions, their margins for independent action, and the accessibility of winning liberty, before firm conclusions can be drawn regarding the comparative intensity of systems of slave control. For a discussion of these themes see GENOVESE 1969, pp. 202-210.

8 I do not mean to suggest here, however, that any linear connection existed between the harshness of the "exploitative," labor- and capital-intensive regimes and the existence of maroon societies — or to the rate of the slaves running away. The factors contributing to the occurrence of *marronage* are many, and include indulgence on the part of slaveholders as well as punishments and the obligation to perform wearying tasks. The runaway communities discussed in the essay represent only one form of *marronage;* other maroons, especially skilled ones, chose to pass as free in urban areas where the availability of their skills often mattered more than the technicalities of their legal status. These individuals, moreover, ran away singly or in small groups, and rarely attempted to create new societies in inaccessible areas. The point here is that maroon communities did not flourish in "settlement" colonies where the overall slave regime seems to have been more lax. Where they existed, the fugitive communities grew in size and number until the perception of them as a threat to property and life prompted Europeans to reduce them. For a discussion of the relevant factors involved in the slaves' decision to run away, see PRICE 1973, pp. 3-4, 23-24, and 1976, pp. 6-29; WOOD 1975, Chapter 9; and MULLIN 1972, pp. 105-123.

9 CARNEIRO 1958, pp. 75-76.

10 KENT 1965, p. 171.

11 DE FREITAS 1954, I, p. 290; FREITAS 1973, pp. 85, 87, 132 *et passim*.

12 SCHAFER 1973, Chapter I, *passim*.

13 GUILLOT 1961, pp. 168-170.

14 FRANCO 1968, p. 96; WRIGHT 1932, pp. 16, 45, 49-50, 69, 110-111, *et passim*.

15 GUILLOT 1961, pp. 138-139. and Chapters 9-12, *passim*.

16 Viceroy of Peru to H.M., August 30, 1560, quoted in GUILLOT 1961, pp. 163-164.

17 See the statutes and programs for reduction of the maroons cited by GUILLOT 1961, pp. 136, 138, 165-166, 185-186, and Chapters 9-12, *passim*.

18 J. LÓPEZ DE VELASCO, *Geografía y descripción universal de las Indias,* 1574, cited in GUILLOT 1961; WRIGHT 1932, pp. 72, 150-151, 162; NICHOLS 1653, pp. 51-52.

19 MORGAN 1975, p. 13.

20 Cf. NICHOLS 1653, WRIGHT 1932, Introduction, xxxviii-xlv; GUILLOT 1961, pp. 171-175.

21 WRIGHT 1932, pp. 171-172.

22 ALONSO CRIADO DE CASTILLA quoted in GUILLOT 1961, p. 170.

23 WRIGHT 1932, note 1, pp. 121-122, 132-133.

24 WRIGHT 1932, p. 133, 150-151, 160, 177, 191, 201, 207, 211, 217, *et passim*.

25 WRIGHT 1932, pp. 235-239; GUILLOT 1961, pp. 191-192.

26 GUILLOT 1961, pp. 191, 299; WRIGHT 1932, p. 214.

27 WRIGHT 1932, pp. 240-241.

28 SARMIENTO DE GAMBOA, quoted in GUILLOT 1961, p. 169.

29 GUILLOT 1961, p. 195.

30 The role of Indians as third parties in relations between Europeans and maroons often seems to have been a crucial one, yet as a topic remains largely unanalyzed. It lies beyond the scope of this essay. Indians are mentioned sporadically in regard to the Isthmian maroons, for example, but references are so sparce that one cannot readily tell if particular fugitive communities treated neigboring indigenous peoples as allies, enemies, or both at different times. For a brief introduction to the question, see PRICE 1973, pp. 9, 15-16, and 19. Again Indians seem to have figured importantly in certain campaigns against Palmares, but the precise nature of their independent contribution to multi-racial relations on the Pernambucan frontier has yet to be analyzed. See also below.

31 The perspective presented here owes much to DENING 1975, and to MINTZ & PRICE 1976. See also PRICE 1973, pp. 14-15; FRANCO 1968, pp. 91-135, *passim;* and MASEFIELD 1925, pp. 85-102, *passim*.

32 PATTERSON 1970, p. 289.

33 MORALES PADRÓN 1952, pp. 270-271, 273-274.

34 The wish to obtain European clothing independently is shown in other instances. The Jamaican maroons attempted to kill the English with as little bloodhed as possible, so that the plundered garments would not be stained or infected with the diseases suffered principally by the Europeans. WRIGHT 1930, p. 143; TAYLOR 1968, pp. 98, 102, 149; SCHAFER 1973, p. 16.

35 TAYLOR 1968, pp. 102-103.

36 TAYLOR 1968, pp. 99, 102, 105-106, 163, 179 *et passim*.

37 PATTERSON 1970, pp. 284-285. WRIGHT 1930, p. 119, believed that the Spanish leader YSASSI was himself of mixed racial parentage.

38 TAYLOR 1968, pp. 185-186.

39 *Ibid.*

40 WRIGHT 1930, pp. 143-145.

41 TAYLOR 1968, pp. 190-192.

42 PATTERSON 1970, p. 297.

43 SCHAFER 1973, p. 22.

44 SCHAFER 1973, pp. 23-25.

45 TAYLOR 1968, pp. 190-192.

46 WRIGHT 1930, p. 144.

47 KENT 1965, p. 161. Given that networks of *quilombos* comprised the multi-settlement of Palmares, the Portuguese term "os Palmares" or the "Palm Groves," more accurately depicts the nature of the spatial arrangement of the black communities. The term "Palmares" is employed here, however, in accordance with typical English usage.

48 BOXER 1957, p. 36.

49 KENT 1965, p. 161.

50 KENT 1965, p. 164; CARNEIRO 1958, p. 50.

51 CARNEIRO 1958, pp. 60-61, 255-258.

52 ARTHUR RAMOS, cited in KENT 1965, p. 171.

53 SEBASTIÃO DA ROCHA PITAA, cited in KENT 1965, p. 170.

54 CARNEIRO 1958, p. 76.

55 Indirect support for the arguments advanced here can be drawn from comparable data on Hispaniola, where Spanish merchants and ranchers traded with the maroons who had fled largely from the French plantation in Saint-Domingue. See below.

56 FREITAS 1973, pp. 72-73.

57 FREITAS 1973, pp. 73-74, 85-90; KENT 1965, p. 171; CARNEIRO 1958, pp. 98-101.

58 CARNEIRO 1958, pp. 110-119.

59 FREITAS 1973, pp. 111-120.

60 The Overseas Council of Portugal, quoted in FREITAS 1973, p. 139, and pp. 139-142; CARNEIRO 1958, pp. 143-145.

61 FREITAS 1973, p. 139.

62 KENT 1965, p. 174.

63 DOMINGOS JORGE VELHO quoted in CARNEIRO 1958, p. 75.

64 DOMINGOS JORGE VELHO, quoted in CARNEIRO 1958, pp. 74-76; FREITAS 1973, p. 148.

65 KENT 1965, pp. 170-171.

66 CARNEIRO 1958, p. 122.

67 CARNEIRO 1958, p. 123.

68 CARNEIRO 1958, p. 145.

69 CARNEIRO 1958, pp. 124-125.

70 CARNEIRO 1958.

71 KENT 1965, pp. 173-174; FREITAS 1973, pp. 71, 87-88.

72 Observation made by KENT 1965, p. 170;

73 "Diario da viagem do Capitão Joã Blaer aos Palmares em 1645", included in CARNEIRO 1958, p. 256.

74 MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRE 1796, *A topographical descr. I,* p. 161.

75 It was commented as the time that "in the same space where a Spaniard installed himself in two days, 100 Frenchmen with 5000 Negroes could only do so in several years." Few statements resume better the contrasting French and Spanish approaches to "settlement." DEBBASCH 1961, I, pp. 72-73; MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY 1796, *A topogr. descr. I,* pp. 60-65.

76 GIROD 1972, pp. 25-27, 37-38; DE VAISSIÈRE, 1909, p. 165.

77 SÁNCHEZ VALVERDE 1947, p. 131 and note 170, pp. 142-144, 146, 169; KONETZKE 1962, Vol. 3, Part 2, p. 58.

78 KONETZKE 962, Vol. 3, Part. 2, p. 553; MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY 1796, *A topogr. descr. I,* pp. 57-58.

79 MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY 1796, *Descr. topogr. II,* p. 172. See also DEBIEN 1966, p. 30.

80 'DEBBASCH 1961, I, pp. 51-53.

81 The name "Las Minas" derives from the West African site from which the former slaves had departed for the Americas. MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY 1796, *Descr. topogr. II,* pp. 174-175.

82 MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY 1796, *Descr. topogr. II,* pp. 175-177; DEBBASCH 1962, II, p. 148.

83 DEBBASCH 1961, I, p. 73.

84 DEBBASCH 1961, I, pp. 80-81.

85 GUILLOT 1961, pp. 79-80.

86 MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY 1958, III, pp. 1131, 1135. See also MINTZ & PRICE 1976; *passim.*

87 DEBBASCH 1961, I, pp. 76, 108.

88 MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY 1958, III, pp. 1135-1136.

89 DEBBASCH 1961, I, pp. 187-190.

90 A powerful description and analysis of the role model of maroons for other blacks in Saint-Domingue is given in FOUCHARD 1972, Chapter 7, *passim,* especially pp. 450-462.

91 It is not implied here, however, that opposed, even warring, European factions never ceased hostilities long enough to show white solidarity vis-à-vis the maroons. As mentioned above, JOHN OXENHAM's men prevented one fugitive black from taking vengeance on a Spaniard, violating the Anglo-maroon accord. DÉCIO FREITAS cites similar cases arising in 17th-century Brazil. In one instance in Bahia in 1624-1625, a group of slaves fled to join the Dutch and fought well on their side. In the subsequent Dutch retreat, however, at least some of the blacks were returned to the Portuguese. The latter proceeded to quarter six of the blacks. In another case, Portuguese *senhores do engenho* of the 1630's asked for, and were given, arms by the "enemy" Dutch in order to suppress rebellious slaves in a Dutch occupied zone. See FREITAS 1973, p. 55. The *palmaristas,* it would seem, had good reason not to join either the Dutch or the Portuguese in their struggle for Brazil.

92 PRICE 1973, Introduction, pp. 1-30, *passim.*

REFERENCES

ATWOOD, THOMAS, 1791. *The history of the island of Dominica.* London: J. Johnson.

BAUER, RAYMOND & BAUER, ALICE. 1942. Day-to-day resistance to slavery. *Journal of Negro History 27* : 388-419.

BLASSINGAME, JOHN W., 1972. *The slave community : plantation life in the ante-bellum South.* New York: Oxford University Press.

BOXER, CHARLES R., 1957. *The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

CARNEIRO, EDISON, 1958. *O quilombo dos Palmares.* São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional.

CRANE, VERNER, 1956. *The southern frontier, 1670-1732.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

DEBBASCH, YVAN, 1961-1962. Le marronnage : essai sur la désertion de l'esclave antillais. *L'Année Sociologique, 3e série:* 1-112 (I:1961); 117-195 (II:1962).

DEBIEN, GABRIEL, 1966. Le marronage aux Antilles françaises au XVIIIe siècle. *Caribbean Studies* 6 (3) : 3-44.

DENING G.M., 1975. *The ethnographic past : culture contact study in the Pacific.* Unpublished paper presented to the Seminar in Atlantic History and Culture, The Johns Hopkins University, Sep. 23, 1975.

FOUCHARD, JEAN, 1972. *Les marrons de la liberté.* Paris: Editions de l'École.

FRANCO, JOSÉ LUCIANO, 1968. *La presencia negra en el nuevo mundo.* Havana: Casa de las Américas.

FREDERICKSON, GEORGE & LASCH, CHRISTOPHER, 1967. Resistance to slaverny. *Civil War History 13* : 315-329.

FREITAS, DÉCIO, 1973. *Palmares : a guerra dos escravos.* Porto Alegre: Editoria Movimento.

FREITAS, M.M. DE, 1954. *Reino negro de Palmares.* Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Editora Americana, Ministerio da Guerra, Biblioteca do Exército, 2 vols.

GENOVESE, EUGENE V., 1969. The treatment of slaves in different countries: problems in the application of the comparative method. In Laura Foner and Eugene V. Genovese, (eds.), *Slavery in the New World: a reader in comparative history.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, pp. 202-210.

GIROD, FRANÇOIS, 1972. *La vie quotidienne de la societé créole: Saint-Domingue au XVIIIe siècle.* Paris: Librairie Hachette.

GUILLOT, CARLOS FEDERICO, 1961. *Negros rebeldes y negros cimarrones (perfil afro-americano en la historia del Nuevo Mundo durante el siglo XVI).* Buenos Aires: Fariña Editores.

KENT, R.K. 1965. Palmares: an African state in Brazil. *Journal of African History* 6 (2):161-175.

KONETZKE, RICHARD, (ed.), 1962. *Colección de documentos para la formación social de Hispanoamérica, 1493-1810.* Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 3 vols.

MADARIAGA, SALVADOR DE, 1945. *Cuadro histórico de las Indias: introducción a Bolívar.* Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana.

MASEFIELD, JOHN, 1925. *On the Spanish Main* (4th ed.). London: Methuen.

MINTZ, SIDNEY W. & PRICE, RICHARD, 1976. *An anthropological approach to the Afro-American past: a Caribbean perspective.* ISHI Occasional Papers in Social Change 2. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues.

MORALES PADRÓN, FRANCISCO, 1952. *Jamaica española.* Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos.

MOREAU DE SAINT-MÉRY, MÉDÉRIC LOUIS ELIE, 1958. *Description topographique, physique, civile, politique, et historique de la partie française de l'isle Saint-Domingue.* Revised edition. Paris: Société de l'Histoire des Colonies Françaises et Librairie Larouse. 3 vols.

— 1796. *Description topographique et politique de la partie espagnole de l'isle Saint-Domingue.* Philadelphia: printed by the author.

— 1796. *A topographical and political description of the Spanish part of Santo Domingo.* Philadelphia: printed by the author.

MORGAN, EDMUND S., 1975. *American slavery, American freedom: the ordeal of colonial Virginia.* New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

MULLIN, GERALD W., 1972. *Flight and rebellion: slave resistance in eighteenth-century Virginia.* New York: Oxford University Press.

NICHOLS, PHILIP, 1653. *Sir Francis Drake reviv'd: calling upon this dull or effeminate age to follow his noble steps for gold and silver.* London: Nicholas Bourne.

PATTERSON, ORLANDO, 1970. Slavery and slave revolts: a socio-historical analysis of the First Maroon War, 1655-1740. *Social and Economic Studies 19:*289-325.

— 1967. *The sociology of slavery.* London: MacGibbon and Kee.

PÉREZ DE LA RIVA, FRANCISCO, 1946. El negro y la tierra, el conuco y el palenque. *Revista Bimestre Cubana 58* (2/3):97-139.

— 1952. *La habitación rural en Cuba.* La Habana: Contribución del Grupo Gramá, Antropologia no. *26.*

PORTER, KENNETH W., 1971. *The Negro on the American frontier.* New York: Arno and the New York Times.

— PRICE, RICHARD, 1976. *The Guiana maroons: a historical and bibliographical introduction.* Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

— (ed.), 1973. *Maroon societies: rebel slave communities in the Americas.* Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Doubleday.

SÁNCHEZ VALVERDE, ANTONIO, 1947. *Idea del valor de la isla Española* (edición anotada; original 1785). Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Montalvo.

SCHAFER, DANIEL, 1973. *The maroons of Jamaica: African slave rebels in the Caribbean.* Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota.

STAMPP, KENNETH, 1956. *The peculiar institution: slavery in the ante-bellum South.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

TAYLOR, S.A.G., 1968. *The Western design.* London: Solstice Productions.

VAISSIÈRE, PIERRE DE, 1909. *Saint-Domingue: La société et la vie créoles sous l'ancien régime, 1629-1789.* Paris: Perrin et Cie.

WOOD, PETER H., 1975, *Black majority: Negroes in colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion.* New York: Norton & Norton.

WRIGHT, IRENE A., 1930. The Spanish resistance to the English occupation of Jamaica, 1655-1660. *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (4th series) 13:*117-147.

— 1932. *Documents concerning English voyages to the Spanish Main, 1569-1580 (2nd series).* London: Hakluyt Society.

SCOTT V. PARRIS
Dept. of Anthropology
The John Hopkins University
Baltimore, Md.

NIEUWE WEST-INDISCHE GIDS

Abonnementen per jaargang f 35,— bij vooruitbetaling (giro 32.97.608 t.n.v. Penningmeester Stichting Nieuwe West-Indische Gids (H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen), te Bosch en Duin.

De kopy moet, in machineschrift, persklaar worden ingezonden, bij voorkeur in de Nederlandse of Engelse, bij uitzondering in de Spaanse, Franse of Duitse taal.

Voor boeken ter recensie alsmede voor alle zaken de uitgave betreffende, wende men zich tot drs. L.J. Westermann-van der Steen of Dr. P. Wagenaar Hummelinck, Laboratorium voor Zoölogische Oecologie en Taxonomie, Plompetorengracht 9-11, Utrecht (030-317241).

Bijdragen worden niet gehonoreerd.

Uitsluitend de schrijver is verantwoordelijk voor de inhoud van zijn publicatie.

The *Nieuwe West-Indische Gids* (= New West Indian Guide) is a direct continuation of the journal of the same name (formerly *De West-Indische Gids*) which until 1973 was published by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.

Subscription price per volume Hfl. 35,— incl. postage (surface mail).

Payment by international postal money order or cheque to Treasurer Foundation Nieuwe West-Indische Gids (H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen), Biltseweg 17, 3735 MA Bosch en Duin (Netherlands), *or* by transferring the amount to our account with the RABO-bank at Zeist (kantoor Den Dolder), Netherlands, account nr. 37.52.44.239 *or* to our account with the National Giro (nr. 3297608).

The N.W.I.G. publishes well-documented papers in Dutch and English, occasionally in Spanish, French or German. Authors should submit their manuscripts to the Editor, dr. P. Wagenaar Hummelinck, Zoological Laboratory, Plompetorengracht 9-11, Utrecht.

Offprints may be ordered at the author's expense.

GJB

ANTIQUARIAAT G.J. BESTEBREURTJE
Zinniastraat 38
3434 HD Nieuwegein
Holland
Tel. 03402-40941

Antiquarian books, in all languages, on

voyages, travels and expeditions
(America, Africa, Asia, Australia, Arctic and Antarctic)

geography

shipbuilding and maritime history

military history

and also
maps, plans and views

Specialising in books on the Dutch East- and West Indies.

Catalogues issued regulary.
Still available:
Cat. 2: Voyages, travels, expeditions, maritime and military history
(ca. 700 books and maps; illustrated.)
Cat. 4: will be issued in september:
Dutch East- and West Indies; voyages and travels
(ca. 1200 books and maps; illustrated.)

Cat. 2: Dfl. 3,50, cat. 4: Dfl. 4,- (foreign customers please add Dfl. 6,50 bankconversioncharges)
Postal account 4319068.

Please send us your list of Desiderata.

We are always interested in buying important single items or whole collections.

